THE SOCIAL POWER OF MIND
Introduction to the Theory of Social Pulsation

Electronic edition

Sarajevo, 2013.
IVO KOMŠIĆ

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Prof. dr. Ivo Komšić

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Prof. dr. Ivo Komšić

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Translation:
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Reviewers:
Prof. dr. Abdulah Šarčević
Prof. dr. Mile Babić

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1. Preface to the Theory of Social Pulsation

Instead of the Preface

This manuscript emerged from strange and surprising circumstances. The president of the Croatian National Council (HNV), Friar Luka Markešić, asked me to cite certain passages from my book *The Survived Country* for the purposes of the HNV, outlining the activities of this non-government organization, and publish it as a separate work. In particular, in the book I published in distant 2006, I mentioned the HNV in relation to some events of the war and ambiguous war activities, but also in relation to open and confidential peace negotiations; however, the meaning and function of the HNV in the process of stopping the war and delineating terms of peace, was never clearly defined. Particularly unclear and unexplained was the participation and influence of this non-government and non-political organization on the conditions of war, which were factually and formally completely determined and determining the subjects of war, presented in their military and strictly structured political outlook. The HNV was not legitimized by any means: it did not have its own army, it was not a political organization, and it did not have any money. The activities of the HNV were outside the existing power relations (be it military, political, or material), and the organization did not fit into the framework in which those relations existed. The activities of the organization were “insubstantial,” had little chance of success, and were delirious and dangerous for its participants.

In my decision to write this book, I was confronted with the following question: do history, and the interpretation of history, have a specific logic? What is historical research?

In order to answer these two questions we must first separate historical practice from the interpretation of history, or better said, from the method under which historical research operates.

The very application of methodology in the interpretation of history suggests that historical practice has its own logic – its own law.

However, we must separate history from its own interpretation. The very essence of interpretation commends meaning, order, and law; otherwise it would be mere recording of events and circumstances without their significance, preference, or cause. In that case, “free will” has the same implication as other circumstances in which it exists and functions; it is just one element of objectivity.

Historical practice cannot be interpreted through the logic of events within nature because nature is subjected to other forms of causality. Nature is not wilfully determined (even in theology, by the will of the creator, the established nature remains “good,” that is, it remains within the realm of general and universal causality) and objectively confined to given causalities; historical practice on the other hand is wilfully determined despite the circumstances in which individual “free will” has the appearance of objectivity and “necessity.” Historical agency denotes choice and decision; in other words, it is itself influenced by the cognition of given (or appointed) circumstances, the evaluation of those circumstances, the goals at hand, and the values that guide the agent. Historical cognition is different from that of nature because historical events involve choice and decision, while natural events do not.
Choice is a particular type of cognition not specifically determined by circumstances and the evaluation of those circumstances. The objectives governing choice do not have to stem from circumstances; they can lean towards other objectives and opt for means of implementation different from those chosen by agents. Objectives can be more or less clear, but their certainty does not depend on it. Also, certainty needs not derive from circumstance.

Choice has no self-certainty. No scientific explanation can elucidate choice, just as no scientific explanation can reliably explain the modus operandi of choice. The circumstances of choice and its historical influence are not scientifically grounded. Science is not essential to the function of history—historical practice cannot be deciphered (history itself is proof of this). Neither cognitive theory nor methodology improves the science of history or advances historical practice.

What, then, is the role of free will, the contingent, and subjective ideas in historical practice?

Is history a legitimate process, a cause and consequence understood only as an imperative sequence of development in typical phases of society?

This opposing relationship between free will and necessity within history derives from different interpretations of history, not history itself. If we understand history as a process, then it presents itself as a necessity and already contains the choice from which it derives; if, however, we understand it as a process of becoming—that is, something which has not yet been, and still harbors potential outcomes—then it is contingent and subject to free will. This opposition exists within the approach and understanding of history, and not within its treatment. In the concept of history as a process of becoming, the essence of historical practice is “free will” (history as “free development”); in the concept of history as that which has already become, the essence of historical practice is “necessity.”

To understand historical effects we must free ourselves from the preconceptions about history, otherwise we risk the aporias similar to that of Achilles and the tortoise. On one hand, history is perceived as a sequence of punctual events of free will whose effect is limited and intermittent; on the other hand, history is perceived as a continual process in which all free will is integrated despite being individual and representing only one element of constant continuity—in this case, history is perceived much like the natural process. If a decision regarding the effects emerges from defined and perceived circumstances—which should be the case—the effects then have the characteristics of natural events. In other words, effects have a cognitive certainty, and they are determined by calculable possibilities which derive from given circumstances.

Indeed, effects are never arbitrary and divorced from circumstance, or divorced from the “historical context.” However, if effects are an axiomatic sequence of probabilities and a function of historical constants, then it is part of the evolution of history which is more or less comprehensible.

However, we cannot perceive the effects of history as the wind in the sails of historical development; instead, we should see it as a choice of infinite possibilities which determines the direction of historical development. It is the choice and decision which alternates the characteristics of circumstance and which turns historical consistency into historical variability, and variability into consistency.

If involvement was the support of the existing circumstances as well as their direction toward calculable possibilities, then it would oppose the process of historical development and maintain its course—just in different modalities.

Through this misunderstanding between historical consistency and historical variability, which appear as “real” circumstances, there was a general delusion regarding political activism and estimating the possibilities of establishing national entities within Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992.
Those first “three seconds” of the Bosnian historical practice, which would determine the future of the country, lasted several months during which important decisions – with inaccurate estimates of existing circumstances – were made. Those inaccurate estimates were already hinted by the then leader of the HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) in the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mate Boban, later the self-proclaimed leader of the Bosnian Croats, the founder of the para-national “Herzeg-Bosnia,” and its president.\footnote{See more in: Komšić, Ivo. The Survived Country. Dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina - Who, When, Where. June 2013. Sarajevo-Zagreb: Synopsis.} He made it clear that historical circumstances already “established” the foundations on which the Croatian people would have the right to their own country within Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was not clear if it was a question of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina or Croats in general, which in that case would mean establishing one nation for both Croats in Croatia and well as those in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, that was not important at that moment, what was important was the evaluation of circumstances which made possible one or the other. Also, it was important that somebody made that evaluation and acted out on it. That conversation with Boban was after the formation of “the Croatian Union of Herzog-Bosnian” and before the national referendum on the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which means that HDZ, in both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (as parties in power in both countries), already made a choice and reached a decision regarding their role, and that the decision of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina about their country’s independence was already within the context of their objective; there was just one other “historical condition” which enabled them to reach their goal – the establishment of a Croatian nation within Bosnia and Herzegovina, be it independent or as part of the Republic of Croatia. When I asked Boban, who was at that time politically anonymous, what parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina he expected his nation to encompass, he cited half the country – from Kotor Varoš to Neum – that is, all the regions where Croats and Bosniaks (back then known as Muslims) collectively lived, regardless if they were the majority or not. Other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, those with a predominantly Serbian population and a combination of Serbo-Bosniak, would belong to Serbia.

Upon my remark that approximately half the new Croat nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be Muslim, and it would be important to know what they thought about it and if they at all agreed with such a division, he asked me bewilderedly “what Muslims?”

Those Muslims that declared themselves as such at the census a year ago, I answered. They don’t exist, was his answer.

That is when he began using immutable “historical facts” which determine the course of history in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

His first immutable “fact” was that the Muslims were not a nation and that they would easily assimilate as either Serbs or Croats.

The second “fact” was that those who refused would be forced to do so.

The third “fact” was that the Muslims would not have access to weapons in case tensions would arise, and that they were neither organized nor had clear objectives.

The fourth “fact” was that the international community would not intervene if it came to war, it would instead accept the “final resolution” of the Serbo-Croats as well as the dissolution of Bosnia and Herzegovina – which was anyways an artificial entity imagined by the communists.

On what grounds were these “facts” established and taken as historical constants on evidence of causality?

The first “fact” derived from an inherited opinion that Bosniaks were merely a religious group, they were not nationally conscious. According to that viewpoint, nations were formed in the 19th century, and Bosniaks missed their chance. Their religion was insufficient
to establish a national consciousness. During the last 15 years, since their religion was accepted as a national identity (until then they were either undecided, Serbian, or Croatian) there was no time – nor opportunity – for them to constitute a national consciousness as an autonomous entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina. If now, in these new historical circumstances and among new historical facts (of a Croat or Serb country in Bosnia and Herzegovina), they were in a situation to declare their national identity, they would opt for the line of least resistance.

To my question, what will become of those who refuse, his coldblooded answer was “they’ll be killed.”

Then, under the second “fact” of this historical consistency was the conviction that the threat of death would inspire the desired behavior.

The third “fact” emerged from the contemporary circumstances which witnessed the independence of The Republic of Croatia from Yugoslavia, and the subsequent establishment of a new national structure which included the military, police, as well as a security service, and that these services were well armed and organized. On the other hand, Milošević’s Serbia utilized the Yugoslav state apparatus and its military, constabulary, and informative structures, along with an enormous arsenal – that of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA). Also, Milošević had (the already formed) political and military structures of the Bosnian Serbs at his disposal.

With the formation of “Herzeg-Bosnia” and the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was an extension of the Republic of Croatia and Franjo Tudman, it seemed the Bosniaks were trapped and had no other choice but to join either their eastern or western neighbors. At that time, the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina just about collapsed, and the Bosniaks still had no military strength on which to rely on; they were in no position to personally defend themselves, not to mention the country at large. It was estimated that the defense of the nation (and it sovereignty) was improbable due to inadequate military strength and organization. Alija Izetbegović, at a certain moment, even gave the order for Bosniaks to join the HVO “because it was their army as well.”

Boban assured me that “it will all be over” before they even got organized. Their objective could not be the defense of the country but mere survival, in which case they would not be a political factor but a humanitarian problem. Behind that reasoning was the decision to use military force, which the Republic of Croatia had already assured by supplying weapons, military personnel, and logistics. Tudman and the leaders of “Herzeg-Bosnia” believed that they must capitalize on this convenient historical moment, and institute “Croatian national interests” and “the interests of the Croat people in Herzeg-Bosnia.”

The fourth “fact” was the international indecision and lack of unity on the subject of the Yugoslav dissolution. Members of the European Union, the United States, and Russia were administered through narrow national interests and mutually agreeable political positions towards Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Apart from enforcing an embargo on weapons in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and supplying observers of the war, these countries did not have a coalesced approach to ending the war and protecting Bosnia and Herzegovina from aggression, which by then was obvious. The west was prepared to sacrifice Bosnia and Herzegovina as a pledge to the annihilation of communism and the collapse of Yugoslavia as a communist country. It was obvious that the regimes in both Belgrade and Zagreb were privy to that information, formulating public opinion in their countries as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In a conversation with members of “Herzeg-Bosnia,” from

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2 See record from the meeting of the Croatian president Franjo Tudman with the delegation of the Croatian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the presence of Croatian officials, held in Zagreb, December 27th, 1991 – from Ciril Ribičić’s book The Genesis of a Deceit: Constitutional-Legal Analyses of the Formation and the Action of Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosna (Zagreb and Sarajevo, 2000).
December 12th, 1991, mentioned above, president Tudman referred to the stance of the State Department as prepared to “demarcate” Bosnia Herzegovina in the event of an agreement. Furthermore, it was clear that Tudman settled with the Serbian political representatives and it was only a matter of determining which “districts were Croatian” as well as if Bosniaks should get territory in the country at all. It was also clear that such an agreement did not exist with the Bosniak political representatives. Of course, the manner in which Tudman used the position of the United States government hints conspiracy, due to the un-verifiability of the stance. It was also the case that an arbitrary position of the most powerful nation in the world would become the foundation on which decisions were made and actions taken. The results of those actions would imply war, unspeakable crimes, depredation, deportation, and genocide.

All these circumstances, which really existed, and accounted for a cluster of historical events, were assessed and taken as resolute facts with cause and directed, desirable effects. The scrutinizers and the historical catalysts failed to understand that historical constants were not absolute; in other words, that their effect is of limited scope and that after a certain period of time it transforms into its own opposite. They hoped for a constant state they could establish which would eventually become the unchangeable social structure. They never seemed aware that “historical constants” become variable, and variables become “constants.”

This shift in definition happened with all “historical facts” under question.

Rousing and radicalizing national consciousness among the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in a manner of accomplishing a national agenda, resulted in rejecting Bosnia and Herzegovina as their native country, and instead imposing those ideals onto Serbia and Croatia.

Under those pretenses, the Muslims fixed their national consciousness onto Bosnia and Herzegovina, and not onto a religious identity. They changed their old communist name “Muslims” to “Bosniaks,” a name which suggests a collective territorial community. The greater the pressure on Bosnia and Herzegovina (the undoing of the country and the fragmentation of its territories), the greater and stronger the national identity. The fact that they were once undecided, or Serbs or Croats, was not only unimportant, but archaic. Precisely contrary to expectations: the relativity of the Muslim national declaration evolved into a historical constant, and Bosniaks converted into an unyielding national community with a clear national identity. That identity, before all else, was linked to a sustainable Bosnia and Herzegovina as a country and the total of its territory – the home of the people – and then the religion, tradition, language, culture, and everything else that makes a people a nation. Inversely, the Croats and Serbs of the country nationally identified with Croatia and Serbia and avoided the Bosnian and Herzegovinian identity – with rather grim psychosocial and political consequences.

The pressure, threat, genocide, did little to nationally deter the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, instead it united and enlightened them. The greater the pressure, the lesser its effect – it failed to cause the desired response. The potency of the pressure as a historical constant was in the end just another historical variable.

This was particularly clear with the “fact” of military organization, its capability and dexterity. It was particularly foolish to entertain the illusion that a political and military state and structure on which such thoughts were founded on, was fixed and unchanging. Without a historical exception, no military power survived the reaction it elicited, regardless of the state it established. Physics functions in similar ways – every action has a reaction. HVO, the military structure, was organized and maintained from Croatia, the HDZ even declared it the governing body of civil society, thus suspending the democratic process established during the 1992 elections. That is how this ruling party decreed a military state, or rather, how it executed a placid revolution on itself. They believed they were working on a permanently stable structure through which to enforce the political goals that stood outside the interests of
the elected civil agenda, together with the political representatives of other national groups and national parties. They indoctrinated a totalitarian military state which appeared more reliable and permanent than the unstable democratic government and its institutions.

I watched the process from up close. Wherever HDZ was in local power, all institutions were transformed into the institutions of the HVO. The first institutional victim was the inherited military and constabulary structure, from the headquarters of the territorial defense, which each district had, to the military territorial formations and the permanent police force reserves. Bosniaks were evicted from all those organizations and institutions, with the help of the military and intimidation tactics, and sometimes even with physical force. Artillery was brought before the headquarters and several shots were fired into the air, while the HVO soldiers – with their new uniforms and badges, pistols and Kalashnikovs – stormed the building and ordered all Bosniaks to vacate. That was usually followed by the raising of the “Herzeg-Bosnian” flag and the removal of all Bosnian and Herzegovinian remnants. It was thought that these actions assured the regime of the new order and the establishment of a new Croatian entity.

Bosniaks left, abased and effete, to some of their larger villages and there started organizing military and political campaigns. They were without uniforms, without weapons, without rankings that would symbolize hierarchy and discipline, they were without logistical assistance. During that time I could not convince a single HDZ or HVO member that their enemy would soon be very organized, very large, very armed, and disciplined, and that it will, above all, be very decisive and galvanized by the idea of Bosnian and Herzegovinian sovereignty. They could not foresee that a fight for their country would become a fight for their very survival. They believed that the conditions they imposed would remain constant and permanent. Their guarantor was Croatia, with its new independence and its subsequent confidence. The fact the Bosniaks were mustered without weapons, in jeans and sneakers, was understood as a historical constant on which to negotiate historical decisions and actions. Indeed, it was a manufactured condition with certain accord, which attempted to assure its longevity, but it depended precisely on the conditions on which it was established. At times the most arbitrary of things in history last a long time. However, some societies – and the power relations within them – are determined by their drive for self-sustainment, not by the current power elite. Independence stems from internal abilities and capabilities of a certain historical condition to sustain and rejuvenate its cardinal ends. Those ends must be desirable and generally embraced because they always involve the means and strategies that are acclimatized to its very nature. In case those means are based on force, pressure, or crime, the ends are erratic and unsustainable. They cannot be guaranteed by any external sources regardless of the power bearing down on them.
2. History as a Creative Act

Historical action is a creative deed, and history a creative act. It is the conversion of historical constants into variables, and variables into constants.

Historical action can be established on false judgement and choice; it can acquire self-certainties in a wrong way, but even then it alters the existing historical circumstances and creates new ones.

Choice and decision, as acts of free will, are not only parts of historical relations that possess the character of necessity. Free will is the force that amends historical relations and directs the process of development in one of the possible directions. It is not just one direction; history is an open multitude of directions, but choice and decision applies to only one. That one can be less plausible than the others; in what, then, is the given certainty of choice and decision? What is included in this understanding?

It is arranged and it encorporates several theoretical approaches:

1. Reflection on the given circumstances,
2. Evaluation of circumstances in their power of influence on the established state,
3. Reflection on the possibilities emanating from the given circumstances,
4. Veracious-cognitive value of conduct/action,
5. Morally-valuative character of conduct/action,
6. Possible historical impression of conduct/action – historical confirmation of correctness or incorrectness of conduct/action, or choice of method for achieving the goal, rather, causally historical notion of facts,
7. Abstaring all these procedures in order to reach a decision and to act.

Such a simple question: what do we do when we do something, all of a sudden becomes complicated and seeks a clear answer, because through all this disjointed conduct we still do not know if it will be good and if it can be justified in a reliable way. After all, choice and decision can contradict reason.

I refer to Max Weber, because he was the first sociologist who attempted to prove, along Husserl’s philosophical reasoning, the existence of particular logic of spiritual sciences and the meaning of cognitive theory in social sciences. His stand vindicates my inquiry about the logical (scientific) legitimization of practical political action.

“Our real problem is, however: by which logical operations do we acquire the insight and how can we demonstratively establish that such a causal relationship exists between those "essential" components of the effects and certain components among the infinity of determining factors” (Weber, 1949 : 171). This position keeps me convinced, as I have stated before, that an understanding of history and history itself (the product of events), also differ in that historical events include historical understanding; a scientific historical understanding is the realationship of conscious understanding to that which happened, even if it is not merely “repeated” history of understanding, because with that, history itself would be impoverished or presented in all its indistiguishable elements, without causality. Historical understanding is part of historical events – it is enriched by events. Historical events include this understanding, the practice of understanding which is inherent to history, which creates history. Scientific understanding avoids the uncertainty entranched in the foundation of history and its immediate consciousness, because it has historical experience before it, experience that transformes uncertainty into certainty, into causality.
Weber was concerned with the development of scientific understanding of spiritual sciences and its reliable methods. The goal of that understanding is the revelation of cause-and-effect relations, as the contents of scientific insight, that are not visible in the historical spiritual processes themselves.

The employment of that method includes “abstractions.” The first “abstraction” is the abandonment of the factual cause-and-effect of the course of history and its examination in an altered causal relation, or rather, in a different assumed causality. The “operation of abstraction” is possible only for science and its research because it is governed only by “facts,” historical events, and above all, notions. Only events are subjectively influenced, they are causal and do not know (do not comprehend) possibility. Historical science, insofar as it wants to be science at all, must be governed, according to Weber, according to notions and “because of that in the position to interpret and explain possibilities,” that is, also that which could have happened but did not, or everything that could have been.

The process of abstraction, which Weber introduces to the methodology of spiritual sciences, is just one analytic procedure by which to separate the components of immediate given conditions – a clutter of possible causal relations – and expand the actual causal relations through synthesis. “Even this first step thus transforms the given "reality" into a "mental construct" in order to make it into an historical fact” (Weber, 1949: 190).

Through this analytical process we designate and again assemble the elements of the existing given conditions, according to the rule of experience; that is, according to the rule of what happened, happened. “hence, that it can be determined what effect each of them, with others present as ‘conditions,’ ‘could be expected’” (Weber, 1949, 190).

Historical science, which is here “the judgement of possibilities,” is actually a cry for “rules of experience.” Without being acquainted with these “rules,” or rather, without these experiences, the science of historical science would be lost or become normative.

Weber adamantly insists on separating the science which deals with “abstractions” in understanding, from normative thinking and subjectivism. Empirical sciences must differ even from natural sciences, established on theoretical precepts, from which we analyse nature, and from spiritual sciences that begin from historical relevance and normativism. Historical fact cannot be taken out of the laws which were in any way presumed, nor out of some quantitative relationships that are characteristic, or applicable to, nature. Empirical science deals with qualitative processes. “The type of social science in which we are interested is an empirical science of concrete reality” (Weber, 1949, 72).

Empirical science must therefore be exclusively separated from the normative science that is established on normative judgements and ideals. Empirical science can determine that which was wanted in a given situation as well as that which might be, but never that which could be. Also, it can confirm the suitable means for achieving the established historical ends, in addition to estimating the chances of their attainment. That includes the criticism of the established ends as both meaningful and meaningless. The “cost” of each end can be determined – empirical science knows even that. However, it cannot determine the decision because it is not a direct historical understanding – an understanding that is part of the very historical event. Weber’s scientific understanding cannot reliably determine the proper decision to be reached in certain historical circumstances, it is not concerned with whether something should be done or not. It always compensates and institutes the notions which enable an understanding of historical facts. Comprehending the meaning of the historical power of ideas facilitates learning and critical judgement. The “ideal type,” as a result of scientific abstraction, is not the goal of understanding, it is the means. It allows an understanding of historical processes, a path to that standpoint from which the entire historical process acquires meaning. The “ideal type” is not the result of a thinking game, but a
development of a scientific notion whose measure of success – that is, its scientification – lays in how much we adequately comprehend the concrete phenomena in their relationships, in their causality and meaning. In the “ideal type” we have the given “is the conception of an effect which becomes a cause of an action” (Weber, 1949, 83). The trouble with Weber’s hermanuistic method is that it applies to the processing “subject” which eludes understanding because it presents a specific configuration and a particular constellation of action and direct comprehension that is sperete from this subsequent scientific understadning. Weber therefore assigns spiritual sciences the task of re-experiencing the understanding of spiritual processes. “The real reason is that the analysis of reality is concerned with the configuration into which those (hypothetical!) "factors" are arranged to form a cultural phenomenon which is historically significant to us” (Weber, 1949, 75). For Weber, historical experience as a given, or a subject of historical science, is the boundary of that science. The scientific consciousness of history cannot transcend experience and roams only within its boundaries.

It is about what I encountered at the very start – the need to separate historical science from historical action and its conscienteness. Science adheres to the completed subject; action, founded on the consciousness of the uncertain, only then develops its (historical) subject. Weber does not allow historical science to transcend the boundaries of experience, just as Kant does not allow the conscience to transcend the boundaries of the subject. In any case, analytical science is not able to exceed these boundaries because they are placed there in advance.

We are interested in investigating if it is possible, in historical action, to exceed the boundaries of the given circumstances and if the consciousness of that action allows it, insofar as it is of scientific nature at all.

The Consciousness, in its experience, does not account for the subject, individually, alone; it exists in itself, and conscience in its comprehension gains experience about it, and “changes” it, comprehending it as the untrue (making it true only when comprehended as true). However, when it is a question of a historical event as the subject of comprehension, it is not only the “result” of the experience of consciousness about it but a subject that equally comprehends; historical events do not possess the character of the subject of nature because the subject, in comprehension of historical circumstances, is simultaneously the agent of the event. Consciousness is scientific, despite being indifferent to its subject. History/event is the deed of comprehension, or rather, the work of the comprehending subject – performance does not have the character of the subject itself, but instead clearly thought-out tendencies.

I can justify this position by calling on Hagel’s experience of consciousness:

“For the real issue is not exhausted by stating it as an aim, but by carrying it out, nor is the result the actual whole, but rather the result together with the process through which it came about. The aim by itself is a lifeless universal, just as the guiding tendency is a mere drive that as yet lacks an actual existence; and the bare result is the corpse which has left the guiding tendency behind it” (Hegel, 1977, 2,3). In making decisions we not only solve the situation in which the decision is made, we do not only adhere to some drafted analytic and what is determined as means; the one making the decision addresses his own conditon, inquires about himself. The question about self actually becomes the deciding, fundemental question. It is not only a matter of understanding What (should be done) because it corresponds to truth, but also How (I exist) and Why (I act).

This further complicates and expands my intentions to a level I had no intention of exploring.
3. The Possibility of Knowledge, the Boundary of Performance

Under my topic, man develops through his decisions. How can philosophy direct us to those decisions – perhaps through analysis only, like hermeneutics?

Man makes decisions in a moment which takes time and eternity into consideration, not completely disposed to interpretation – reason. “Hermeneutics does not go beyond the formal indications precisely if in the situation of the decision is interpreted in its structuralisation, and the decision must be left to life itself – for example, religion or politics”3. Hermeneutics can know the “why,” but it cannot knowingly “affirm” the decision.

This understanding brings me to the beginning, to the life situation in which we make decisions and take action in relation to a medley of circumstances. What is it that prevails within us and says “do that.”? Are those great moral reasons, conceited historical aims, pragmatic ends, or is it fear, anxiety, somebody’s persuasion, or some erratic detail. This unrest brings me back to Aristotle because I believe he can acquaint me with the answer and deliver me from the need to have that answer be unique and unambiguous.

In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle elucidates the plurality of logos as law and truth. The theoretical (scientific), practical (philosophical), and religious truth pertains to the same reality – certainty and is found on the same planes. The theoretical, practical, and religious situations all demand, in their own way, a personal relationship with truth.

Aristotle merely delineates the problem, he does not resolve it, because he remains linked to his ontological position and not to the uncertainty of the circumstances in which decisions are made. Aristotle closely abides by his definition of being through four causes: causa materialis, causa formalis, causa finalis, causa efficiens.

His fundamental goal is to define the being of man through these four causes – this is the subject and ambition of philosophy as a discipline of wisdom. Aristotle’s metaphysics is the science of being, it is the “theory” of being for One and All. Therefore, as the greatest form of knowledge, it cannot reside in the uncertainty of practical life.

Philosophy is the understanding of the mind, and as that, the greatest form of understanding; practical action is rational and differs at the level of uncertainty. That is why its foundation and certainty must be searched for in the self-evident mind – Aristotle terms this, morality. Morality is the unity of mind with itself; it cannot find certainty outside of itself. To avoid the uncertainty of a practical situation, foundation or “security” lies in the individual who is certain of himself, it lies in something universal within him that belays unity with himself – in the mind, in the conscience.

Besides truth, does Aristotle note the probable (the possible)? Can the probable (the possible) be the subject of philosophy, and can it be known?

With Aristotle, that which is possible is possible in terms of notions, or in terms of necessity; in both cases, that which is possible is possible from some sort of activity; nature acts from necessity and from it emerges (grows and discloses) that which is possible; that which is possible in terms of notions does not belong to the possibilities of nature.

That which is possible in terms of notions must possess determination as a presumption for being; among animals there is passion, drive, and urge, among humans there is premeditated choice and free will.

When man has possibility and aspires towards something in terms of notion, he then forms with necessity; man forms only that which possesses possibility, and he forms it in a way in which possibility exists. We must therefore distinguish formations of those possibilities, given through mere motion (nature or need), from those that rest on the activities of the mind – they are not given by nature of that which is motile, or motile from something else. We must digress from Aristotle’s notion of the metaphysical being in order to get to action (energy), or the reality that is not given only in the possibilities; something is presented to action that was not given only as possibility. Movement or motion differs from action because it is linked to possibilities and does not possess the ends in itself; action is the “movement” that has the ends in itself. “Obviously, therefore, the potentially existing constructions are discovered by being brought to actuality; the explanation is that the geometers’ thinking is an actuality; so that the potency proceeds from an actuality; and therefore it is by making constructions that people come to know them” (Aristotle, 2005, 10).

Everything that pertains to the possible (“power”) also includes the opposite, in other words, the possibility of not being – the opposites cannot simultaneously exist (the true and the untrue, good and bad, useful and useless, etc.). “Elemental” beings relate only to action because they do not apply to possibilities – as the true and the untrue, being and non-being, etc.; if being is, it exists “such” as it is; if it is not “such” as it is, it does not exist – truth is being, untruth is non-being, however not as “adequatio,” but “such” as it reveals itself in being.

With things that are cognitive, that which moves is the form (causa formalis), and form is only in action (Aristotle, 2005, 298). Form is decisive for the being.

Does this “action,” which is only a part of the science of being (as causa formalis), have a fundamental and greater value outside of this science; does it, in things uncertain, present only knowledge?

Can Aristotle help solve the fundamental question I propose here: with what power of the mind can we overcome the limitations and uncertainties that the objective givens pose to action? Is the understanding of consciousness (as a science) the model for that?

Neither the subject of the mind (science) nor of wisdom is uncertain, but the subject of prudence (phorensis) is – it pertains to that which can be different and that which is possible. Prudence is the capacity of action that follows the truth of reason and achieves, for man, that which is good or bad. However, that which ought to be good or bad, becomes good or bad it its performance. From where does this good or bad performance stem?

The initiative of things done is in the intention of its doing. If the intention is not good, but instead pleasure or pain (either own or someone else’s), the very intention is hidden or distorted – pleasure or pain cannot be initiates since every vice ruins the ends.

“It remains, therefore, that prudence is a true characteristic that is bound up with action, accompanied by reason” (Aristotle, 2011, 120).

If prudence is “truthful and according to reason” – that is, in it we find the given truth because reason follows – then it is virtuous because untruth, or even the intention of untruth, cannot follow. That is why it differs from dexterity which intentionally err (confirming his eminence); dexterity cannot be virtuous.

If political action is defined as “the skill of possibilities” then it abandoned virtue and transformed into a form with its ends in its creator, and the possibility of existence in the given reality and its technical or social conditions.

That is what happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1990, with the introduction of political pluralism without an adequate social structure. A multi-party political structure
emerged while the old, single-party social structure remained. The newly formed political organizations did not possess the social affiliations of whose interests to represent. The communist social structure was very poor and was covered by the category of “the working people,” regardless of the social structure they belonged to. Even the clear social distinction between the peasant and the worker disappeared because in a workers’ country the peasants were reformed into workers and as such led a peasant-worker life that insured at both ends the social structure and a fair standard. The typical urban-rural clash dissolved while the workers’ security was nicely compensated with modest rural forms of ownership. The established social mechanisms of transfers, from one affiliation to the other, functioned well because they were guredoned by the communist socialist measures for free education, complementary scholarships, job security, etc. The ostensible urban class was already, by the first or second generation, rural.

The social stratification was established more on the professional rather than caste-class differences.

Too, the religious-national differences were inconsequential despite their existence. The communist system and its ideology did not allow idealization and politicization of religion and nationhood. The religious-national question, in the spirit of Marxism, was considered a bourgeois question and, in a workers’ state, relegated to the past. All political action, on the grounds of the religious-national basis, was considered ideologically unacceptable. Religious communities and their activities were sternly separated from the state and public life, confined to their institutions and private spaces. They had the freedom of expression only within those boundaries. Religious communities did not exist outside the religious institutions. Religion was the citizens’ private matter, abhorrent to the communist ideology. That also meant that religious individuals were second-rate citizens, and as such, had trouble accomplishing social promotions that were related to the ruling political organization. Religious individuals could not even be members of the organization, and each attempt of religious social action was sanctioned.

Thus, the newly formed political organizations, in 1990, did not express the interests of a social class and affiliations that would take a different stand in the social and national structure. National institutions were covered by the members of the party while the social organizations were the derivatives of that party, with specific and sometimes opposing interests – The Youth Organization, The Union Organization, and The Organization of the Socialist Union that amalgamated and adjusted those interests with the interests of the ruling party. Not a single newly formed political organization resulted from specific social or class interests, nor did it have a social structure. The League of Communists – The Social-Democratic Party of B&H (SK-SDP B&H), The League of the Socialist Youth – The Democratic League (DSS B&H) had in place the old ideological structure and an inherent generational rift.

Most of the newly formed parties had to develop their own social structure. That development was in fact the revamping of structures suppressed by communist totalitarianism. In order to reactivate those structures, there needed to be a reactivation of the values and interests on which they once functioned.

That is how, before the League of Communists, the opposing parties activated the national-religious ideologies and interests, and appealed for support from the analogous institutions – that is, the religious communities. On the other hand, their goal was to defeat the communist regime and oppose the communist ideology. The old values, disdained by the communist ideology of unity and brotherhood, collectiveness and multicultural organizations (from sports clubs to natural science circles), were summoned and called to aid. All that spread to every-day life, to the acquired habits, to the entire social structure. In such a situation, the architects of these new ideologies and the advocates of new forms of life did not
care to think about the consequences of the national structure of both Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. When I warned against this, just prior to the decision on the formation of a multi-party system at the Constitutional Court of B&H, 1990, I was subjected to heavy criticism, even threats, while I stood alone. At Court I asked how the newly formed parties would align their programs (nationalistic, religious, royal, and others) with the existing secular and multinational, as both social and national, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I emphasized that the national-religious political parties, in light of their fundamental interests, aspire towards the formation of their national entities, which means, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, three national states. I was clear and adamant that it was not a matter of cultural societies that would cherish their folklore, but of political organizations whose very existence elucidates their aims. I was vehemently berated, especially by those who, under the communist system, which was still active, took clear and profitable positions – some of them being the most ardent ideologists of that regime.

The nationalistic ideology, which did not have its own social infrastructure, was decreed by a single decision by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a new social and political entity, it begins its process of legitimization through tenacious propaganda and support provided by the religious infrastructure that previously roamed outside the political system. Without a single visible cause, it is the result of a decree, but it immediately takes upon itself the social causality – it becomes the most important social subject. The national-religious political organizations did not form in historical continuity, from some national-religious affiliations with particular social interests, instead they resulted from a swirl of a “magic wand” by the highest legal institution in the country. Only with that revelation do they charge at the existing social structure, with which they do not correspond and which is homogenized around the workers’ interests as universal political interests. The attempt by Ante Marković, then minister of the League, to preserve that interest by transforming public property into private property, was not successful. He was not supported by his contemporary republican leaders of social structures. Instead, they presented the “working class” with nationalist and religious interests as their principal interests. “The working class” took the bait, and in the 1990 election gave power to a new political structure which, by its raison d’être, was inherently opposed to it.

Thus, the social circumstances created by decree inherit the social causality, evoke the formation of a new political structure which then forms a new social structure and begins the process of forming a new national structure. The newly formed community and nation takes upon itself the new social causality – it becomes the source for formulating new social relations and new national movements. The national structures take upon themselves the paradoxical function of annihilating the nation itself. Citizens are no longer members of the social stratification, but a nation and a religious community. Their source of social liberty, their political subjectivity, is eradicated, and reduced to a collective affiliation, their civil consciousness is recast as the collective consciousness. The basic aims of political reforms in communist countries have failed at this question. The collective consciousness, earlier linked to the collective interests of the “working class,” is not liberated and transformed into civil subjectivity, but instead replaced by one great collective interest for another – the national – and then equated with it. That is how the sabotage of communist ideology, as a collective social consciousness, became its opposite – three collective (national) ideologies. That was the social consequence developed through the social cause, and vice versa. The expected consequence, in this shift of

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4Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina regarding the legalization of the political pluralism (multi-party system), the Republic Assembly of Federative Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 31.st, of July 1990. changed the Constitution amending, whereby all legally-formal conditions for multi-party elections were created. 42 parties joined the electoral race.
social causality, was the abolition of the social and national multicultural institutions. Parallel
with the formation of national political organizations we have the formation of national
cultural communities, or rather, the revamping of those that existed before the communist era.
It meant the deconstruction of multiethnic societies and associations, just as national parties
formed under the communist party. In most communist districts, entire communist
committees switched to national parties and became their new leaders. In the Republic of
Serbia, is happened under the republican communist leadership under the direction of
Milošević.

The conflict of the national parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, from the moment they
took power, was to determine who would take over the Republic for itself. The political
conflict grew into battle, an armed clash with an integral structure of war — ideological,
military, logistic, fueled by propaganda, etc.

That process became apparent when the nationalist ruling parties started ravaging the
existing national structure, but that knowledge came late even to those who opposed it.

Political parties assembled their armies, and then the armies became political subjects
that determined the relationship and the stand of political parties. The political influence was
transferred from one social affiliation to another stronger one.

The military clashes around Bosnia and Herzegovina, its status within Yugoslavia, its
future and inner structures, were formed by the alleged objective circumstances in which
political action is taken. They implemented the conditions for fabricating national states
within Bosnia and Herzegovina, and fought for their borders. The entire social-political
structure, formed after the election, in 1990, receded to the military. All citizens, despite their
religious or national affiliations, became a part of a certain military structure, be it mobilized
soldiers, members of the labor obligation, or civil defense. Political affiliation also waned and
lost their functionality because everybody was either part of HVO, the Army of B&H, or the
Army of RS.

All attempts to take political action were unsuccessful because there were not any
objective opportunities for that. The strength and force of the armies, their role and the
territory they controlled, was the basis of the so-called real-politics. Those without an army or
money bound to real-politics could not be a real political factor despite the ideas they pled.
Those who advocated against war as a possible solution to the political conflicts, and against
the objectives of nationalistic politics, were in particular disadvantaged. They did not have a
single social structure on which to rest. Individuals who attempted this were either mobilized
for the army or mandatory labor, or even killed.

The ostensible real-politics rested on a military structure that did not tolerate action
outside its control.
4. Action as Virtue

Action that derives from reason, in contrast to “real-politics,” is a moral virtue directly established on the integrity of choice, that again derives from the correctness of desire and the truthfulness of reason. For action to be virtuous, choice must be made according to the truth (of reason) and proper desire, because only then is choice worthy. Desire must strive for that which reason proclaims; on the other hand, reason is effective insofar as it is truthful. The good is given only in the truth that corresponds to correct desire. The aim of action, as a deed, as well as invention, is to do good.

There is no action without a link between thought and meaning because only the thought that is about something means something; thought alone, that relates only to itself, moves nothing. (Same applies to the created thought, because even creation applies to something determined, and not towards some general objective).

Man is the element of choice because within man is both the intellect and desire (the avid intellect, the rational desire).

Of course we cannot choose that which already happened, only “how something that admits of either existing or not existing may come into being” (Aristotle, 2011, 119).

“For prudence is characterized by the giving of commands: its end is what one ought or ought not to do” (Aristotle, 2011, 128).

In Aristotle’s analytic of state of choice that precedes action, reason and desire are the determining factors because they determine the ends. However, Aristotle cannot take the “truthfulness of reason” and the “correctness of desire” out of the very analytic of reason. In order for “truthfulness” and “correctness” to be justified, they must be action, elucidating action as understanding and its role in determining if the ends were truthfully or correctly stated. Reason, as a power of understanding (beside others), becomes truly comprehensible only as action. Aristotle, in his discussion on reason, will himself digress from its analytics and judge it from the actions of those we claim are rational. Answering the question “what is reason,” he asks who are the rational people, who are those who act; only by answering that question do we answer the question of reason. Through their action, people confirm if their objectives were truthful and their desires correct. With the statement of objectives, the truthfulness and correctness are merely presumed, their reality is confirmed only in action.

“On account of this, we suppose Pericles and those of that sort to be prudent—because they are able to observe the good things for themselves and those for human beings. We hold that skilled household managers and politicians are of this sort too” (Aristotle, 2011, 120-121). If Pericles did not confirm his national capabilities through action, he would certainly not be an example of reason. Only from his actions does it become clear that his thoughts are truthful and his desires correct.

‘Scientific” certainty of reason is conferred only with action. Action is the cognitive force of mind, in addition to the theoretical (analytically-synthetic) force, which is the focal point Aristotle presents. Insofar as we remain on the level on a purely theoretical understanding, we shall never transcend understanding itself. Action must be studied as a cognitive force, but a specific form of cognition, different from the theoretical. Cognitive action outweighs the subject to which it applies because it creates the subject.

However, the cognition of reason is not a separate, specific force of mind, but just another dimension of that force. The mind, in essence, exists as the sum of its forces because each force is just one dimension of mind which would, without its unification, be incomplete
and lost. Each force in itself is limited in its presumptions, only as the sum of their parts could they overcome boundaries and liberate the mind towards complete understanding. Analytic understanding is not capable of overcoming the subject to which it applies. That aptitude is possessed by another power of mind, one that develops its subject in accordance to an existance, and achieves the certainty of truth in its subject through action. The boundaries of each existance is overcome by an understanding that develops the new and the yet-non-existing. The existing and the non-existing are only then embraced within truth because it is the real comprehension of the power of mind in its entirety, not only one part.

Political action (economy and statemanship, according to Aristotle) as a phenomenon of reason, deals with all terms of reference in practical understanding. It is the unity of analytics and practice and, as that unity, also the vessel of its value of truth. Without it they would be, on the one hand, empirical (conservative), and on the other hand, a utopian consciousness, but in both cases, indolent and unproductive.

Political philosophy, as practical understanding, must posses its own concept of the political in order to take a side within a variety of different political options. For choice to be made and action taken, in Aristotle’s words, reason must determine what is “truth.” Without a previously determined conception of the political, there is no affiliation with political options, because there is no criterium for choice. It is clear that the conception of the political does not rest on universal truth, but stems from analytically determined boundaries of some existing state or its phenomena – “people,” “spirit,” “class consciousness,” “generation,” etc.

The political is therefore practical, it ensues from the “soul” – “the internal demension of existance,” according to Heidegger. But that is not the forged spirit as an organization of the ruling class – communists, nazi organized divisions of race or nationalist organization of nation, liberal organization of competative society, and so on. Politics must not be absolutized into total politics, spirit must not be instrumentalized because politics is not a technical mastering of life situations despite a metaphisical suicide within technology – total technology. “Philosophical deliberation must still try to learn from the detours of the past in order to free itself for difficult, yet altogether different, tasks of the future” (Poggeler, translated from Bosnian to English).
5. The Hermeneutics of Realization

Here I call on Heidegger, who equally struggled with the hermeneutics of acting (act). He had to isolate this phenomenon from “content” and “relation,” and assign it a different meaning. Action refers to an act, content to an object, relation to a distance relation. An act must be performed, on the self or another, thus it cannot be understood substantially, as an object. Hermeneutics, however, can interpret only the structuralism of an act – a life act, and cannot rise above it. It is formally indicative, but an act alone cannot explain, because within it remains something non-disposable, as it does in, for instance, faith. Philosophy, as hermeneutics, remains on formal denotations because it interprets situation of choice only from its structuralism, yet choice is actually left to life itself.

Heidegger does not venture further from this hermeneutic formalism. However, it is a matter of overcoming this formalism and establishing the hermeneutics of an act itself, in order to embrace the decisiveness within it.

The structure of the situation in which decision is made, and the subsequent action taken, does not need to be the decisive cause. Performance-action refers to something non-disposable that is not part of the situation. Aristotle, whom Heidegger goes back to, sees the situation of choice under variable causes but still does not reduce it to a moment and non-disposable. With Aristotle, reason is that which leads desire. Reason relates to the present, and that experience of time, because it maintains the Being as a presence. However, decision and doing occur in the moment that is not an excerpt of the present, nor can it be measured and quantified in linear boundaries of time. That “moment” can last for a “long time”, but it is a created moment of that time, not procured. It is the time created in the act and lasts as long as the act itself, its realization. It is that agony of creation that occurs only formally in a linear time, but the thing relevant is outside it and disregards it.

This sort of time is not defined by space and velocity by which that space is covered, as in physics. The moment of created time can last longer or shorter by the standards of physical time, which depends on the content of the act itself. This agony can last a “long time,” depending on the extent of the demand that the actor places upon himself. That time is a pulsating time, not linear, in a level or a line. The pulsation of that time is spherical, and its circumference can be either bigger or smaller. Indeed, that pulsation withers in action itself, loses intensity as much as the action withers in its own realization. This time has its varying cycles, of most and least intensity, even to complete lethargy. – This is when a new time ensues, a new “now,” with its own duration.

This time is usually expressed as a time of significant events – for example, time of Antiquity, time of the Enlightenment, time of capitalism, time of revolution, time of siege, time of reconstruction, time of transition, etc. These times can be measured linearly only formally, but they have the depth and breadth which are “measured” by the strength and effect of the event – by their viability. It is “one” elongated lifetime that has pulsed to a given limit and is now spent – then comes a new one, etc. These “news” of time do not have to continue through content and have an unambiguous continuum. The pulsation of one time period does not have to cause the pulsation of another. On the contrary, the other time period exists for itself, with its own presumptions and unpredictably. It can develop as a fracture of the previous but without continuity; it is not a sequence of “now” that follows one another. The pulsating time encompasses all three dimensions of time in one – the past, the present, the future. That pulse is their unity, their moment that lasts.
This sort of time was experienced in Sarajevo, from 1992 to 1995, in time of the siege. Restricted to a small area, without food, medicine, without electricity, water and heat, exposed to frantic shelling and sniper fire, time was not measured linearly. People did not know what day or date it was, there were no religious or public holidays. They lived in a moment between life and death and nobody knew how long it would last because such a moment was immeasurable in physical time. That moment was measured in suspense, explosion, and death. It was as big as the losses, torment, and fear. That moment stretched 1479 days. Those days were not measured by the people of Sarajevo; they were measured by those on the outside. The people of Sarajevo did not notice change in their drained and pale faces, nor the horror of death they saw and carried in their own hands – it was the others that noticed it about them. In order to see themselves and to measure time, they deliberately had to detach themselves from the state they were in, detach themselves from themselves, and just observe. That would suggest being outside the siege, outside one’s own life, and precisely that was impossible. Everybody lived in only one moment; some managed to survive that moment. It terms of content, it was immeasurable, remote, and unrepeatable.

Distinguishing between content, relations, and realization, Heidegger avers that truth is not given either in historical understanding, or in theory of history – the object of the science of history; truth is given in the interpretation of the historical being in terms of its historicity, or sense. This stance emerges from a philosophy that deals with the sense of being in general, not just a particular being, by which the positive, ontic sciences are barred. The reconstruction of the question of being is a general philosophical reconstruction of the question of the notion of man and all his phenomena.

Why is that question posed at all?

We ask for the meaning of that which makes being what it is. With that we do not primarily ask about the being as being, but about the meaning of what makes it what it is. This inquiry is actually that which makes the human being that what it is – that is his being. The being of man, therefore, is this inquiry and the projection on the sense itself. It is not enough for man to determine how being is, he goes further and asks: what is the meaning of that by which something is, including his own being? The being of man is given through his need to pursue meaning – he can understand that which is only if he situates it in the arena of thought. In order for sense, as being, to be separated from the accident of being, it must ask to whom the thought belongs: does it belong to being as being, or the very question? In other words, is the being of man given in the “tossing” of the sense to the Being of being, or does man discover this sense with beings?

The sciences, including philosophy, that give an answer to this question are in fact the modalities of the being of man. They are the capabilities of man’s inquiry into being in general, it is man’s Dasein. Man, in contrast to other beings, comprehends himself in being, in his inquisition; he is intelligible and fathomable to himself. “The ontic distinction of Dasein lies in the fact that it is ontological.” (Heidegger, 1996, 10)

This self-understanding is the certitude of being of being (man). The thinking of this “being of being,” its ontological nature, does not mean the foundation of ontology; for Heidegger it is pre-ontological – beingness in terms of understanding being. (According to this universal stance, the thought of the being of history is not the foundation of history, but the revelation of its meaning).

Inquiry, as being of man, and this capability of relating towards the being is existence; existence is “that” which man chooses to be – and that is a potential being of Dasein. “ The question of existence is an antic ‘affair’ of Dasein.” (Heidegger, 1996, 10). Man chooses his own existence, his facticity is his “innerworldness”; being-in-the-world is the heterogeneity of that innerworldness, just like manufacturing, elaborating, cultivating, utilizing, abandoning, undertaking, executing, understanding, questioning, interpreting, analyzing, deciding, etc.
Here, Heidegger does not yet make the Aristotelian distinction between creating and doing, but instead wishes to illustrate the foundational relation of being-in-the-world and define it through a single notion. That is the notion of Care. Care is the foundational characteristic (existential) of being of a Potential-being-in-the-world. The being of man must be made perceptible through care. Care and caring are, however, not perceptual understandings, but associations in the world as handling, using, which have their own “understanding.” This understanding is not theoretical but active, and is given as a previous state. We do not understand the traits of being through it, instead it is itself part of the structure of the human being and its encounter in the world; that is what appears in the encounters, utilization, and creation, and what emerges thematically only in the frame of determining man, as co-thematized.

Care is some previous active understanding that is not given through any notion, but in traversing and its results; only through it does being – the one utilized in making – becomes accessible and belongs to man as Dasein, and man discovers his own meaning.

The being of being that we use, and who in that utility is exposed, is Ready-to-hand. It is not accessible through understanding but through action, creation. “But association which makes use of things is not blind, it has its own way of seeing which guides our operations and gives them their specific quality. Our association with useful things is subordinate to the manifold of references of the ‘in-order-to’” (Heidegger, 1996, 65).

Theoretical understanding is guided by methods and creates its own methods, while association operates through guidance. A work being created is a type of tool of being, it bears the wholeness of instructions within which tools are encountered. It does not guide only towards what it is from, and what it is for, but also its creator and user, along with their world – it encounters that world. It is a type of action that generates sense within the created, which that meaning does not posses outside its creator.

Man is the ontologically-ontic I: I am with my being, while simultaneously another “I,” some “subject,” “personality” – an ontic fact. I as a “subject” asks for that Who – who is maintained in the alternation of standing and mood, and which is Identical, and applies to that alternation of both. This being (identical), in the heterogeneity of Dasein-in-the-world, must be searched for in the type of being in which the Dasein dwells in primarily and most often. That being is the encountering Dasein of Others; Dasein-in-the-world encounters Others who are themselves Dasein-in-the-world. Others are “also” there, being-with, “with” Others. “With” and “also” should be interpreted existentially, not categorically. Man’s world is a communal world. Man, as being-in-the-world, is a being-with Others. His intra-worldly being-in-itself is being with Others.

The encounter with the world and the Others is existential, not categorical, which means that the world and Others are not encountered theoretically, with some a prior understanding where the difference between Dasein and themselves is established. Dasein and Others also encounter one another from the world in which they are and towards which they relate as Care, and in which they relate toward-each-other; they are existences encountering things and themselves within the world – that is the phenomenal and factual state. The worldly encounter of man is elemental and factual, and applies to the encounter of man with himself as well; it is not some internal perspective on self, it is not an experience which could serve as a foundation and basis for other encounters. Man encounters himself primarily in the world – through that which he does, which he needs, expects, prevents, through that which he cares for; he is understood from the There of the Ready-at-hand world for which he cares.

Dasein of Others is not encountered as subject-individual, but in their being-in-the-world, in the existence – caring. This type of Dasein, existence (like with the Other) is not a characteristic being of being, but its existential determination which belongs to him by itself.

“The phenomenological statement that Dasein is essentially being-with has an
existential-ontological meaning” (Heidegger, 1996, 137).

Therefore, it does not mean that the Other constitutes the I only upon its encounter, but that the encounter itself is of significant determination, an existential determination. The significance of encountering the Other for the Dasein, and that the Other encounters it return, and that this encountering takes place through caring, belongs to its very nature. This existential determination of Dasein, as being-with, also applies when the Other does not factually exist. “The being-alone of Dasein, too, is being-with in the world” (Heidegger 1996, 113). The fact that the Other is fathomable, belongs to Dasein, just as Ready-at-hand belongs to it. Fathomable means understood. This reasoning did not evolve from understanding, but is the only possible manner of being for man. That is the nature of its existence; it enables understanding and knowledge; the Other is fathomable through a concernedness.

In the relation of caring toward being, or the being of Others, there is care in the realization towards the Others – a relationship of inequality between I and Others. That is the characteristic of being-with-one-another. Overcoming this “distance” (difference) occurs when Dasein is subjugated to being-with-one-another, that is, the existing state of within the world. That is one way of accommodating Dasein in being-with-one-another and depriving Dasein of being – being is brought out by Others. That is the equalization, or subjugation, of everydayness in being-with-one-another, in other words, the reign of Others. Belonging to everydayness is concealed by belonging to “Others,” but, it is about that which “is-there.” This reign of everydayness is not a concrete this or that, it is not someone, nor is the sum of all, it is the neutral “they” that is – enjoying, reading, judging, watching, thinking… This “they” is not determined, it is an imposed unobtrusive, and regulates the manner of being in everydayness.

The existential character “they” is the averageness, it is only concerned with the average, it is always average; this average watches over every exception. “Distantiality, averageness, and leveling down, as ways of being of the they, constitute what we know as "publicness." Publicness initially controls every way in which the world and Da-sein are interpreted, and it is always right” (Heidegger, 1996, 119).

This “they” deprives man of responsibility because it ordains and decides upon each consideration and decision in advance. The being of this “they” is nobody because everybody is Other, and is not that what itself is. Nobody does not mean Nothing, instead it is a type of being of Dasein as being-with – as ens realissimum, as “reality”; the loss of Self in the being of Dasein is a “reality” existence in which I and Other are Nobody. The “reality” is a loss of being regardless of its presentation as the “realest subject” of everydayness.

“This, whose being is “reality,” must therefore not be taken as Nothing, but also not as a “general subject” above most, above the set of being-with-one-another, as a relation of each individual Dasein.

The they-personality must be distinguished from real personality; the they-personality is the personality of everyday Dasein, in which Dasein is dispersed and lost. “It itself, in its everyday kind of being, is what initially misses itself and covers itself over.” (Heidegger, 1996, 122). It is about the being of an actual personality that is lost in the everydayness, but not disappeared. In contrast to that, the real self-being is an “existential modification” of They.

How does this “modification” take place, how does I overcome the everydayness, how does it regain its Self-Being? How is sameness, as the being of everydayness, overcome within the being of identity I, which permanently maintains itself in heterogeneity?

(This “sameness” is completely contrary to “identity” I, yet both are presented as being of Dasein, as two existences).

Man discovers his meaning in time. Articulation of the eventfulness of man as such is historicity; it is his temporal manner of existence. This historicity comes “before” history
proper, as world-history event, because history cannot occur without the participation of man – man therefore belongs to world history. Historicity constitutes the existence of man, man is always in his ownness (sense of history). History is only made possible by the activities of man, with his temporality.

In that sense, man is the past, it is always in it and “subsequently” acts within him, drags behind him, or rather, goes before him as an event of himself. Man occurs from his own future which is actually this historicity as the past. Man understands himself out of such an event – a past which belongs to him and which he “inherits.” From understanding the historicity of the past a possibility of man’s existence reveals itself.

“Its own past and that always means that of its "generation" – does not follow after Dasein but rather always already goes ahead of it” (Heidegger, 1996, 18).

For man, a (personal) historicity can be hidden and unrecognizable, just as it can be revealed and nurtured. But only by questioning the meaning of self is the question of all events posed, history itself as the temporality of man. However, subordinating to tradition, to which man is susceptible, he looses a sense of its understanding and formation – he forfeits to the “surrender” that distorts the “origin.”

Temporality (time) is not (analogous to some existence); it produces itself, provokes, takes it to maturity, and thusly enables the authenticity of existence. Only in temporality does Dasein accomplish its authenticity.

Authentic temporality is the future because it matures – it is “produced” from it. The future is the primary phenomenon of time since only it, through its being, awakens with the past and creates the present. The future is that cleared space, a “processed” space in which man supervenes upon himself as his personal Potentiality-of-being. Temporality is the genuine condition for the possibility of care as the existence of man. Time is not outside man, as something prevalent towards which man relates or in which he exists; time makes the man, “conquers,” clears while becoming authentic; that time is the future because only it can be “conquered,” only within it can man arrive to himself; that is not possible with what was or what is because is is the only future that man brings forth to existence.

For Heidegger, that which is Before-the-Self is founded in the future, that which already is, is revealed in the past, Being-With…is made possible in the present, which means that the basis of existence is the future, the foundation of facticity the past, the former, and the foundation of decay the present, or rather the contemporariness. “Dasein does not first fill up an objectively present path or stretch "of life" through the phases of its momentary realities, but stretches itself along in such a way that its own being is constituted beforehand as this stretching along. The "between" of birth and death already lies in the being of Dasein” (Heidegger, 1996, 343).

This “stretching” is the occurrence of Dasein, it is the temporalization of temporality, that is, “production” of time – and that is the birthplace of history. “The analysis of the historicity of Dasein attempted to show that this being is not "temporal " because it "is in history,” but because, on the contrary, it exists and can exist historically only because it is temporal in the ground of its being” (Heidegger, 1996, 345).

The sense of Dasein – care – is to “produce” time, to eternally clear the “space” of its occurrence, to lead into existence its future, the Whole-Potentiality-of-Being. “Factually, Dasein always has its "history," and it can have something of the sort because the being of this being is constituted by historicity” (Heidegger, 1996, 350). In other words, historicity constitutes Care, or, Care is (one of its methods) the concretization of the historicity of Dasein. The notion of what Heidegger calls “forward-running resoluteness” is the sense of occurrence of Dasein, given in temporality. The moment Dasein, as a subject, takes over its own facticity and confronts it with that which it could be, with the future, with the conscience, it gains its rightness – its existence; it “resoluteness forward-running” from his functionality

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and unjust existence, he takes responsibility for the *situation*.

Heidegger pauses at this point of analyzing “forward-running resoluteness” which is the decision for the *rightness* of existence. The subject understands the situation: it understands the factual “There” and the (Can-Be) Potentiality-of-Being which approaches from the future, but from this existential understanding it cannot come to that on which it truly decides, nor to the open possibilities of existence. Both one and the other remain incomprehensible because the subject cannot achieve the certainty of its decision, or the certainty of the possibilities which are open. That certainty cannot be attained in an analytic-theoretic manner.

“Nevertheless, we must ask whence in general can the possibilities be drawn upon which Dasein factically projects itself?...Is taking over the *thrownness* of the self into its world supposed to disclose a horizon from which existence seizes its factual possibilities?” (Heidegger, 1996, 350).

Heidegger avoids this *cul-de-sac* by opening the possibility for existence that is outside the Thrownness-Into-the-World, and that arises with the decision that the factual possibility is grasped through succession.

Confronted with death, the existence decides on its finitude and takes *fate* upon itself. Only with this confrontation and with this finitude does the Self evade the inexhaustible heterogeneity of the offered possibilities, and reduces them to the simplicity of its fate. Deciding upon its fate, the Self (nevertheless) chooses possibility, which is, truth, succeeded, but within it reinstates itself for itself.

The Potentiality-of-Being, or the future, is here not understood substantially but formally because “substantially” is that which is determined as succeeding and not as temporal, which clears and usurps as own-most.

Since the event of Dasein is fate, and it, as a Being-in-the-World also, exists as Being-With Others, then this event is a With-Event, and Heidegger interprets it as destiny. “With this term, we designate the occurrence of the community, of a people. Destiny is not composed of individual fates, nor can being-with-one-another be conceived of as the mutual occurrence of several subjects. These fates are already guided beforehand in being-with-one-another in the same world and in the resoluteness for definite possibilities. In communication and in battle the power of destiny first becomes free. The fateful destiny of Dasein in and with its "generation" constitutes the complete, authentic occurrence of Dasein” (Heidegger, 1996, 352).

Heidegger, therefore, associates the correctness of existence with the events of the community – generation, people, or rather, the participation within it. Since the possibilities are not attainable (nor uncertain) analytically, nor can the choice be theoretically justified in a given situation; the subject is left with “free” action in its destiny, in the event of the community. The choice of such an action and existence are “insured” only if the being of that being is founded already in death, guilt, conscience, freedom and finitude; only with all these within the self, the subject is historical and its own fate.

“Only a being that is essentially futural in its being so that it can let itself be thrown back upon its factual There, free for its death and shattering itself on it, that is, only a being that, as futura is equi-primordially having-been, can hand down to itself its inherited possibility, take over its own thrownness and be in the Moment for “its time. “Only authentic temporality that is at the same time finite makes something like fate, that is, authentic historicity, possible” (Heidegger, 1996, 352).

However, the future and death are only formal confrontations of the subject with itself, only the possibility of returning the subject to its Thrownness and departing from it are formal. That departure lays in the choice of taking over the inherited fate, either the people’s, or “generational.” The formality of future and death reminds the subject on its finitude and
restores it to that finitude. The being of its historicity is given in the fact that it places itself in
the inherited, despite having the freedom of choice. Choice emanates from finitude and not
from some comprehension, because the finitude of being is the history of Dasein. “Authentic
being-toward-death, that is, the finitude of temporality, is the concealed ground of the
historicity of Da-sein” (Heidegger, 1996, 353).

Heidegger’s “forward-running resoluteness” comes down to choice in tradition, in
inheriting, and presents faith in the repeated. Even though it is not about bringing back “Past,”
nor associating the present with “the Survived,” but about reclaiming the possibility of former
existence, this “reclaiming” cannot compare with that power of Potentiality-of-Being of the
future. Future and death function as a pressure for finitude to be accepted as being and for
historicity to be recognized as that being. Possibility (the Potentiality-of-Being) comes down
to revamping former existences, down to the choice of “heroes,” “personal heroes,” and thus
walking out of the Everdayness, out the Fall. “The occurrence of history is the occurrence of
being-in-the-world…With the existence of historical being-in-the-world, things at hand and
objectively present have always already been included in the history of the world. Tools and
works, for example books, have their "fates"; buildings and institutions have their history.
And even nature is historical” (Heidegger, 1996, 355). Nature as landscape, an area of
inhabitation and cultivation, as a battle-field or cult-place, etc., as Things-at-Hand/Objectively
Present, territory of people and not something for-itself, as history of nature itself.

Man is worldly historical. That means “the world” is not something outside man but in
existential union with him, as events of the world and the events of man. The Ready-at-hand
and the Present-at-hand, are likewise the events of man, and by that alone, they are historical.
“The historical world is factically only as the world of innerworldly beings” (Heidegger,
1996, 389).

Ready-at-Hand and Present-at-hand have their own nature of engagement in use – in
that which happens to them. It is not a question of mere things that change location, but of
that which stimulates events. The same applies to historical events. However, historical events
lack the ontological structure present in the “events” produced by Ready-at-hand and Present-
at-hand, in, for example, in goal-instrumental action. This “ontological structure” is only
possible insofar as only the Ready-at-hand and present-at-hand have the symbolic strength of
“personal events,” or rather, the initiated event. “Nevertheless, we may
venture a project of the ontological genesis of historiography as a science in terms of the
historicity of Dasein” (Heidegger, 1996,392).

That science rests on the resolution of the world-historical subject that makes its
existential stability. “As fate, resoluteness is freedom to give up a definite resolution, as may
be required in the situation. Thus the steadiness of existence is not interrupted, but precisely
confirmed in the Moment. Constancy is not first formed either through or by "Moments"
adjoining each other, but rather the Moments arise from the temporality, already stretched
along, of that retrieve which is futurally in the process of having-been” (Heidegger, 1996,
391).

The future is the substantial, that which is inherited and stretches from the past as
possible, that which can be repeated. History, as a science, is sketched in the historicity of
Dasein. History enables Dasein the openness for “monumental” possibilities of human
existence, which Dasein then adopts through repetition. In this repetitive adoption and
consideration of possibilities, Dasein maintains the “have-been-there” existence, while the
existence that already-was, becomes the statement of the substantial and sketched possibility;
it is the only certainty in the defense of possibility. “Da-sein temporalizes itself in the unity of
future and the having-been as the present” (Heidegger, 1996, 397). In that case, the future is
formal and the past a substantial possibility of existence whose being is temporality, as a
notion of the being of care.
For Heidegger, “conquering” time, “manufacturing” time, is not considered a clearing and stamping down the way towards the authenticity of existence in the undetermined possible, but a “coercion” of joining the future-formal with the past-substantial in the Now-Today. The past is insured from the future to present, the future-possible is insured from the past and does not remain “empty.” Stepping away from the Everdayness of Now, from Thrownness, the return to real history is given in the unification of this future and past in the present, which is the real temporality of existence. “As authentic, monumental-antiquarian historiography is necessarily a critique of the ‘present’” (Heidegger, 1996, 397).

Can man be accessible and reasonable in his wholeness and his rightness?

Care is the structure of the whole man. It relates to that in-front-of-itself that shows that man exists for his own sake. As long as man is, he relates to his Potentiality-of-being, to that “in-front-of” which can be. The structure of human being is uncompleted because new possibility always arises, the unsettling of the Potentiality-of-being. As long as man is, he is never settled, he is never “whole.” If he was to achieve this, as a being he would not be able to experience it, he cannot be “concluded,” he cannot empirically experience his end, his death.

Does death possess certainty outside the empirical?

Death is certain as an end, and it is simultaneously undetermined – the “when” is not known; it is most personal to man because of this, one cannot relate to it empirically, it is part of man’s existence as an undetermined. Man is always towards-death, lives and acts as though he is towards-death, as though he is at the end. Since, the end is part of his being – it permits him to a Whole-potentiality-of-being. To an end, which permits man to be-in-wholeness, man does not act in approaching death through his departure; man is Being-towards-his-own-death, it is always part of his being, part of his is.

Man, in his being, is always Towards-death, and that is not associated with empirical death. The Authenticity of existence consists in being (thrownness-in-the-world) towards-death. Inauthenticity of being (Be) means escaping death. Being-towards-death means being authentic – that is one existential possibility of man.

However, man is most often in the Unauthentic existence towards-death – being-towards-death. Then, question: can we come to the Authentic being-towards-death, to the sought wholeness and Authenticity of man’s existence? Is that the question of understanding, or is Being-towards-death, something greater than that?

Being-towards-death means being towards the Possible – a readiness towards some Possible and the care about its realization. This is what man must resolve within himself. In the surrounding world, in the realm of the Possible (Handiness) and Ready-at-hand, man always encounters possibilities. Man attempts to achieve the possible through Attunement – the earnestness of care (execution, preparation, modification, etc.). Earnestness has the character of relevance.

The relationship towards death, being-towards-death, cannot have this character of relevance – it is not the care for earnestness. Death as the Possible is not some possible Handiness or Ready-at-hand, instead, it is the possibility of man’s being, of his existence. The earnestness of that possibility would deprive man the base of his existence towards-death. But man, in whatever manner, need not distance this possibility from himself, or be in the periphery in thinking (or even pondering) about it, and reduce the possibility of that Possible. On the contrary, man must always be in such a way as not to lessen that possibility; he must be the Understanding as possibility, and kept as such – without disruption, and intact. Since the possible is expected – earnestness is awaited, and in this expectation there is a “digression” from the Possible and the search of a stronghold in Reality. Without the Expecting, it would not be expected. It is expected from Reality, and emanating from it, the Possible exists in the manner of expectation and is engrossed in Reality.

Being-towards-possibility (death) means the “anticipation of this possibility”
(Heidegger, 1996, 242). In this “anticipation,” man discovers and comprehends himself to himself because he discovers his possibility – he projects himself onto his own Potentiality-of-being, he exists in such a way. “Anticipation shows itself as the possibility of understanding one’s ownmost and extreme potentiality-of-being, that is, as the possibility of authentic existence” (Heidegger, 1996, 242).

This “anticipation,” in the most personal possibility of man, permits an exit from “They,” from being lost in the mediocrity and ruling opinion, from the Everydayness. The analysis of the phenomenon of death is essential in displaying the manner of overcoming Everydayness.

Death exists for man only as an existential experience, not in the least as an empirical experience. It is a possibility which is not empirically associable, nevertheless it is empirically most personal – that is the Potentiality-of-being which is not there, but merely an experience of understanding, and, as such, part of Reality. “The non-relational character of death understood in anticipation individualizes Dasein down to itself” (Heidegger, 1996, 243).

The “experience” of death, as the limit of possibility, allows man to always prevail over his own attained existence and guard him against falling from itself and its Potentiality-of-being. Too, that “experience” allows an understanding of the possibilities of Others, and saves him from an inaccurate interpretation of the possibilities of Others. The “anticipation” towards the unsurpassable possibility (death), allows man to attain all possibilities which precede experience and generally anticipate the entirety of its being – the Whole-potentiality-of-being. “Being-toward-death is essentially Angst” (Heidegger, 1996, 245).

The original phenomenon of Dasein, by which it affirms its own authenticity – the return of they-self into the authentic conscience – is a call on ownmost inauthenticity. (ibid)

The call of the conscience is a call towards the ownmost Potentiality-for-being of Self, a call upon man in his ownmost possibilities.

Is it possible and sufficient, with existential experience of death and conscience, to overcome the falling into “There,” into everydayness? Does this fundamental experience of man, which changes man, have an effectively objective, significant change in Being-in-the-world?

The falling of man into everydayness must not be perceived as fatal; it is precisely with existential experience of death and conscience that man overcomes, or delivers himself from it, regaining his distinctiveness. However, falling is the fate of man, just as fate and possibility are in its overcoming – man arrives to such a state of his existence through fate in order to retreat from it; in order for man to raise to his distinctiveness, to his actual existence, he must experience unauthentic existence – the falling prey. Man is what he is only as a completeness of that experience.

Is consciousness possible if man is falling prey?

Does that mean that the call of conscience emerges from the fall alone, from that experience? Or does it emerge from that which is possible? How does man attain the possible from which the call of conscience comes, if he is in the everydayness? Does it mean that existence is always divided between that which is and that which is possible? Where does the certainty for the call of conscience come from? Where is it affirmed if man is falling prey, while the possible is still not? How can that which is not yet possible vouch for itself as the possible? If man can call forth his own Self, how could he have lost it in the everydayness? Or, is this duality in man his fundamental experience? Might not this experience of ownmost possibility always be the immanent, unfinished project of the ownmost, which permits perpetual measure of existence with itself?

Man’s freedom is present in this element of possibilities. In a free relation towards the possible-being, man overcomes his own fall, which is dual – the fall in the physical (Handiness/Hand-at-hand), and the fall into the world (everyday, they-reality). This first fall
transpires as goal-instrumental, the second as value-rational. Freedom is overcoming one and the other. Freedom is the release from the conditional – the foundation in himself. Freedom is not an action by or through something, it is the action itself. It does not occur in the goal-instrumental or value-rational action, it occurs in the action itself – the action by which it occurs for itself. That is the will that relates to nothing outside itself, except itself. That is the will that wants itself; I always want to be willing, I only want that will because it is the foundational experience of I. Freedom is that willing because it is unconditional and founded in itself. Freedom is the dignified I, an ownmost need to be free. Only from a foundational experience of freedom is this invocation possible for the ownmost to be safe and secure; only from this experience is the conscience as warning of unauthentic existence possible, and the existential experience of death as an existence at-death.

Heidegger rejects the possibility of duality in Self, which would simultaneously include existence, the invoked, and the invoker. “Dasein calls itself in conscience” (Heidegger, 1996, 254).

Dasein cannot simultaneously be the invoker and the invoked. Dasein is differently “there” as the called-upon, than as the invoker. The call emerges unplanned and opposite of expected from me, but over me.

It does not come from some Other who is in the world with it. That is not the voice of some “other,” some particular power which is executed like that.

“The call attuned by Angst first makes possible for Dasein its project upon its ownmost potentiality-of-being…

Conscience reveals itself as the call of care: the caller is Dasein, anxious in thrownness (in its already-being-in . . .) about its potentiality-of-being. The one summoned is also Da-sein, called forth to its ownmost potentiality-of-being (its being-ahead-of-itself . . .). And what is called forth by the summons is Dasein, out of falling prey to the they (already-being-together-with-the-world-taken-care-of . . .). The call of conscience, that is, conscience itself, has its ontological possibility in the fact that Dasein is care in the ground of its being” (Heidegger, 1996, 256).

The call of conscience invokes both the manner of Being-in-the-world as well as the manner of Being-with (being-already-in), because both manners of Dasein are in Angst. The call, then, is neither one or the other manner of existence in the fall, that which already is, but that which is possible, that which conditions the Possibility-of-being of factual existence. The call offers no information on events, nor does it come from there, it is not the correction of events. The call comes from discomfort, from the Angst of factual existence of Dasein that is given in the fall. “The call directs Dasein forward toward its potentiality-of-being” (Heidegger, 1996, 259).

The call is always a call of an individual being, its Potentiality-of-being. The call is not the ideal and general Potentiality-of-being. That is why it is founded in care and conscience as the existential experiences of the Self – of Dasein.

The exit from the fall, an alternation in the manner of existence, is given only as Self-possibility of disclosedness of Dasein-in-the-world and with-others. It does not exist as some “objective,” ideal, or some other “general” possibility (scientific, moral, political, religious, etc.). The call of conscience, as a possibility of overcoming everydayness, does not come from them – that possibility and its achievements occur only as factual existence (of man). The call “forward k” is the call back to k to that which is possible to comprehend as the fall; from it emerges the call, from its uneasiness, its Angst. The call emerges from guilt and the confirmation of that guilt.

However, a question remains: where do we draw the idea of guilt from, if not from the interpretation of being of Dasein? In other words, who says how we are guilty and what guilt is?
Also, how do we establish the call, how does it achieve its notion? It cannot be from “guilt,” it is not just a formal opposition to it.

The call, even as the notion of guilt, could be understood only from the being of Dasein. Neither is guilt insufficiency, nor is the call the repeal of thus understood guilt – some sort of warning and agreement. Guilt is not guiltiness towards something (some fulfillment of the responsible, obligation toward others, etc.): guilt is the source, and from it emerges guiltiness.

Care, as the being of Dasein, includes: facticity (thrownness), existence (project), and entanglement. All these beings of Dasein are simultaneous; in being, the being does not belong to itself – ownmost – it is the Potentiality-of-being; existing, it cannot arrive behind its thrownness, behind its existence. Existence is the existence of where one is thrown, and Dasein cannot relieve itself from this thrownness and return to its ownmost being. Dasein is always its own “it is”; existing as being it is the foundation of its own Potentiality-of-being. “And how is Dasein this thrown ground? Only by projecting itself upon the possibilities into which it is thrown. The self, which as such has to lay the ground of itself, can never gain power over that ground, and yet it has to take over being the ground in existing. Being its own thrown ground is the potentiality-of-being about which care is concerned” (Heidegger, 1996, 262).

“Thrownness” is the basis of existence, its being is the Being-in-the-world and being-with-others. On the other hand, the being of Dasein is the Potentiality-of-being, or rather, that which is its possibility. However, Dasein is not determined from this Potentiality-of-being, but from its foundation, the existential – thrownness. This means that Dasein is never in command of that which is its ownmost, and that it is always ordained from its foundations.

The existential notion of thrownness is this NO. That which Dasein is Not, that “nothingness” is what constitutes it, what constitutes its thrownness. The resolve by which decision is made on the exit from the loss of They, is limited by the facticity of thrownness. “In resoluteness, Da-sein is concerned with its ownmost potentiality-of-being that, as thrown, can project itself only upon definite, factual possibilities” (Heidegger, 1996, 275).

Being-in-the-world, its thrownness and fall, if not already – the talk about them – led by some “idea” of existentialism and its validity? What is this “talk” founded on, and where is this certainty of existence drawn from, if its foundation is the “facticity” of thrownness and falling? “The idea of existence which we have posited gives us an outline of the formal structure of the understanding of Dasein in general, and does so in a way that is not binding from an existential point of view” (Heidegger, 1996, 290).

Dasein, therefore, possesses a “postulated sketch” of existence that is formal and nonobligatory, that does not have to be existential but that is still the foundation of understanding Dasein. This “sketch” is the fundamental difference between existence and reality because it is the one presupposed idea about being in general. If we arrive at the idea of being through the understanding of the existential Dasein, how do we reach this understanding from the viewpoint of the “sketch” and its presuppositions? To understand the existence of Dasein we must presuppose the idea of being, and to reach the idea of being we must begin at the existence without presuppositions. How do we solve this circle?

For Heidegger, this “circle” means: “the idea of existence and of being in general is ‘presupposed,’ and that Da-sein gets interpreted ‘accordingly’ so that the idea of being may be obtained from it” (Heidegger, 1996, 290).

However, it is not a matter of consequence here that something ensues from something else or that something can be deduced. This pre-sentation (presupposition) does not have that logical function. It has a function of “projection of understanding” – which is the invocation of uttering only that which is worthy of being stated, “so that it may decide of its own accord whether, as this being, it will provide the constitution of being for which it has been disclosed.
in the projection with regard to its formal aspect?” (Heidegger, 1996, 290).

Passing through Heidegger’s hermeneutical facticity of life, his historicity oriented towards his disinclination of the moment, a new disposition of time is reached from that experience. That experience can only be described by the concepts expressing its character and not by fitting it into general categories where it occurs. The factual life is not determined externally, neither structurally nor categorically, but concentrated on an own world that is becoming self-understandable. Despite how incomprehensible and specific Heidegger’s concepts in that (self)understanding may be, they are the concepts of facticity of life that in their experience become historically transparent to themselves. Concepts: Dasein, existence, care, Ready-at-hand, Present-at-hand, are concepts describing the manner of man’s positioning in the world. These concepts unveil the dimensions of that positioning towards subsistence, towards the tools and symbols which man invented while mediating subsistence, directly or indirectly interacting with others. Through the facticity of these relations, man becomes visible to himself; this type of understanding is neither observational nor theoretical, but instead active, stemming from an interaction between the self and other. From this self-understanding emerges an understandable relation towards subsistence, be it about “falling” or “authentic” existence.

Going through Heidegger’s concepts of life experience, we pass over an open history book and an own-historical facticity. Uncertainty and “care” is same within us all, with the same drive to “found” them and make them certain. Of course, it is clear that this certainty does not occur subsequently, nor can it be subsequently justified through understanding. Only within itself must experience bear its certainty and become justifiable through action. The basic disposition of that experience is uncertainty because it is unrepeatable; it takes place in a moment that does not have potential for repetition. With such reading of Heidegger we can conclude that we are incessantly in the void of self-consciousness and history. It explains the personal torment that accompanied my entire experience. On one hand, I began in experience from my academic position, from my habit of deducing history from reason; that is why it is the exegesis of reason, even if we did conceived it as a fact of reason. On the other hand, I began from experience itself, trying to find reason, law, and order within history. How else would it be possible in historical chaos – volunteerism, contingencies, extremities – to “find” Law, and how to avoid being, in an inverted order, repeatedly subject to the power of the general, as mere executioners, free of all responsibility. My entire experience is obsessed with the question of reconciling these two – how to individually determine responsibility for what was done, and not slip into chaos, not distance reason from history. A conflict always waged within me between those who logically ponder, and those who politically act. I studied people with weapons and criminal faces (hatred emanating from their eyes) decorated in religious garbs – crosses and beads – people who called on God while simultaneously advocating and carrying out crimes. They most certainly never heard of Plato, or Aristotle, or Descartes, or Kant…My problem was the problem of a professor. I strove to legitimize and explain to my students the political action, and social action in general, through some principle, be it Plato’s spirit, or Aristotle’s lawfulness in an altering reality that is received with a unique ability of reason (phronesis), or Descartes’ self-founding ratio, or Kant’s transcendental reason.

As a professor I insisted my students should know the understanding of reason within history; as a political actor I was acquainted with action which could not be legitimized by anything, yet it called on highest principles, even Law, Proclamation, and so on.⁵

In those situations, in the middle of such “history,” and with a professor’s burden to

justify everything, one usually loses his head, or keeps his head and loses his mind. I was saved by the fact that I still read Aristotle and Kant, trying to explain everything to myself (I tenaciously read Kant’s *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone* with the intention of uncovering the secret of “inclinations” in people); in my professor’s naivety I wanted to find “God’s finger” in the behavior of the most incorrigible criminals. On the other hand, I was in the middle of people’s capriciousness, arbitrariness without collateral and justifications which could only be attained through pragmatic cunning, without law and order. The legitimizing power of mind stops here, and if used, one looses his head.

But what then remains of philosophy? Is it a lesson in idleness, in a history where nothing happens, a history below itself? Both Plato and Aristotle, among many others, at some point had to save their heads yet still did not waver in their thought – their intellectual justification. Not everything can be accredited to chaos, non-understanding, and malicious nature of individuals. There must be some thin thread that links everything together: licentiousness of the people, a malevolent nature and an incapability of understanding according to a plan by which everything is attained and unified.
6. The Power of Practical Social Science

I must again return to the question of how it is possible to scientifically legitimize knowledge of historical events, or as Weber says, “concrete cultural phenomena in their connection.” In other words, is scientific historical knowledge possible, like a scientific knowledge of history is for Weber?

Weber, with the “ideal type,” overcomes the undefined historical content, yet allegedly justifies it. Rather, he is not concerned with the impact of direct historical knowledge on the historical content, but more with its understanding of the “concept.” It is a conceptual construct (Gedankenbild) which is neither historical ‘reality’ nor even the ‘true’ reality. It is even less fitted to serve as a schema under which a real situation or action is to be subsumed as one instance. It has the significance of a purely ideal limiting concept with which the real situation or action is compared and surveyed for the explication of certain of its significant components. Such concepts are constructs in terms of which we formulate relationships by the application of the category of objective possibility. By means of this category, the adequacy of our imagination, oriented and disciplined by reality, is judged” (Weber, 1949, 93).

Thus, the “ideal type” is not an intelligible subject of mind, it is merely a methodic postulate, an instrument of knowledge and a measure of truthfulness of the “object” which is measured against it – it cannot induce or inspire the practical mind to action.

Weber is aware of the theoretical and methodological dangers that emanate from both the “naturalism” and “rationalism” of knowledge. On the one hand, they are the “naturalistic bias” that in the understanding of history determines the historical being as a Procrustean blanket through which it constantly maintains itself and which, stringently, obeys every effort of free will to decide and persist. On the other hand, it is the overstatement of ideas that, behind history’s back, determines history as its real strength. The term “ideas” often implies some collective conscience that rules over the masses or social groups as a part of their “cultural peculiarities.”

Weber clearly distinguishes the logical structure of “ideas” from concepts from historical reality. “Ideas” spread from some “directional settings” or from postulates of morality, while the historical process from psychological and social condition of the people. The ideal-typical nature of “historical synthesis” is especially evident when the “theoretically directional settings” disappear and no longer reside in the heads of people, and the “ideas” that were historically “fundamental” die out.

The ideas “liberalism,” “socialism,” and so on, are clear ideal types that have the same features as the synthesis of “norms” of some economic epoch from which we begin. “Ideas” are merely conceptual means of comparing and “measuring” reality in relation to them, and as such they are efficient and valuable means of research, and not ideals which we should strive towards or which should direct us towards historic actions.

But, Weber cannot avoid the proposition that “ideas,” consciously or subconsciously, are ideal types, not just in the logical, but also the practical sense, or forms that contain that which in some sense should be – that which is common and permanent in it. In that sense “ideas” are not just logical tools for comparing and “measuring” reality but also ideals which worthily evaluate reality – “ideas” in that sense are valuable judges of directional character.

Between these two concepts of “ideas” Weber makes a principle distinction which must not be overlooked.
For him, this ideal type is logically perfect – it is not value judgment. It is simply naive to believe, although there are many specialists who even now occasionally do, that it is possible to establish and to demonstrate as scientifically valid ‘a principle’ for practical social science from which the norms for the solution of practical problem can be unambiguously derived” (Weber, 1949, 56).

This knowledge cannot be established neither on the opinions of the people and their human “weaknesses,” nor on ethnic norms and immutable values, or, rather, the “principles” and “ideas” from which a concrete historical structure could be drawn from or applied to.

A self-evidence of regulatory value measures does not exist, or rather, intelligibility and justification of some goals themselves, despite how valuable they might seem – alleviating poverty, for instance (through social care and so on); every goal posed at the moment of becoming a practical problem becomes contested because it enters the realm of general cultural affairs – it is part of some opinion about the world. “We cannot learn the meaning of the world from the results of its analysis, be it ever so perfect, it must rather be in a position to create this meaning itself” (Weber, 1949, 57).

Politics is practical action, producing events, institutions, social relations; it is not just any action – spontaneous, extracted, accidental, etc. – but an action with intent, that is, a meditated, rational, action of mind. That is an action of conscience which demands accountability; it is not established just on knowledge, nor just miracles, it is a willful affair – that “I want this now,” regardless of the assumptions, possibilities, or impossibilities; it is the conviction that everything is possible, even when is not.

That action does not apply to just anything, but to that which is general, social, and national – to their formation and erection of new institutions, to the establishment and implementation of political decisions and ideologies. This action incorporates the establishment of ideas and ideologies (action from beliefs), selecting or creating the means of implementation and the method of their achievements.

Its truth is neither theoretical nor factual, but based on events; everything that can be theoretically confirmed and reasoned gets its value of truth only through action; that value of truth is neither structural, nor axiomatic, nor legal, but emerges from the reality of the event, from its singularity and its un-repeatability. For this truth to have immanent infinity, the identity and communitarian persuasions and legitimizations must be abstracted from it. It cannot be supported by any previous procedure or anything communitarian, otherwise it cannot historically supply the structure for its process; it is simply open and “offered” to all, and that cannot be limited by any affiliation.

It is of course not irrational nor “miraculous” because it does not exist prior to the action through which it is carried out; no external identity relates or influences it. It is entirely subjective and subsumed by no “law” because it is affiliated with disclosure through development. It is not some enlightenment but a process that gains its certitude from the fidelity to events and not some state of affairs and current situation (legal, ideological, etc.).

The starting point of truth is neither the whole nor the exception of the whole, neither the totality nor the symbol, it is the event as it is – a-cosmic and “illegal.” Truth does not occur in the discourse of a random ruled and obedient, but in openness and freedom – it is neither prophetic nor “philosophical.” That which is declared through action, that which happens, disposes neither with evidence nor counter-evidence; it has neither the empirical nor the historical designation. The event does not belong to the order of the factual that could be interpreted or falsified, proved or refuted, it is simply an opening for something new, a shift in the relation between the possible and the impossible. It claims it is possible to win factually – to win against death. That is the possibility of every subject, to go from the particular to the universal. The participant of the event is the one who names this possibility that depends
neither on knowledge nor order, but on the value of the event. The participant does not need to know anything, but he divulges to others a taciturn or impossible possibility.

Analogously, that is how, for St. Paul, Christ is the question of possibility of a new subject and a new direction, not a question of knowledge. No knowledge of method can resolve this. An event is not an intermediation of something else – neither factual nor knowledgeable. An event is bare and a new direction in itself, it is a clean start.\(^6\)

A revolution, for instance, is not a means to lead to something else, to some other state – it is in itself a sufficient action of political truth.\(^7\) Reality is not that which finds its place within some state or basis of knowledge, nor that which corresponds to Law on the basis of designated exceptionality; reality is the sole event. The applicable real is an illusion; the truthful real occurs through event, it has neither prophetic nor argumentative assurance.

I think I got close to an answer. We must focus on a political event as an object because, as an action that develops a social and nation community and its institutions, it involves several levels of knowledge. First, it involves a theoretical understanding (analytical-logical) which relates to an existing object and which can be deemed phenomenological – an understanding of an “object” as it is given to consciousness. However, when it is a question of society and nation and its institutions, it is not only a matter of objects as objects but also the intentions that guide an understanding towards these institutions; they cannot be separated from the means by which they were established.

Second, intentionality of understanding affected by the intentions of existing institutions has another inter-junction that is affected by the appointment of new aims, which is the consequence of the previous understanding. New goals are appointed as upgrades of the existing ones which have been proven insufficient, seized to act and lost their practical meaning. Their understanding is the knowledge of that which could be, and it is only possible as a wholly different type of understanding. The problem that presents itself is the relationship between these two levels of knowledge, one limited by the “object” and the other which goes through that “object” and which is only presented to itself as unlimited. Is that “limitlessness” merely the “skill of the possible,” or just another not-yet-existing, or is it a wholly new construction of (un)certainty – its cutout?

This problem brings us back to Aristotle and his practical knowledge which determines the action and the means of achieving that which delineates theoretical knowledge, and which practically transcends the limits of phenomenological knowledge. This knowledge is rigorously concerned with the goals that are intended for knowledge because the procedures and resources must conform to those goals. Only through a fusion of these levels of knowledge can the field of uncertainty be overcome.

Practical knowledge, in its application of procedures and resources, determines if the analytically-logical knowledge is truthful, and if its goals are justly posed. The truthfulness and virtue of knowledge is not determined theoretically because theory can procure its persuasion. That persuasion is achieved only in the unification of all levels of knowledge through practical action, which in turn declares the truthfulness and virtue of knowledge. That which is unenforceable or that which in action gets corrected, is revealed as untrue and incorrect, and is perceived as such.

Action, as knowledge, is the unity of phenomenology as an analytical and productive utopia.

It seems that the nature of the theoretical (analytically-logical and phenomenological) knowledge is clear and coherent, with its influence and limits, and that the problem with practical knowledge, or knowledge of action, remains open.

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6 See more: St. Paul, to Romans 4,13 and 7,6; Gal. 3,2 and 3,23, to Corinthians. 3,6.
7 For Marx communism is not a state. See more in: Private property and communism. 1844, Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts, , „Early Works“, translation 1967. Zagreb: Naprijed.
The answer to the nature of knowledge derived from action is still unclear. Does it also have only the rationally-pragmatic power, without the possibility of proclaiming new apodictic courts?

Here, it is as if we lack a particular cognitive power which could represent a synthetic power of mind, the unlikely possible which comprehends the intentionally posed goals, not towards the existing object but towards the imagined possible from which it then returns to the existing object and comprehends it in coalition.

I must find my answer in Kant, or at least portend, because he understood the practical power of mind as the knowledge of action – virtue and reality of knowledge is proven through action, not theory.
7. Cognitive Power as Practical Power of Reason

When discussing object-existing and its certainty, Kant separates it from both the sensibility (phenomenon) and the concept (noumenon) – that is, the manner in which it appears to cognition. The representation and concept are forms with logical power of uniting the a priori sensual versatility into conscious unity. Concepts and categories, as pure forms of reason, have a task to compare the sensible “object” with the thing in itself, and with the “beings” of reason – noumenon – or rather, with themselves. They are forms of use of reason in relation to thought and the object in general, and not a capacity by which to imagine or determine the object. Kant rejects these possibilities because pure concepts of reason cannot represent a type of knowledge separate from sensibility. "Observation" of the noumenon, as a rational being, would be an intellectual observation, where noumena would take the role of "objects," which is not possible considering that they are given as negative, not possible. The concepts of reason are forms of thought for sensible observation, and are not useful beyond that. The synthetic power of mind is not applicable outside the field of possible experience because synthetic perspectives emerge only in the application of categories’ sensible diversity, with the subsumption of given sensory content. Outside that field, the categories are empty and transcendental, and their transcendental application is not possible.

However, categories are not arbitrary; even though they do not supply the foundation for positive knowledge outside sensibility, they determine the limits of sensibility, of existence.

True, concepts can be divided between the sensory and the intellectual, but things and the world cannot be divided between phenomena and noumena in the positive sense - that is, as two separate and irremovable worlds. The sensory world exists as a unique world with a comprehension of that world, i.e. the world and its understanding are unified in reason itself, despite being separate in concept. Knowledge is the unity of the world, and the concepts about the world, while simultaneously an understanding of the boundaries of concepts and the world (sensibility). Without concepts, the heterogeneity of sensibility is not knowledge; without sensibility, categories are empty and pure forms without positive determination. As intelligible, reason is only a limit of sensibility, not a positive object on which to present. An attempt at understanding this intelligibility as an object, would not lead to any discursive knowledge of categories, but intuitive un-sensible “observation.”

“With us understanding and sensibility can determine an object only in combination. If we separate them, then we have intuitions without concepts, or concepts without intuitions, but in either case representations that we cannot relate to any determinate object” (Kant, 1998, 352).

In order to exceed these limits, we must step into a different type of power of mind – into its practical power – which is active-cognitive and which is, on the one hand, the reason for the existence of the very objects, and on the other hand, the basis of will itself as pure reason. Practical power of mind is a type of knowledge which is the reason of object existence, with a power of causality in determination of will and the object of will. This knowledge does not require experience (sensibility) as proof of its certainty, nor can it be theoretically self-evincing or deductible. The theoretical function of reason remains powerless against it.

This understanding, for Kant, is the understanding of moral law as a principle of deduction of freedom and the causality of pure reason. Moral law cannot be deduced
theoretically because it is the principle of deduction of freedom. Practical concepts *a priori* produce reality themselves towards the things in question – inclination of will – and they do not need perception to gain significance.

“For if as pure reason it is actually practical, then it proves its reality and that of its concepts through the deed, and all subtle reasoning against the possibility of its being practical is futile” (Kant, 2002, 5).

Practical reason affirms its reality and “the reality of its concepts” through action, not theory (which is limited by the very power of theoretical reason). The power of practical reason is the power to prove freedom as a possibility outside the boundaries and antinomies of theoretical reason, which cannot vindicate the causality of freedom but instead disappears in the chain of causal correlations, outside which freedom cannot be demonstrated, but merely imagined. Freedom, as a un-condition that conditions, can acquire its affirmation only through action because action is part of its reality and the reality of its concepts. For theoretical reason it is problematic – that which cannot be thought.

Only with real freedom, which is also active, and which proves its reality under the apodictic law of practical reason, other concepts and pure ideas of speculative reason (God, immortality), acquire their reality and objectivity, their existence, “that is, their possibility is proven be the fact that freedom is reality.”

A guarantee for the possibilities of notions of God, immortality, and freedom, are not found in the theoretical use of reason but in the practical, moral use.

Reason that is “purely” practical suggests that its power is practical, that it understands itself as that power (for will and action sake), and justifies itself through action. Its boundaries do not derive from self-understanding and they are not theoretically determined, but from the boundaries of action, boundaries imposed on will.

Practical reason, as the action arising from pure freedom, overcomes the limits which theoretical reason set itself (in order not to fall into delusions and antinomies); that which cannot attain its reality theoretically, because it neither has the object to which it relates nor the sufficient proof of its truthfulness, now attains it through action. “All other concepts (those of God and immortality) that, as mere ideas, remain unsupported in speculative reason now attach themselves to the concept of freedom and acquire, with it and through it, stability and objective reality. i.e., their possibility is proved by freedom’s being actual, for this idea reveals itself through the moral law” (Kant, 2002, 5).

Without the reality of freedom we would not have the opportunity to “meet” the moral law within us: freedom should, therefore, first exist in order for moral law to be known; in that sense, freedom in an *a priori* idea of speculative reason despite its inability to be known theoretically as some being in-itself. Only a free being can be a moral being.

The will is conditioned by maxims that determine it subjectively; when conditions of subjective will (i.e. maxims) are revealed as valid for the will of all beings, that is when the condition becomes objective, or gains the power of practical law. Therefore, the practical principles by which man acts can be both maxim and law, depending if they apply as subjective or objective, general. If these principles are within the subjectively accidental conditions, they are maxims; if they are without them, they are laws because they are concerned with the will outside the natural as well as subjective causality. Practical law is *pure law* since pure reason, within itself, is sufficient grounds for determining will.

In theoretical understanding (of nature), the principles of that which happens are simultaneously laws because that understanding is determined by the properties of the object. In practical understanding it is a matter of the determining reasons of will which is, on the one hand, determined by “objects,” that is, empirically, and on the other hand, determined by pure reason. In practical understanding, therefore, there is no compatibility of principles of action
and law because the subject is also empirically affiliated. Practical understanding does not merely differ from the theoretical, but varies within itself too.

1. the maxims – determined by the powers of desire – subjective;
2. the imperatives – practical laws of reason which prescribe action as the means of accomplishing a given goal; reason is not yet the sole determining factor of the will, the law is the need which objectively enforces action.

Imperatives could be hypothetical or categorical, depending if the practical laws are of goal-rational action, or rather, regulations of tact or active causes, or are they practical laws which determine will regardless of its sufficiency for a given consequence or goal.

Maxims, to avoid being merely subjective, must acquire pure legislative form as the only adequate determining reason for the will. The will, thusly determined, is freedom.

This pure legislative form of the will – freedom – is part of reason because only reason can present it. It cannot be a sensual object because it is not part of appearance and it differs from the determining factors of action in nature towards natural causalities, which are appearances themselves.

The will that is determined by pure laws of reason, outside any natural causality, including a subjective power of desire, is free will because, as law, only the legislative form of maxims applies to it, and nothing else. The will is free to look for the law which is capable of necessarily determining it (not under any circumstances, not even under the necessity of the causality of nature), that being moral law.

“Whether or not the causality of the will is sufficient for [bringing about] the actuality of the objects is left to reason’s theoretical principles to judge; for this is an investigation of the possibility of the objects of volition, and hence in the practical problem the intuition of these objects does not at all amount to a moment of the problem. What counts here is only the determination of the will and the determining basis of the maxim of this will as a free will, not the result. For provided that the will is lawful for pure reason, then its power in carrying out [its aims] may be what it may...” (Kant, 2002, 64-65).

Practical reason, not theoretical, is the determinant for the will because it does not find this understanding necessary – it understands its law only as pure moral law; it is particularly impossible to comprehend the reality of determinative reason in an empirical manner – freedom. No a priori reception is necessary for it because it is intelligible, not cognizable as such; it is merely a practical agent of the will. Freedom does not need presentation, nor reception, it is identical with moral law, which is practical. That which applies to freedom is repealed as the necessary existence of freedom – it needs not be imagined or constructed. That type of understanding is debarred despite being necessary. (But, I still lack its determination, it is still unclear and nebulous).

“Such a course, however, I cannot take in the deduction of the moral law. For this law pertains not to the cognition of the constitution of objects that may be given to reason from elsewhere by something or other, but to a cognition insofar as it can itself become the basis of the existence of objects and insofar as reason, through this cognition, has causality in a rational being, i.e., [as a] pure reason that can be regarded as a power directly determining the will” (Kant, 2002, 65).

That what ought to be done cannot be deduced from theoretical principles, nor can it be explained as a necessary empirical; it is moored in pure reason as grounds of will, which is the moral law. Action needs a moral foundation, not a theoretical one – pure reason is the power of the immediate determination of will. All knowledge halts before this power because it is unknowable.

Understanding relates solely to the obligation of pursuing moral law, in other words, moral law is understood as the causality of freedom, as well as its necessity and the possible existence of perceptive nature.
“Just as the metaphysical law of the events in the world of sense was a law of the causality of sensible nature” (Kant, 2002, 66-67).

Practical reason does not learn, it produces action. “The objective reality of a pure will or—what is the same thing—of a pure practical reason is, in the moral law, given a priori through a fact, as it were; for so we may call a determination of the will which is unavoidable, even though it does not rest on empirical principles” (Kant, 2002, 75).

The reality of pure will or pure practical reason is established through reason, it is not deduced; freedom is the spontaneity of reason.

Since practical reason, which determines will through its own existence, creates reality to that which it applies to, and since it does not depend on the execution of its own (practical) power in certain given conditions, it does not need perceive and theoretically justify its meaning. Moral law is a form of intellectual causality because it immediately, in pure reason, determines will – in contrast to the natural and subjective causality – narcissism and vanity.

It is sometimes incongruous how moral law is negatively affective, quenching natural revolt; it is the cause of positive feelings (utmost respect) which is learned a priori – a feeling caused by intellectual rationale.

“Thus the moral law, just as through practical pure reason it is a formal determining basis of action, and just as it is indeed also a material but only objective determining basis of the objects of the action under the name of good and evil, so it is also a subjective determining basis—i.e., an incentive— for this action, inasmuch as it has influence on the sensibility of the subject and brings about a feeling that furthers the law’s influence on the will” (Kant, 2002, 99).

Pure practical reason is therefore the decisive reason of the will as moral law, while on the other hand, it is an impulse of the will because it produces the feeling for abiding by law. The cause of such feeling is unlike other feelings of pathological nature, it is instead in pure reason – this feeling is “practically produced.” With that, the impact of narcissism and vanity is bereaved, while the advantage of objectively existing law of reason, on the incentive of the senses, is presented. Respect of law is morality itself, subjectively viewed as incentive. This respect becomes a subjective part of man’s feelings as a finite being. “This feeling (under the name of moral feeling) is thus brought about solely by reason” (Kant, 2002, 100). This feeling is the incentive by which to establish the law within us as the maxim of our actions. We act from obligation towards the law, not from preference to what those actions should produce. “For human beings and for all created rational beings moral necessity is necessitation, i.e., obligation, and every action based thereon is to be conceived as duty, not as a way of proceeding that by itself we already favor or might come to favor” (Kant, 2002, 106).

Action is neither established nor justified through a given understanding, but through a formal obligation towards respecting law regardless of the consequences; they can be very painful and induce negative feelings. The truthfulness and accuracy of action emerges from pure practical reason and from an obligation towards (moral) law which it appoints. For the will of the most sublime being, moral law is the law of light, and for the will of every finite rational being, it is the law of obligation – that is, the compulsion or determination of action through respect of that law.

Practical reason is not cognitive in the same sense as the speculative, which deals with the understanding of possible objects – receptions, notions, principles; practical reason deals with its own power – actualizing the “object” (good and bad) in accordance with its cognition, rather, it deals with the will, the causality determined by reason. The evidence and justification that practical reason is for itself and is practical, without mixing any empirically determining notions, must meet in the most ordinary practical use of reason, that is, all natural human reason completely a priori, without any sensory givens, confirms the moral law as the supreme practical principle, as the supreme law of its own will.
“This justification of moral principles as principles of a pure reason by merely appealing to the judgment of common human understanding: viz., because anything empirical that might slip into our maxims as a determining basis of the will becomes recognizable at once through the feeling of gratification or pain that necessarily attaches to it insofar as it arouses desire, whereas pure practical reason straightforwardly opposes admitting this feeling into its principle as a condition” (Kant, 2002, 117).

Kant shows us that transcendental freedom is possible – a freedom external to space and time, external to the causality of nature and psychic distinctness, freedom that is a priori practical and determined by pure reason. This freedom is supplied in the power of pure reason which is, like freedom, practical. Freedom is only possible as a pure reality of reason. If it is possible for reason to assign its own reality as practical, or rather, assigning it for our will or our will alone, then it is possible for reason to assign its own intelligible reality external to the empirical and natural reality; that is, it is attainable as pure intelligence which determines its own self. With Kant, it appoints only the moral law as the reason for the action of our will. But, other than the laws of the will, it can appoint other principles for the practice of the will – it can establish an intelligible reality of reason, an arrangement of reason, not just moral law. Reason has the capability and power to establish its intelligible arrangement as the grounds for action of will and its obligation. That intelligible arrangement has the same form as moral law, and finds itself in identical relations to the empirical incentives of will and natural causality as itself. However, it is not just a matter of pure form, as with moral law, but also a matter of the capability of the intelligible content which reason, in its own pure power, appoints. This content is also not synthesized from experience, much like moral law, instead it is appointed by pure reason.

Pure reason, however, knows the “weaknesses” of its intelligible content, knows that it is pure content a priori which needs yet another justification, a certainty that practically proves and confirms that that which is the postulate of pure reason is possible in time, but not in the manner of natural causality and empirical givens. This certitude is the experience of pure reason within history, the experience of reason regarding itself and that which it is prepared to generate it its purity. Historical experience of pure reason as action of free will is its persuasion and justification, its adjustment and the adjustment of time in which it is generated.

“And thus the actuality of the intelligible world has been given to us, and given to us determinately in a practical respect, and this determination, which for a theoretical aim would be transcendent (extravagant), is for a practical aim immanent” (Kant, 2002, 133).
8. The Creative Power of Mind

In principle, Kant opens the possibilities of “understanding the supersensible arrangement,” despite, for him, being limited by moral law and its order, to reach over that and over the limits set by pure practical ends. Freedom is not merely the possibility of understanding a priori the law which pure reason establishes as a given, instead it is also a creative possibility of understanding the generally unconditioned.

This creative possibility of mind, which is limited by nothing, perhaps presents the path to take in this subject; the creative power of mind would simultaneously need to be both theoretical and practical, both an understanding through theory and an understanding through practice.

“Solely the concept of freedom permits us to find the unconditioned and intelligible for the conditioned and sensible without needing to go outside ourselves. For it is our reason itself which cognizes itself through the supreme and unconditioned practical law and cognizes the being—the being which is conscious of this law (our own person)—as belonging to the pure world of understanding, and in so doing even determines the way in which, as such, this being can be active. Thus one can comprehend why in the entire power of reason it can be only the practical that helps us [proceed] beyond the world of sense and that provides us with cognitions of a suprasensible order and connection—cognitions, however, which precisely therefore can indeed only be extended just as far as is necessary for our pure practical aim” (Kant, 2002, 134).

Moral law, as the highest determining reason of will, is merely formal (proposing that the maxims of our will be universal law) and abstract from all matter and objects of desire—subjects. In what sense is the unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason the greater good, it cannot be the determining reason of will—that is always merely moral law. The greatest good is the object of practical reason, pure will, the thing to be achieved. Moral law is the biggest reason why we benefit ourselves through the object—our action is its cause.

The determining reason of will cannot be a single “object,” even if it means being the greatest good. Indeed, the notion of the greatest good already contains moral law as the greatest condition, making the greatest good not merely an object (a “thing”) of the will but also the idea, which means that the representation of its existence, made possible by the representation of practical reason, is simultaneously the determining reason of pure will.

The representation of the greatest good, made possible by pure practical reason, becomes the determining ground of pure will in its autonomy. That is how the prevailing formalism complies with moral law and submits itself to the agency of practical reason, the possibility to conceive the representation of the greatest good, and to simultaneously have that greatest good be the determining grounds of will, the catalyst of action—the cause and reason of the greatest good.

The notion of the greatest good is comprehensible through deduction, that is, transcendentally. “It is a priori (morally) necessary to produce the highest good through freedom of the will; therefore the condition for the possibility of this good must also rest solely on a priori bases of cognition” (Kant, 2002, 144).

However, we do not differentiate good and bad through deduction. Everybody knows, without any previous knowledge, what is good and what bad because each is persuaded through action. Thus, through action we must justify that which we fancy. “The greatest good” is an action which contains in itself the good as an ends and which sustains itself by
those very ends. It sustains itself as such because it is persuaded and justified as good. Its existence is its persuasion and it is understood as such. Comprehension is given through action, but not through any action – only that which prevails as good. This is neither a common goal-instrumental action, nor is the understanding a common analytically-synthetic one. This action, which is simultaneously an action understanding or an understanding of action, must be designated as a separate notion. That is creative action, or the creative action of understanding. Therefore, reason has three powers of action, not two – the theoretical, the practical, and the creative. All three forms of action are cognitive: the theoretical uses only the theoretically-cognitive mind, the practical practically-cognitive, the creative creatively-cognitive.

Spontaneity of free will does not possess “conditionality” outside the rationally determined moral law, from itself alone – moral law does not possess any objective existence which could have the characteristic of objectively given necessity or cause, unlike, for instance, law and rituality. This objectively given freedom is the institutionalization of subjectively determined freedom as moral law – institutionalization in the judicial, ritual, and public laws. With Kant, freedom is deducted from practical reason, while legitimacy and morality have their own metaphysical source – they are the beings of that which is possible through practical reason.

However, the institutionalization and objectification of freedom within morality, law, and ritual does not allow a creative relationship between the mind and reality, only an analytical one. Objectification of freedom acquires the character of necessity, not unlike the causality of nature for free will, making the impulse and its spontaneity fade – the impact it can have only in the creative mind.

Free will, under preconditions of objectified freedom, becomes merely an apology for what is already considered attained freedom. Through objectification, freedom deprives itself the possibility of free action; in a system of objectified and absolutized freedom there emerges freedom itself as an act of subjective will offered by the creative mind, there emerges the spontaneity of will as a principal of practical reason.

Creative cognition has within itself not only cognitive power but the power of realizing the spontaneous. Reality, as a creative form of the real, as a realization of the spontaneous (institutionalization etc.), begins to lose the inner power of its reason as soon as it takes shape. Only creative cognition has the energy of mind to accomplish the perceived – it sides with the subject, it maintains its subjective form to its own realization; in realization it separates itself from this power of mind (a subject that can equally be an individual or a group – a class, people, tribe, party, etc.) and slowly wanes in the life of its reality.

The creative action, as an understanding, is the one that understands this waning, structural ossification of the mind which has become the reality. Practical reason cannot exceed the limits of this reality, but it can understand them; it understands the objective as the limit, as a limit of the mind itself, and gives the basis (task) for creative understanding for the exceeded limits and the establishment of a new request for creative action. Movement is not composed of an incessant reformation of that which is subjective into that which is objective, into its otherness and oppositeness, and then, finding itself in that objective, returns upon itself – it is the eternal circulation of consciousness within the self, except that its content is sometimes subjective and sometimes objective. Same applies to its form. This movement occurs in continuity, it is the consciousness practically indifferent to where it finds itself, either in the element of the subjective or the objective – it is important to always find itself. However, the relationship between practical and creative understanding is not a continuity but a discontinuity; at some point the mind loses the energy in its form which no longer has creative power, creating a difference between the objective and subjective of the mind beyond the point of amendment through synthesis, identification; the mind does not find mind-ness in
reality, its reality transformed into a reality which exists as an objectively given power and potency, but not the mind itself. The mind must again find the form through which reality is overcome; that form is not a single form of reality because it has exhausted its possibilities, nor does the mind any longer recognize itself in that reality as its own realization. In reality the mind understands the loss of its realization and seeks a whole new form; reality has no power over it because its mind-ness has perished from it.

Here, it is not a matter of dialectics of crossing from the subjective to the objective and from the objective to the subjective through a synthesis of the mind which incorporates them. The creative mind, which is both cognitive and practical, reveals that in reality there is actually nothing to synthesize, that it is merely an empty shell from which the content of the mind emerged. The creative mind, in its understanding, must abandon reality in order to overcome it practically, rather, it must abandon its inanimate forms and shape them in a new way. That shaping is not a synthesis of that which became its opposite, but the creation of a new form in which the mind appears in a new way. That is the dialectics of the discontinuity of the mind. Even though dialectics implies the transition from one to the other and the recognition of the self in that other, it is here a matter of “transition” from one to the other, but not as a continuity, instead as a discovery of a new form which neither exists nor which could be found in reality. That new form is the breakthrough from reality, it is a deed of the mind to which the real is only the support and encouragement; that is not the reformation of any existing form of reality, instead it is a new form which does not issue reality as such but as creative understanding in its creative act.

We could not reform a single proposed peace treaty for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but abandon them and suggest a wholly new one, on new grounds. They were all constituted on the division of the country. The first peace plan fashioned for Bosnia and Herzegovina was the Cutileiro’s plan from Lisbon. It was already established under the idea of division, just that the division was timidly proposed and cleverly concealed. However, the political logic of that plan and its subsequent practical implementation led directly to division. The founding thesis of that plan regarding the “three constitutive units,” which were nationally determined and which were, in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, constitutionalized, revealed the true meaning and aim of that plan. Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into three national territories which were awarded constitutionalism and which thusly became three national states within the country.

The foundational obstacles in the execution of this plan is how to assign the borders of these “constitutative units” keeping in mind the mélange of the population and the lack of clear ethnic territories within Bosnia and Herzegovina. The fact that some territories were ethnically homogeneous only exacerbated tensions because under the scope of things it did not satisfy the idea of “constitutive units.” That is how this plan rested on an array of national unifications and homogenizations of territories which was a sign to national politics to conclude their strategic programs, both political and military.

The second peace plan was Vance-Owen, which somewhat more openly proposed the idea of dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina, albeit hiding it behind the nationally mixed “provinces.” That is why the plan was acceptable to the majority of the contemporary leaders who had the power to make decisions on this important issue.

However, this plan had an inherent mechanism of abetting military conflict and it linked peace negotiations with military activity more directly than the Cutileiro plan. Under this plan, the so-called pre-committing of military units in accordance with the national structure of the population in the “provinces” was envisioned. That is how a peace plan spurred the formation of national armies in the “provinces” which should have constituted Bosnia and Herzegovina. Given that the national armies were in part already formed, or at least in the process of being formed, the Vance-Owen plan was the basis for completing this
process and the political decree of the international community that a single territory can support only one national army. It was basically a command for the military units of other ethnic groups to disarm and subjugate.

The Vance-Owen plan of “pre-committing” was the initial capsule of the conflict between HVO and TO B&H, which would transform into the Army of B&H.

The third peace plan was Owen-Stoltenberg. This pair from the international community led peace negotiations in Geneva, spring of 1993, at the time of the worst battles in B&H. Their peace negotiations and the plan they proposed was a step beyond the previous. The basis of the negotiations was an ethnic division of Bosnia and Herzegovina which they called “The Union of the Three Republics.” Division was no longer masked either through “constitutional units” or the “provinces,” instead it was a precondition for the “peace resolution for Bosnia and Herzegovina.” The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which still formally existed and was internationally recognized under the “peace resolution” of Owen-Stoltenberg, disappeared under the constitution of the three national “republics.” This plan contained in itself Cutileiro’s hidden agenda of “three constitutive units” and Vance-Owen’s idea of the nationalization of territories, except that the new plan finalized both of these ideas in national “republics.” “The Union of B&H” was only a cover of transitional resolution in which the national states in the county would first constitute and then disunite. Keeping in mind the already formed para-nations of the Serbs and Croats – Republika Srpska and “Herzeg-Bosnia” – it was not difficult to anticipate A. Izetbegovic, as a national leader, to declare his own prepositions. That happened on February 7th, 1994, two days prior to the initialization of Geneva’s “peace package,” at the Congress of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Congress was to decide upon the group of national delegates who would go to Geneva, and the papers they would sign. In a controversial debate the SDA party proposed that the prepared “Geneva package” be reformulated to include the third “republic” in the framework of “the Union of the Three Republics” to be a “Muslim nation.” Upon Izetbegovic’s intervention, the Congress accepted the proposal.

However, this plan, like the previous, had a fundamental problem – how to establish the borders of the future “republics” and how to solve the problem of nationally mixed territories?

The only solution was to seize the negotiations which divide Bosnia and Herzegovina and which foster military conquest. It was clear that any partisan military occupation of any part of Bosnia and Herzegovina leads directly to a national division of the country, because militarily determined borders would be acknowledged by the negotiators as well as the mediators of those negotiations – Owen and Stoltenberg.

For a new resolution the “Geneva negotiations” had to be aborted and the military conflicts, which were waged for the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had to be stopped, and a wholly new basis for negotiations had to be proposed. That step needed to be taken.

Creative understanding means understanding the reality of the real, which is concealed by reality. As such it has no direct certainty since it cannot directly observe its own subject; too, it cannot identify with the theoretical mind (epistemology) because its subject is that which, in reality, is not revealed or even specified; the reality to which this understanding applies in general is the reality of changeable causes, a reality which does not have an internal causality. Creative understanding is therefore a type of understanding which in reality, not determined by unchangeable causes, creates the subject of its understanding by aligning the elements of its reality in a new way, a manner in which they could not be aligned from reality itself. Creative understanding establishes its own “causality,” and in accordance to it produces a new reality, or rather, the reality of that reality. That action cannot be the object of a theoretically-scientific understanding because it is limited by the reality of its object; creative understanding transcends reality by giving it a new dimension which is not directly
visible – it reforms it but does not abolish it. This form is a single possible form, but one which cannot deduce or indicate directly from the reality of the existing, it is the result of a creative act of understanding.

Reality understood as such differs from the basic object of production-reproduction, as well as a work of art, in that it has to have an aim within itself, and those formations have an aim in their creator. This difference is important, with Aristotle⁸ too, because the object of creative understanding must have within itself a reason of its existence, must have within itself its consistency and power of its realization, otherwise it is merely a “raw concept,” arbitrary and capricious to the subjective mind; it must be presented as founded in itself because only as such can it have reality – a historical form. That which the creative mind comprehends must be feasible. History, as a creative act, is possible only under the condition of creative cognition which guarantees it the cognitive causality.

This conclusion brings us back to Kant and his differentiation between phenomenon and noumenon. Intelligible existence is given in morality, and its law in moral law: intelligible consciousness of one’s existence is freedom, while free action is the practice of absolute spontaneity of this consciousness. In contrast to that is the sensible life as the absolute unity of the phenomenon. Intellectual observation which would relate only to the intelligible is not possible because it deals with the spontaneity of the subject as a thing in itself; observation relates only to phenomena and not to the intelligible, the being in itself. Intellectual observation is replaced by the concept of mind.

Moral law enables a difference between action as a fact of a sensible being and action that emerges from relation towards the intelligible being (which is understood a priori). The concept of the mind regarding freedom is transcendental and no reception could undermine it; the concept of reason is the concept of causality which needs to have sensible reception before it can have objective accountability. For the synthesis of intellect, the mind requires that which is unconditional, that which is a priori given; in order for the intellect to achieve its synthesis there must be something to synthesize – sensibility and concept. The categories which enable synthetic thinking, which reason performs, are mathematical and dynamical, or rather, categories of quality and quantity which enable synthesis in the performance of the object – that which is congenial, both the categories of necessity and causality which enable synthesis in the existential performance of the object. It is than a matter of synthesizing the conditional of the sensible world with the unconditional of the intelligible world. That is the possibility to simultaneously think of the conditional as the unconditional, that which is sensibly unconditional causality as freedom. But that is possible on insofar as we think of freedom as an act, what is more, an intelligible act – freedom is the unconditional, intelligible action in the sensible world. Freedom as the possibility to imagine unconditional causality exists as a fact, as the truth, practically as a being.

“Hence nothing remained but that there might be found an incontestable and, moreover, objective principle of causality that excludes from its determination any sensible condition, i.e., a principle in which reason does not further appeal to anything else as determining basis regarding causality but rather itself already contains this determining basis through that principle, and where it is therefore itself practical as pure reason. This principle, however, does not need to be searched for or invented; it has all along been in the reason of all human beings and incorporated in their essence, and is the principle of morality” (Kant, 2002, 133).

It is only a question of how this maxim becomes objective in the wider sense from merely existing as a concrete human being?

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As a being of the possible, a specific freedom of man, a maxim of law, fails to become the objectively-conscious maxim of action, as an objectively given law identical to the subjective. Kant’s intelligible world emerges with every rational being and fails to be objectified as the foundation of causality; as the intelligible world it does not have an objective existence outside reason, rather, outside practical reason that acts only subjectively after all, from itself. Freedom is understood as the power of unconditional causality, the power of pure reason.

Man’s action can be spurred in two ways: a) extrinsically, publically imposed laws which in that case have the character of necessity, b) intrinsically, internal law that performs some action obligatorily. Action is possible, then, under the imperative of law and the imperative of obligation – which are dispositive reasons of the will (legality and morality). Acting out of obligation towards intrinsic or extrinsic law belongs to ethics. Ethics teaches us that the idea of obligation alone is enough to spur the will.

Moral laws apply as laws only if they are a priori established and necessary; concepts and courts (knowledge) of action and inaction cannot have moral gravity insofar as they derive and learn from experience, it is delusional that moral maxims can derive from that.

However, action established on moral laws, even if known a priori, is the action of reality in history, not the intrinsic action in the self. Regardless if this action is impelled by obligation and regardless if its provisional reason is intelligible, it is an action by which something is done – some relation is formed, some institution, etc. Despite all provisional reasons of action, that (thing done) objectively exists, it has its historical reality – it is a fact (not as a natural object but as alienated will).

As a socially-conscious fact, obligatory action assumes the character of reality. It is not nature but it receives the power of natural necessity – its causality. That is how it matures to the pending circle – through its alienation, free will brings into question and abolishes its rationality because it opposes itself; on the one hand it is pure practical reason, whose legislature is its duty, while on the other hand it is the act of freedom which received its externality and has causality in that externality. For Kant, these two causalities are annulled.

“The concept of freedom is a pure rational concept, which for this very reason is transcendent for theoretical philosophy, that is, it is a concept such that no instance corresponding to it can be given in any possible experience and of an object of which we cannot obtain theoretical cognition: the concept of freedom cannot hold as a constitutive but solely as a regulative, and, indeed, merely negative principle of speculative reason. But in reasons’ practical use the concept of freedom proves its reality by practical principles, which are laws of causality of pure reason for determining choice independently of any empirical conditions (of sensibility generally) and prove a pure will in us, in which moral concepts and laws have their source” (Kant, 1996, 14).

So, freedom as a concept of pure reason cannot be the object of theoretical knowledge because that concept does not contain the object-ness to which that knowledge would relate; freedom gains its reality only through a practical use of reason which follows the law of causality of pure reason, “independent of its empirical conditions.” True, pure will exists within us, but the laws of action which determine it not only prove its rational purity nor do only concepts and laws of morality receive “their origin” from it, but that “origin” becomes the objective, outside pure will itself. Through action, pure will exists itself and establishes itself extrinsically, outside pure will itself. This exteriority of free will and the laws of pure reason become the object of understanding, in particular as a possible object to which concepts of pure reason relate. Understanding is simultaneously a priori, because it has to do with the concepts of pure reason, but also part of experience because it deals with the experience of practical reason, or rather, with the experience of freedom for which pure reason has its “origins” – its historical existence. With this historical fact, freedom is
encountered as with necessity; on the other side is the necessity of its pure determination in
reason.

Between this duel necessity, understanding is either apology or criticism, bringing into
question its own foundations. From this strain it can emerge only as new, abandoning both
apology and criticism and forming itself as creative. Creative understanding is the “doing” of
something new. These three forms of knowledge are given simultaneously – the mind is
simultaneously theoretically-cognitive, practically-cognitive, and creatively-cognitive.

Custom-ness is given in the unity of knowledge and action, in the realized self-
consciousness, otherwise it is merely torn between the concept and reality. It is the realized
consciousness of freedom of self, and as such, the catalyzing aim of action. Understanding
freedom of self, its notions, has the drive for achievement. The customary being, therefore, is
the catalyst in the aim of action because that which he is in himself, he is for himself, in the
understanding of self – he is already the achieved notion of freedom, a notion that developed
in the existing world and through the nature of self-consciousness. Action, the reality of self-
consciousness (its knowledge), embraces within itself the already established reality of
freedom as the existing world as well as the “nature of self-consciousness.”

For Hegel, custom-ness, with its forms, takes on the role of the “subject,” the driving
force of history – subjective action is historical as long as it is the reason of the existing
forms, as long as it is their exponent. Subjective knowledge is the truth as long as it is
“objective,” as long as, in the general world, it reveals mind-ness as its own, or at least the
mindlessness.

However, how does one maintain subjectivity of the individual as subject and person,
or as a community, since only they have the creative power? Creative understanding and its
“object,” which reforms anew, acquire their truthfulness only through their creative action
which will “decide” to which degree the knowledge of truth is realized. The realization of
creative understanding can be presented as the opposite of the intellect, that is, not as the
intellect which incessantly presumes the good, but as the realization of evil. Creative
understanding can be equally on the side of the individual and the community, that is, the
individual can realize his understanding as much as the community. The achieved,
institutionalized power of mind of the individual possesses the power of reality as much as
some communities or groups, meaning that it can have greater or lesser truthfulness, be it
good or evil.

Action is justified through knowledge, knowledge is justified through necessity, which
means that action is justified through necessity; if freedom is an understood necessity, action
is justified through freedom.

The relationship between knowledge and action is not theoretical and cannot be
resolved theoretically because that would mean that action is taken as a necessity only if it is
theoretically understood as a necessity; too, it would mean that action is free only if
interpreted as understood, that is, insofar as freedom is theoretical.

Beside this theoretical knowledge which makes everything equal, there is a practical
understanding, an understanding through action. This understanding has two levels: 1. Pre-
theoretical understanding which does not need theory to justify it – a direct understanding of
nature and other people which is intelligent in action and not in the understanding which it
would presuppose; understanding disappears through that action as practical experience in the
shape of standardization, institutionalization, language, culture, customs, etc.; 2. practical
understanding which presupposes thinking and knowledge – the universal which is
understood but not experienced; this knowledge does not alter its practical character despite
being determined by knowable and appointed goals. This understanding is practical in the
sense that the understood, as universal and necessary, which is theoretical, can be confirmed
as such only through action, which is how the appointed goals are confirmed as real and true
through action anyhow. Truth or untruth of understanding is not resolved theoretically but practically, through practical realization.

Theoretical understanding and its truth are resolved through the analytical-synthetic process of understanding, and it is always theoretical – knowledge of the laws of nature. The practice that follows this understanding is always just a repeated nature, it is established on theoretical truth and has conceptual certainty.

Practical understanding, which applies to action and fact, and which arises from that activity, cannot always ensue theoretical understanding because it too would merely be an observation or apology of reality. Practical understanding must follow, from one side, over and above what is theoretically understood – the universal and necessary, and from the other side, over and above the pre-theoretically experienced knowledge, direct action that constitutes the world of things and relations between people. Then, aside from this theoretical and practical understanding there is another form of understanding which will not intervene between them and which will be outside the contradiction of blindness from immediacy and cognitive necessity. It is the creative understanding, which is not only experience or analytically-synthetic, but the possibility of the new. It must not be arbitrary or an escape from reality, it must also be the power of mind which must rely on the experienced and analytically-synthetic understanding; it is in some sense theoretical but it does not have the certainty of the universal and the necessary, and it knows it; it issues the possible, not the necessary, because it realizes that action cannot be determined by theory all the way through. Creative knowledge is neither dogmatic nor utopian, it is simultaneously the understanding and action of the new, its reality as well as the request for its realization.

Theoretical understanding is the subjective search for the intellect in the world, as well as in thinking. Insofar as it relates to the world, it is analytical, insofar as it relates to consciousness and the capability of thought, it is synthetic – in the former it finds its laws in the existing, in the objective, while in the latter it finds the law (concept) within itself and “accepts” the external, assimilating it.

The disagreement between the subject and the object is repealed under understanding, but that repeal is unilateral because the one-sidedness of subjectivity repeals the one-sidedness of objectivity (“by receiving the existing world into itself, into subjective conception and thought.” Hegel, available at: www.marxist.org) and vice versa, the one-sidedness of objectivity (as illusion and coincidence) is repealed by the innerness of the subjective which is imported into it and which is “truly” objective.

The former is a drive towards truth – theoretical action, theoretical understanding; the latter is a drive towards achieving the good, will, practical action and practical understanding.

Knowledge of the universal is achieved through understanding, the intellect within the subject, which is good and which wishes to enter the outside world through the will; this good is still only subjective because it searches for the external world (including the immediate consciousness) as coincidence and nothingness, and aspires to determine its own ends which are not coincidental and arbitrary, but knowable like the intellect – good in-itself and for-itself. With such subjective will – determining the ends to the external world – the disagreement between the subjective, which is understood as the intellect, and the objective, which is understood as futile, is not repealed because it is all a single process. The disagreement is only repealed with the objectification of the good within the world, the becoming of good in the world, with realization. “This life which has returned to itself from the bias and finitude of cognition, and which by the activity of the notion has become identical with it, is the Speculative or Absolute Idea” (ibid).

Only with the absolute idea does Hegel repeal the disagreement of one-sided knowledge and will because he establishes the intellect as the unity of the objective and
subjective. The absolute idea is the intellect that exists and finds itself as existing – it thinks itself the intellect and is established as intellect objectively, as the world.

This absolute existence of the intellect, as the union of subjective and objective intellect, is always the self-search of the intellect through the dialectics of understanding – consciousness finds itself in the reality of nature and man.

However, that continuity and unity of consciousness with itself is possible only in the movement of consciousness. The reality of nature and the reality of man (family, community, country), are not the same continuity, intellect or the absolute idea, because those two realities differ. Aristotle justly confirmed that social reality and action of man are founded on varying causes, meaning that it is not intelligible and knowable in the same way as nature. The “intelligence” of that reality is unknowable by the intellect because it resists mediation – the intellect does not find itself as a form of the objective, instead it must present itself as such. The intellect objectified in nature and society cannot assure itself a continuity of development through the dialectic of understanding because that continuity remains existent only in consciousness. Man’s action is not mental because it appoints ends due to its inability to secure its own certainty. It can be founded on the knowledge of man’s reality without resignation, but how can it determine what is good if that reality is already some objectified ends?

Intelligence is like understanding (thinking) which recognizes – it recognizes forms of consciousness as its own, recognizes the thing in its name, a thought is its thought and simultaneously an object, that is, the universal is its object, its “thing”; “the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts; these are as its content and object” (ibid).

Like the will, intelligence is practical – it appoints aims and the “ought to,” which it again recognizes as universal and towards which it gravitates. However, that which is once established as universal cannot be altered by knowledge, or by action on which it is established. Only creative intelligence can change it because only it can appoint new aims which are external to the existing; it overcomes the existing real, abolishing it in reality, and not only in understanding as negation. The universal that objectively exists only as reality is not only a positive moment of consciousness, its being subject to its negative action – bested in thinking, instead it is a reality which resists consciousness, which has the power of the positive just as thinking has the power of the negative. The reality of the real can only be overcome creatively, through elimination or reformation made possible by creative intelligence; only it appoints and achieves new aims which cannot obtain their satisfaction in that which exists because it is its own notion, its universal already drained.

Understanding must be regarded as a triple action: as theoretical, practical, and creative. These actions are identical in their ends but differ in presumptions and methods. Theoretical action receives the existing world into a subjective presentation and thinking, or recognizes it as an objectively existing law towards which the subjective consciousness is equated; practical action objectively determines the existing world as its own ends, and presents it as its own. In both cases the existing world is presumed an illusion and coincidence, and through these actions ascends to truth; in the first case it is comprehended as the universal, in the second case it presents itself as the universal. The veracity of consciousness is therefore revealed or recognized as the necessity of the general, notion or law, or rather, assigned from the will as the necessity of its notion or law. As a theoretical action, understanding is the understanding of the good as the existing world. Both of these actions presuppose the separation of the subject and the object, the subjective and objective universal – the subjectively determined good in contrast to the objective existence of the world, objectively existing truth, as a notion or law, in contrast to subjective opinion or the relativity of sensible knowledge.
With this divorce these actions enter an infinite search for the universal in the particular and relative, or, accomplishing the good as universal aims – that which should be. This eternal maintenance of contradiction between the subjective and objective, Hegel attributes to their uniqueness in the "speculative" or "absolute idea." The "absolute idea" is capable of objectively recognizing, as law, its intellect, or rather, the existing world as good, and simultaneously as the appointed subjective, produced by subjective action, theoretical or practical. That is life as unity of understanding and will – action.

This speculative overcoming of difference between the subjective and objective raised to understanding is intelligence – it is “the intelligence [that] shall itself determine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content” (ibid). Intelligence determined in such a way is free will because it knows itself as the epitome of itself while simultaneously appointing that epitome as existing. Becoming so objective towards the existing world from the knowledge of self and the action of that knowledge, the will becomes the spirit, or rather, reality as individual existence. As knowledge, the spirit is on the grounds of generality – “hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a thinking will – to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks itself” (ibid) – as action of free will the spirit is on the grounds of singularity. True freedom is spirit as morality because it is the will which no longer has subjective, selfish content, but the general, that is, that which is in thinking and in aid of thinking – “it is nothing short of absurd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life” (ibid).

Morality as objectified spirit actually presents an overcome immediacy of drives and natural dispositions, it presents intellectual objectivity; the objectification is the fact of all natural dispositions and epitomes of will, and that fact is given as law and obligation, not as coincidence. “The discussion of the true intrinsic worth of the impulses, inclinations, and passions is thus essentially the theory of legal, moral, and social duties” (ibid).

The will that is free, meaning, whose content is the universal, the notion alone, and which is positioned as such in reality, is the objective spirit – the intelligence.
9. Scientific Knowledge of Reality

The path from the individual will to the reality of liberty whose content is notion, or, the knowledge of the general, must also be understood as necessity, or rather as the realization of that which is understood through notion. This understanding is therefore both presumed and accomplished as understanding – the wholeness and erudition of its forms is founded on the spirit of logic and the final form is the speculative understanding or absolute knowledge which incorporates all forms. In this speculative understanding, which is the only true understanding for Hegel, the content is significantly associated with the logical form, with the internal law of the mind. This understanding is the thought which begins from itself and which, from its internal necessity, unites with the truth which is already given and which is understood as reality – laws, morality, family, community, country, world consciousness. This “truth” is not sufficient as the final realization of the intellect but is necessary in approaching it; it is concerned with the immediacy of longing, the abstraction of law of individual will, natural drive and love that links families, the interests of society, and the strength of national institutions. This “truth” has a character of the public but not yet of whole science, it is not yet proven and taken in its necessity, it is not yet observable in its entirety nor in a single of its subjective or objective forms. Openly acknowledged “truths,” that is, the valid truths of reality, are not proven but present myriad different opinions which are, as such, the content of the final truth. Speculative understanding must leave this ruling opinion insofar as it wants to reach a scientific level – it must overcome it.

What does this overcoming consist of?

It is not possible through the will of that which is other and different from the existing because it would merely be vanity; it must be carried out as necessity and presented as necessity.

The start of overcoming is given in that which is given, in that which is valid, and its substance – substance of law and direction of custom-ness-of-the-country. On the other hand, the start is given in thought, the foundation of man’s liberty, in all its forms – ownership, morality, family, community, country, and world history. However, that thought cannot be perceived as aberration or rejection of that which is universally accepted and valid, as construction of a new and specific reality. That thought is not closed within itself, it is not a kingdom of thoughts and concepts of something not-yet-existing, that which “the ethical world has just been waiting for such projects, investigations, and proofs, as are undertaken now” (Hegel, 2008, 6). Hegel rejects every possibility of cognitive thought outside the given, outside the existing. Science of thought is impossible outside the existing and valid truths, nor is a form of knowledge possible outside the one which relates to the existing world. An understanding of reality, established in thought separate from the real or in the presentation of that which not-yet-exists, is not possible; if it were possible, then the spiritual universe would be left to chance and arbitrariness. On the contrary, the world of subjective law, morality and ethos, is the mind actualized in the element of self-consciousness, which made itself aware as the real; that is, the cognitive mind in the existing, in the valid and given – the unity of mind and reality, form and content.

How do we, in the valid and given, which as such is not cognitive or universal but infinite opinion, reveal the cognitive and real? Is the understanding of the un-cognitive sufficient in the first step, in order to reach the cognitive in the second step? Is this second
step – the sole cognitive understanding, sufficient for the becoming of the valid untrue and the un-cognitive true? Is this reversal merely cognitive?

Scientific knowledge “is the exploration of the rational, it is for that very reason the comprehension of the present and the actual, not the setting up of a beyond, supposed to exist, God knows where” (Hegel, 2008, 13).

The mind has to recognize itself in the present, and that understanding is the reconciliation of mind and reality; the mind capable of that is free from the infinity of opinion, coincidence, and vanity of the particular – that is the mind that freed and raised itself to the conceptual level all alone. That is the union of form and content, “for form in its most concrete signification is reason as conceptual [begreifend] knowing, and content is reason as the substantial essence of actuality, whether ethical or natural. The conscious identity of these two is the philosophical Idea” (Hegel, 2008, 15).

The mind, therefore, in the illusion of the temporal and temporality, must understand the substance which is immanent and permanent in the present. “For since rationality (which is synonymous with the Idea) enters into external existence [Existenz] simultaneously with its actualization, it emerges with an infinite wealth of forms, shapes, and appearances. Around its core it throws a motley covering in which consciousness is initially at home, a covering which the concept has first to penetrate before it can find the inward pulse and feel it still beating in the external shapes” (Hegel, 2008, 14).

The reality of mind is not open to consciousness and cognition because it is in the motley of external characters of mind. It cannot penetrate alone this “motley covering” by which the heart of mind is covered and coated. That is possible only with conceptual knowledge which has the power of “penetrating,” and externally discovering the pulse of mind that beats within it. Cognitive knowledge does not remain with the understanding of those infinitely dissimilar relations – a motley of characters, with their regulations. It must not fall in their trap, which happened to Plato, who for the sake of a specific form of nation lost its deepest principle – free character.

How does the mind manage to penetrate towards itself in the real, come to its substance and overcome an abundance of characters which obstruct it, and not take a single one for itself as finite?

That is possible insofar as the mind assumes itself as the substance of character in which it is actualized, that is, insofar as the cognitive is necessarily the real, and the real the cognitive, even if the cognitive within the real was merely felt as pulse still beating. Otherwise, the mind does not easily mature towards its own immanency in the characters in which it was realized. Between it as a concept (knowledge) and it as reality is a thick layer of motley characters which must be penetrated. As a substance and the pulse of reality the mind is merely presumed in the knowledge of itself because it knows that concept does not exist without reality, and reality without concept. The drive of the concept is to realize itself, to produce itself in reality. But this transition from knowledge to reality, despite being understood as necessary, is not realized in the continuity of consciousness because it always encounters the already existing motley characters of mind. Knowledge of that motley, and even the knowledge of its mental substance, is not sufficient for establishing new reality because those characters resist it through precisely their own reality. Those characters are not overcome by the fact that they are as such, and that they are cognitively understood as other and different; it must also be realized by or against those characters and their reality. An understanding of the cognitive requests its exfiltration from the characters and true realization, or realization in truth, not in deception. For that, both understanding and action are necessary. Since it is presumed that the cognitive is necessarily active, and is realized as such, the active immanency of knowledge is not put into question, instead it is the action within the other and the different that resist this law that is put into question. The understood and active is not in
continuity with itself, as Hegel presumes, because it must be realized among the characters which are not immanent, but which already exist. The mind has the power to realize itself in reality, but cannot reach itself through the real, it remains only knowledge. The active immanency of mind does not secure itself in the understanding of the motley of its characters, but in the penetration of their hardened crust in which truth no longer dwells.

The mind is need of one more dimension by which to exit its cycle of futility, through which to overcome the interruption of its continuity that already took place in reality – the mind is lost in the abundance of characters and no longer recognizes itself among them. How does it get its truth while holding on to reality, without it being mere naked concepts or vanity of knowledge?

“All else, apart from this actuality established through the working of the concept itself, is ephemeral existence, external contingency, opinion, unsubstantial appearance, untruth, illusion, and so forth” (Hegel, 2008, 17).

The difference between reality and basic temporary existence leads precisely towards the fact that the concept, in that existence, did not grasp its reality, and that it is untrue. The shaping of the concept in its realization is the second significant moment of understanding of the concept itself without which (realization) the concept does otherwise not contain truth and assumes only the abstraction of reason. But this understanding encounters, before all else, the untrue, the coincidental, and the temporary, because the concept itself is realized in the characters that conceal its purity. If this realization were in pure form, these coincidences – a motley crust of different forms, would not even exist. The mind must imbue itself, to the core of realization, without abandoning that realization; it must equally protect itself from ending up in its own abstraction as well as opinion. This imbuement through the motley of characters is the creative understanding with a twofold function: on the one hand it reaches the concept of reality and its law, on the other hand it issues the request for the reformation of existing characters in accordance to its understanding – it is active.

History is revealed as cognitive – that is, lawful – to only this type of understanding. However, as the understanding of law and the request for the reformation of its characters are not in continuity, history cannot be displayed as a continuity of a single law, a single truth.

Namely, an understanding of the law of reality is possible only when achieved in time, when it gets all its external characteristics, and that suggests a presumption of finite law. Understanding is the understanding of its achievement and simultaneously an understanding of the need for reforming its characteristics. That reformation requires a new effort of understanding – not only sensing towards the intellect but towards a new form of reality. That understanding is not only cognitive but also creative – it cannot be satisfied with only knowledge but needs the possibilities of realizing that knowledge. This new realization cannot be in continuity with the one that preceded it. The previous was achieved in its time, the new one forms its time in the present.

With Hegel, despite being cloaked this is visible in his differentiation of the natural positive, and philosophical law. Natural law is abstract because it vanishes in the infinity of possessions, in the wandering and transference from one object to another, in the coincidental and temporal, in everything but the preserved and permanent; its truth is external to it and achieved with the overcoming of direct will. Positive law is a higher form of law than the natural, and it contains all of its elements – a knowledge of law as positive judicial science, as well as content that is its own element, with a particular national character (linked to the historical development of a given group of people), its particularity in the application of a scientific notion of law, subsumption of the objects and incidents which are external to the concept, and finally through “the final determinations requisite for actually making decisions” (Hegel, 2008, 20).
Philosophical law is a realized idea of law, which exists in relation to natural and positive law, as a theory of law towards some historically concrete law – that is, it is their realized truth. However, we must keep in mind that in the context of its gestation, law falls outside the science of law – it already has its fixture in reality which is not the result of knowledge, it is not its deduction and it is not proven in a didactic manner. That type of law is directly presupposed, both as private property which is concretized through agreement and by which the abstractness of natural law is overcome, and as positive law which determines and maintains the interests and institutions of society. In the Hegelian system of law it will only subsequently be deduced from concept and prove itself relevant, rather, as a part of a system, an idea of law.

But it (law) is, before all else, given as some direct state. That state, that historical element of natural and positive law, Hegel regards in totality with legislation in general, with its knowledge and not separate from it, because in that case it would merely be a presentation of law or some heightened feeling of law – verve. This relation is subsequent and emanates from knowledge itself – scientific law. In its immediacy, that state is part of all relations and characters that determine a people and a time.

Observing this historical incurrence of law and its dispositions – in time – has its virtue and vindication and stands outside the philosophical observation – outside the philosophy of law. The philosophy of law observes every other historical form of law from the notion of law and deduces it from it because it must be justified from the notion which is in-itself and for-itself. Some genuine disposition, some historical content of law, can be reasoned and proven consequential on a foundation of chances and existing legal institutions, while being un-reasoned and unfair for-itself and in-itself. Justice and reason of some historical law can be shown only through a concept, and not through its germination in particular opportunities, events, etc. Adduction of historical causes must be differentiated from knowledge and justification from the concept itself, from conceptual deduction of the “thing” itself.

“Once the origination of an institution has been shown to be wholly to the purpose and necessary in the circumstances of the time, the demands of the historical point of view have been fulfilled. But if this is supposed to pass for a general justification of the thing itself, it turns out to be the opposite, because, since those circumstances are no longer present, the institution—far from being justified—has by their disappearance lost its meaning and its right” (Hegel, 2008, 22).

The difference between justifying something from circumstance and from concept is the difference between reason and intellect – reason is concerned with condition, coincidence, and so on, while the intellect is concerned with the general; reason justifies from external circumstances, from incurring and developing of something valid, the intellect justifies from internal reason which is the essence of “things.” For example, reason justifies law on grounds of consequence which it produces (fear of law) and not on grounds of positive disposition of justice; the intellect justifies law from the concept of law and justice – the law is the positive realization of the intellect itself, the law itself must be intellectual.

“The basis of right is, in general, the realm of spirit [das Geistige]; its precise place and point of origin is the will. The will is free, so that freedom is both its substance and its goal, while the system of right is the realm of freedom made actual, the world of spirit [Geist] brought forth out of itself as a second nature” (Hegel, 2008, 26).

“Will without freedom is an empty word, while freedom is actual only as will, as subject” (ibid).

In man, the thought (the spiritual) and will (the concrete) are not separate. Man’s solemnity, his relationship in general, is a unity of thought and will. He cannot relate to something only as thought or only as will. It is not a question of abilities, but conduct towards...
something that is coevally theoretical and practical – volition is thought because thinking as
the will delivers itself into effect; that which is thought is wanted, that which is wanted is
meant. Thinking is already the usurpation of the thing in question because the thing that
makes it an object is already taken from it – taken from the sensory and built onto the
thinking. The object as thought becomes essentially and directly Mine because only in
thinking, I am with myself; “I do not penetrate an object until I understand it; it then ceases to
stand over against me and I have taken from it the character of its own which it had in
opposition to me” (Hegel, 2008, 26).

The I, in which every particularity, character, and the natural, vanishes the thought -
remains the general. To think is to produce something universal.

“The variegated canvas of the world is before me; I stand over against it; by my
theoretical attitude to it I overcome its opposition to me and make its content my own”
(Hegel, 2005, 27).

Practical solemnity, therefore, begins with thought, with appropriation by thought,
instead that it is not the repeal of the particular and the different but the placement of
differences. With practical solemnity and action, man determines himself, poses it externally,
poses it as different to himself. However, that difference is his difference because the function
of its allocation belongs to him. All that is determined in such way bears the stamp of man’s
spirit.

That which is theoretical is shown to be substantially contained in the practical. Will is
that which determines itself by placing itself into something; that which it wants must present
to itself as its own, as an aim – it must think that. Will is the practical spirit, and spirit in the
intelligence. In its development it goes from the sentiment, through presentation, to thought.
Intelligence is therefore theoretical and practical, that is, it relates to the object that it
appropriates in thought, and which simultaneously practically appoints as its own, through
which it is negatively determined and has itself as itself – it can relate to it, alter it. That is the
single and distinct power of spirit.

The theoretical side of intelligence always begins with the given, the existent, and
appropriates it in thought; that appropriation is actually the suspension of everything existent
and the understanding of the particular as universal. “The variegated canvas of the world” is
the presumption of knowledge and without it, it would be empty. But that “variegated canvas”
evanescs in understanding the conception. The universal, from which the will could only be
conceived, is liberty. Volition is knowledge like free will and is posed as such to immanency.
Law, morality, family, civic society, country, is the immediacy of free will, its placement in
exteriority.

That which is presented as free will becomes the subject of thought. In the manner of
keeping with thought it must be “penetrated” with thought, presented and adopted as thought,
and without arrears too. On the other hand, the drive of thought is to be realized and
maintained in the way it was established – as external. But that is no longer the subject of how
thought exists in immediacy, as a form of free will; that is now a new subject, one that is
conceived as universal and opposes the existing. That which is “adopted” in thought is not
repealed externally, in its reality. This reality still stands as the impenetrable “motley
covering” of reality; it resists the drive of understanding that its variegated-ness unifies
concept and in it develops. Only in practical action is this obstinacy of the real revealed, but
not penetrated by attack. Practical intelligence reforms the real and grants it its character of
universality. The character of free will, as a concept, does not appoint itself to empty space
but in the reality which already has its characters, its immediacy and exteriority.

In order for the drive of the cognitive mind to achieve the reformation of reality, the
intelligence must encroach another of its powers which is neither theoretical nor practical, but
creative.
Without creative power, the practical power, as a side of theoretical power which has the drive for accomplishing, can only mean wandering or violence upon the already existing characters of reality. That is negative liberty, the will which annuls, an empty abstraction “I” as the practical side of mind; too, that is an understanding which abstracts everything particular and natural – annuls, appropriates. Only the creative understanding stems from the negative, consolidates will and concept, it confirms the unity of its practical and theoretical power of mind. This unity is the condition of reality’s action in an already existing reality, which is not established but changed. For the real to be cognitive, it must, other than being perceived as cognitive, pose itself as cognitive. That posing is not posing in thinking but in reality which it cogitatively covers with its “variegated-ness.” Practical understanding cannot achieve that because it collides with the real, but only with its superficiality which must be altered in accordance with the perceived universal of that reality. That can only be achieved with creative understanding which takes the real both as the existent and as understood, and which brings those two into contact. The unification of the existent and its notion is a specific capability and power of intelligence which differs from theoretical and practical power.

Intelligence, both as practical and theoretical spirit, is before all else negative and abstract. The will is free – how does intelligence appear, negative because, referring to nature infinitely or its own immediacy (sensuality and similar), does not ultimately determine anything but instead repeals – everything emerges from its abstraction, here one, there another, etc. Also, in the understanding that it adopts through thinking, a positive disposition does not exist because understanding takes all immediacy of reality and reduces it to the universal; only in that universal, concept, reality achieves its true character, but it is not its existing character but a different one in which all determinations of that real become no longer valid and acquire an altogether different notion. In order to acquire the new notion there needs to be a union between thought and will which is not a continuity of one to the other. Free will emerges from its immediacy and abstract infinity if it manages to raise itself from the notion of liberty. To achieve that it cannot remain in its negative state – it must overcome it and appoint itself as positive, it must place reality itself as liberty. But that is not the reality of negative liberty in which there is another reality which emerges from understanding. That understanding is also in a state of negativity, it encompasses the reality of liberal immediacy and naturalness because that is the only way to positively determine itself as something else, something more – like a notion.

Determined by notion, liberty only then appoints itself positively (in ownership, law, morality) and realizes that the reality it finds itself in is not its actual reality. However, there is no continuity of action of free will determined by notion, and reality of negative liberty from a single historical condition. For that condition to be the condition of positive liberty, the practical and theoretical spirit must be mediated by creative spirit and creative understanding, which only recognizes the difference at the level of reality. Negative liberty is the state of global patchwork which is always imposed as real and which liberty overcomes in annihilation and turns into emptiness. That type of action is empty because nothing remains after it, just as knowledge that adopts its subjects by taking away their immediacy also empties the notion without its realization. However, that realization collides with the hard crust of reality and enters a state of emptiness which negative liberty already made it. Positive determination of notion in action is possible only as a new reality.

The emptiness of negative liberty, abstracting from every disposition, can be elevated to the character of reality, either theoretically in religious fanaticism, or politically in the destruction of any social movement (individual, institutional, organizational, etc.). It is against all positive dispositions because it brings order; its realization is the “fury of destruction” (for
instance, the Terror of the French Revolution, Communist revolutions, Islamic revolutions, national movements, and so on).  

That negative moment or disposition of thought and will is overcome by determination and differentiation, the appointing of some distinctive “I.” That is how the abstract “I” – its pure negativity – enters into existence, into training.

However, even this moment of determination is negativity because it annihilates the first abstract negativity. Will is no longer given abstractly, in the orientation which wants nothing concrete to its infinite orientation, instead it is limited to something in which it is concretized.

So, both of these moments “I” – its pure reflection in itself as a negation of every disposition, and his disposition and concreteness, are in relation of negativity of one determination to another, and both are one-sided. The will is the unity of those moments – the moment of determination must be returned through a moment of self-reflection to the moment of ambiguity, to the universal. With that the individuality of the will returns to the universal, returns to itself as its determination. I as the will is negatively determined towards the self by being concretized and by being negatively appointed in relation to its determination which “knows it as something which is its own, something which is only ideal [ideell], a mere possibility by which it is not constrained and in which it is confined only because it has put itself in it.—This is the freedom of the will and it constitutes the concept or substantiality of the will, its weight, so to speak, just as weight constitutes the substantiality of a body” (Hegel, 2008, 21,32).

In linking these two moments of negativity, the will is mediated by itself and returns to itself. It is not presupposed as something complete prior to its determination and the repeal of that determination – it is this action. Only with this action is the will the universal which is with itself because it presents itself as the other and seizes to be universal since it recognizes the other as its own – it remains with itself in its limitedness, and in the other it maintains the universal – that is the concrete notion of liberty.

If the will could be presupposed as the subject, as the universal which relates back to itself, it would remain abstract and undetermined; too, if it was to be presupposed as determined, content-wise, it would remain finite and coincidental. The will, as liberty, exists only in action of this transference of the universal to the particular and the particular to universal – into its concept; it is the unity of determination and the annihilation of that determination.

The mere reflection of the subject as the will, the capability and power of mind to abstract from each determination, is not sufficient for the concretization of that pure negativity of mind; the mind, in the state of negativity and abstraction, cannot be determined concretely – it cannot supply itself with the content. In self-reflection the mind retreats its universality which it can understand only as the abstraction of something. The mind does not possess the capability of abstracting from that abstraction because it reached its universality through abstraction – understanding through that universality is neither possible nor does it make sense.

On the other hand, the concrete of the mind as the will, the particular content in which it is given, cannot elevate itself to the concept as its truth. The I cannot exceed the boundaries of its determination, it remains in it like in its “truth.” Also, it is in opposition to its speculative truth because it is the abstraction of this determination. The speculative knowable mind relates to itself and abolishes everything concrete – it does not have the power of understanding the concrete in its determination because it exceeds it. The immediacy of those determinations, from its side, resists the abstract, negative power of mind which destroys.

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9 See more: Hegel (1989), addition to paragraph 6.
In particular, whether it be nature, whether it be the determination of the will, its content and aim, it is still something concrete. As something concrete and as content, it cannot relate to itself because it would negate itself – its essence is to be what it is. As the negation of an abstract uncertainty, it is determined and positively given, but it can neither negate its own givens, nor is the mere negative abstraction sufficient for its negation. We are not grateful to the cognitive and practical power of mind for the concrete becoming of mind, or the mindlessness of the concrete, but instead to their unity, which their one-sidedness alone could not achieve. That is achieved through creative power of mind which has the potential of actualizing the universal, notion as understanding or liberty, and still to retain its truth, and that which is universal raise to the level of notion, and retain its contents and determinations. Creative intelligence is the thin thread of spirit that binds their cognitive and practical mind and enables its existence. Without it they would be lost, one in its own abstract ambiguity, the other in coincidence of infinite determinations. Without the creative intelligence, knowledge would remain abstract and without the possibility of concretization; the actual would remain coincidental and meaningless, left to itself and its immanence. The actual historical state would remain unprevailable, without meaning or aim; knowledge would remain abstractly opposite to un-knowledge, the actual as coincidental.

Creative intelligence is neither just theoretical nor just the practical power of mind, it is the action of their fusion.

“Thus freedom lies neither in indeterminacy nor in determinacy; it is both of these at once” (Hegel, 2008, 33).

In the amalgamation of ambiguity and determination one does not remain one-sided with a single disposition, but is limited by another, and in that limit knows itself as itself. However, this knowledge of self as self, and knowledge of other as self, is the result of neither the abstraction from other nor the designation of self as the other. It is precisely the question that, through the abstract understanding of self, we do not determine ourselves in the other by the immanency of that same understanding, nor can we abstract the other so we are simultaneously with us and with it. For instance, love and friendship as immediate dispositions, as concrete liberty, are no longer possible outside the content of the others. Every return to the self from other means the repeal of that liberty. The “I” does not truly exist outside determination, outside the other.

One can conclude about customs through analogy. It has knowledge in its self-consciousness, and reality in its existence, except that action has its “foundation” and catalyzing ends in the customary being “the concept of freedom developed into the existing world and the nature of self-consciousness” (Hegel, 2008, 154).

In knowledge and in existence the foundation and the catalyst is the “habitual being,” that is, the habitual reality regardless of its degree of development – despite it being a family, society, or country.

Custom-ness, for the subject, has the character of natural necessity because liberty does not exist outside the already established liberty. Laws and regulations, rules and norms, permit the survival of custom-ness which is elevated above subjective opinion and discretion. Liberty is proven through the reality of custom-ness to be perceived as necessity. “It is the fact that the ethical order is the system of these specific determinations of the Idea which constitutes its rationality. Hence the ethical order is freedom or the will in and for itself as what is objective, a circle of necessity whose moments are the ethical powers which govern the life of individuals. To these powers individuals are related as accidents to substance, and it is in individuals that these powers are represented, have the shape of appearance, and become actualized” (Hegel, 2008, 154, 155).

Power is on the side of custom-ness, the life of the individual is administered by it. “Thus the ethical order has been represented by peoples as eternal justice, as gods existing in
and for themselves, in contrast with which the empty business of individuals is only a fluctuating play” (Hegel, 2008, 155).

For the subject, custom-ness is, on one hand, an object of knowledge, but an object that is, as if a being of nature, completely distinct, while on the other hand, in that object separation, custom-ness is not alien to the subject, instead it gives it “spiritual testimony,” perceives it as its own being “in which it has its own self-feeling, residing in it as its own from itself, “the essence in which he has a feeling of his selfhood, and in which he lives as in his own element which is not distinguished from himself” (Hegel, 2008, 155). Custom-ness, as substantial determination for the subject, is obligation (to be part of family, society, country).10

Customary life and its characters are not the realities of liberty according to subjective arbitrariness but according to the notion of will, and that is universality and divinity. Notion, the universal is that which must appear in understanding, which must be understood as universal and which must supply reality – the idea of liberty exists only as such. Then, the universal, understood as universal, must relate to the complete liberty of uniqueness and the goodness of the individual “that the interests of family and civil society must concentrate themselves on the state, although the universal end cannot be advanced without the personal knowledge and will of its particular members, whose own rights must be maintained” (Hegel, 2008, 235).

Knowledge and will of uniqueness is universal (of the individual, of family, of civic society), it is the function and welfare of uniqueness and cannot “progress” without distinctiveness.

The action of concretization of liberty is on the side of uniqueness, it shifts towards the interest of the universal, and on the other hand, the universal knows and admits it as its own substantiality and acts upon it as its final purpose that it “does not prevail or achieve completion except along with particular interests and through the cooperation of particular knowing and willing; and individuals likewise do not live as private persons for their own ends alone, but in the very act of willing these they will the universal for the sake of the universal, and their activity is consciously aimed at the universal end” (Hegel, 2008, 235). 11

Then, first of all, the actual individual and his or her specific interests should be developed and have fully developed acknowledgement of its rights – in the family, civic society, and country; second, from this development the actual individual, with the aid of itself, partly traverses into the interest of the universal; third, the actual individual, through his or her own knowledge and will, partly acknowledges the universal as its own substantial spirit; four, the actual individual is active for its own substantial spirit like for its own final goal; five, the universal is valid and executed through this particular interest, the knowledge and will of an actual individual; the actual individual does not live for its own interest, instead its will is together in the universal and for the universal, its action is aware of that function.

From this developed individual interest and right, man himself emerges as partial, meaning not complete. He is still tied to that interest and right and he cannot completely abandon them.

It means he partially abandons them himself, transcending them. It means that the possibility of transcending the existing system of developed relations (family and civic society) is presupposed. The actual individual must acknowledge the universal as its own substantiality, and that emerges out of knowledge.

With Hegel knowledge is the creative power of mind which allows transcendence of the existing and the achievement of the universal, which is both truthful and the only possible

11 Ibid., p. 378.
real. The cognitive power of mind is also the theoretical power of the knowledge of truth, as well as the practical power of its realization, and also the creative power of this live transversal of the existing into the possible, possibility into reality. Creative power is part of cognitive power, according to Hegel.

Only under this presumption about the creative power of knowledge is it possible for the actual individual to find its final interest in the universal and for the universal to be achieved in particular will and its aim. Furthermore, it is presumed that the particular and the universal are identical and that that identity is understood and acquired through knowledge.

However, there remains an open problem: how is it possible for the universal to be understood as universal in the particular and the unique, which it not yet inhabits, and for which the universal is merely a possibility?

Only in notion is that possible given as being-in-itself. The existing system of connections and relations (family and civic society) is not yet a notion and does not possess the universal given as in-itself; it is an unfinished notion, in other words, it is only partial. But it is also completely developed in its own notion, it is that which is in-itself, and its in-itself is realized as family and civic society. This system of connections and relations cannot overcome itself because it developed its possibilities to the very end; it, being what it is, has no further possibilities nor could possibilities be recognized and known within it.

How, then, do we get to the knowledge of the universal, the notion which is above family and civic society, above the system of relations and institutions in which the individual finds himself?

No theoretical or practical power of mind can reach the universal by holding on to the existing and its understanding – that understanding is always limited by the givens. Cognitive power, neither as knowledge nor as command for volition, is not in position to do this. A new force is needed – a creative power of mind which will find the possibility of the universal outside the existing and its knowledge.
10. Nation as the Reality of Spirit

Hegel presumes that the existent is cognitive and that the individual understands the cognitive as its own; too, he presumes that the individual understands the cognitive as its ultimate ends which allows it to overcome those existing ones that did not yet achieve the ultimate ends – that did not yet live up to that degree. Hegel presupposes the thing to be achieved, as achievable twofold – partly as an already given reality, partly as the universal or the cognitive which is individually understood as such, existing for itself.

Universality must be given as reality, in action; it must be individually developed in its understanding – this individuality must be achieved, the universal must be the welfare of individuals, and the individual must know it and desire it, in order for that which exists – as an incomplete notion or unrealized liberty – to be overcome. That occurs within the nation.

It was the nation that became the substantial universality, became its own object and ends as the identity of individuality – as its interiority. That substantiality produces itself through the individual and particular – family and civic society. It is simultaneously the ends of that individual and particular, of their idealities, especially as a political conviction of the individual, as an objectively existing ideality – a political nation in its stance.

The nation stands in relation to the sphere of private rights and private welfare, as well as family and civic society, as “an external necessity and their higher authority; its nature is such that their laws and interests” (Hegel, 2008, 236).

This “external necessity” is overcome through being understood as an “immanent goal” of the private and the particular; the power of this “necessity” lies precisely in the uniqueness of this particular interest within the individual – individuals have a duty towards the universal of the nation as much as they have rights, as much as they claim it and from it.

However, Hegel does not lead us, on the other hand, towards the manner in overcoming the other type of “external necessity,” those being the existing institutionalized individual and particular which have not yet been elevated to the universal – its ultimate truth. He overcomes the “necessity” with the same universal that exists as the “external necessity” in the nation, but he does it in such a way that it emerges from the ideality of the individual and particular, their substantiality which they know as such and want as such.

This overcoming of necessity is merely formal, in knowledge, not even real. Real overcoming involves real alternation of the existing necessities of institutions and relations, and the establishment of new ones.

Indeed, Hegel avers that “a nation is not a work of art,” that it stands in the sphere of arbitrariness, coincidence, and delusion, but that they do not belong to crucial moments of its existence, its idea and truth. They are prevailed through the immanency of the universal in the mind of the individual.

However, even though the nation is not a “work of art,” it is a work, it is the work of individuals, the institution of their relations. It emerges from a twofold relation of individuals – in relation towards the immanency of the universal, ideality, which prevails in the necessity of the universal, and in relation towards the other type of “necessity” – arbitrariness, coincidence, and delusion. In order to create a nation as their own, individuals must overcome both of these necessities.

“On the contrary, in Germany, where practical life is as spiritless as spiritual life is unpractical” (available at: www.marxist.org), both the practical and theoretical mind is missing a vital dimension – their own connection. This connection can only assure the
creative mind, which gives practicality-reality to the spiritual, and certainty to the practical spiritual. For Marx, the actual social power of that identity is the proletariat because philosophy (knowledge) seeks its material weaponry in it, it seeks its spiritual weaponry in philosophy. For Marx the proletariat is the “creative mind” since it connects the spiritual and the material, but only by being realized as historically-real.

In creating a nation, individuals connect these two spheres of necessity, but knowledge and will alone are insufficient. The necessity of coincidence and delusion resists the immanency of the universal which exists in the mind of the individual. That resistance is not only idealistic, not only in knowledge, but in reality; it does not consist of delusions that are also the ideality of mind which have not yet arrived at truth and which are firmly placed within the mind; it also consists of the real relations of individuals when placed at the ideality of delusions, as well as their individual and particular ends, but also the actual social relations.

Delusions, which encompass the pliability of passion, hatred, animosity, fear, and indecisiveness, in given historical circumstances become institutions and “foundational facts” of history, they become the “necessities” which determine the entirety of history, they become the framework of “actual-politic.”

However, delusions are forms (in the Aristotelian notion), not facts. Those are the historical actions that do not have aims in themselves but in their creators (on whom they depend), just as in practical action (poiesis) which relates to the physical, material world whose result is material (for utility). They can be very effective because they are deliberate. Their creators imbue them with all their energy so that their reality takes on an appearance of the real despite not having official certainty. These “realities” depend on the abilities of their creators to display and impress them as such. That occurs through objectification and institutionalization which is always part of the socio-political power of their creators. That is how subjectivisms become objective historical facts with the character of necessity. In all eschatological theories of history, they do not have any truth value, they fall under contingencies without a significance of the real.

However, the experience of history, through which we passed from 1990 to 1995, reveals that delusion, hatred, urges, indecisiveness, and other subjectivisms, can embrace real impact and essentially determine historical processes. They need not remain in the margins of history, they can acquire the form of “creative” practice.

The incongruity on action between the central historical agents of the time – Franjo Tudman, Slobodan Milošević, Alija Izetbegović – lasted two years. As long as their political deliberations and decisions appeared to be ordinary delusions and mistakes, their genuine intentions and aims could not be understood. Public was the enlightenment, drawing attention to the delusions and heavy consequences which could potentially occur – including war. It was not made clear that it was a matter of deliberate delusions which later became convictions, and about the intentions to institutionalize them and turn them into objective facts and circumstances which would in-themselves determine other events.

During the nineties, Tudman, Milošević, and Izetbegović came to a political position which allowed their personalities (the foundation of their delusions) to be transformed into social and political facts – to be institutionalized and imbued with causal historical power.

I closely followed Tudman’s campaign speeches in 1990, not knowing the terms under which he took leadership of the opposition and became the bearer of the agenda for deconstructing communism in Croatia. It was strange and inexplicable that the role was not undertaken by either Savka Đapčević Kučar, or Mika Tripalo, or Vlado Gotovac, or Dražen Dudisa, or Marko Veselica, or Drago Stipac, or anybody else from the “Croatian Spring.” There apparently needed to be someone unknown in the political public, a communist General with a suspect dissident biography. In his campaign speeches he frequently, albeit casually, referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina and its future. Those were cues, not fully formed political
ideas, which hinted at a lack of knowledge, wrong historical information (despite being a historian), or some enigmatic frustrations.

Upon taking power, Tuđman’s stand on Bosnia and Herzegovina was becoming clearer and politically elaborate, until he made it part of Croatian politics altogether. Bosnia and Herzegovina would become a part of the resolution for the Croatian national question in the context of the collapse of Yugoslavia.

To become real, one would previously need to insure that Yugoslavia would collapse. Ideologically and politically that deconstruction began with the League of Communists of Yugoslavia at the 14th congress. The actors of the event were the communist leaders of the republics, with Slobodan Milošević at the head. Tuđman did not participate in that process, he was still anonymous. However, the actual collapse of Yugoslavia began when he came to power in Croatia and when the national institutions started falling apart. Yugoslavia did not need to collapse with the annihilation of the Party, it could have been democratized instead (just as the collapse did not have to lead to war). The deconstruction began with the deconstruction of institutions, the main actors being Tuđman and Milošević (who in the meantime took power in Serbia). Those two, with the help of the new Slovenian national leadership, demolished the national government – which was successfully being led by the Croatian Ante Marković (who also proposed an economic and political solution to the problems in Yugoslavia) – then demolish the presidency and change the national character of JNA as national defense. Only with the deconstruction of Yugoslavia could they bring Bosnia and Herzegovina into the context of ideas and events which they themselves concocted. They exploited the national power for the institutionalization of their personal delusions, frustrations, and passions, and thus transformed them into objective historical circumstances within which the official politics were undertaken. That is how Bosnia and Herzegovina took part in the dissolution of the Serbo-Croatian historical problem and the establishment of an autonomous Croatia and Serbia (Milošević, persuaded by the idea of maintaining a so-called truncated Yugoslavia, wanted to establish a great Serbia).

However, during the entire process of solving the problem, a visible difference between the relationship Tuđman and Milošević have towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, slowly emerges. Their psychotic states, which objectify national politics, are different.

In the conversations I had with Tuđman, I discovered something rather interesting. In his politics towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, meaning in the national politics of Croatia, it was not a case of ordinary delusion, ignorance or mistake in the estimate, instead it was frustration that eventually turned into hatred. It is known that he, even during the seventies, perceived Bosnia and Herzegovina as an artificial communist creation. With that, he revealed, for the first time, his nationalistic side, because the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina must be Serbian and Croatian, is essentially nationalistic. That idea was present in the minds of certain communists even during ZAVNOBIH (National Anti-Fascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina), formed in Mrkonjić, 1943. The Bosnian and Herzegovinian right to be called a republic, equal to other republics, and a constituted unit within Yugoslavia, was disputed even then.12 Tuđman never abandoned the idea that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a disruptive factor in resolving the Serbo-Croatian problem, even within the Yugoslav framework. He was a ridged historian who believed he had a historical task of solving that problem.13 The existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina became a matter of

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frustration, it was a glitch in the history of the Balkan people, and it was his vanity that made him think he could solve the problem for good. This frustration turned into hatred towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, towards its existence, but also towards the people who associated themselves with it.

In almost every conversation I had with him he revealed his real opinions, despite his attempts to conceal them. That hatred was institutionalized, it became the framework of official state politics, the propounded premise for the politics of his party, including all national and party officials. This influenced all the way to the Officials of HDZ in Bosnia and Herzegovina and “Herzeg-Bosnia.” All orders were executed before they came to power in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was not clear to me at the time, it was only later that I realized what was going on.

It was at a dinner party before the war, at our house in Kiseljak, with friars from the Fojnica monastery with whom I was friends, that I noticed it for the first time. Some local members of HDZ, who were also the communist district leaders, came uninvited to my house during that dinner. They were also my friends, colleague high school teachers, old schoolmates, and old acquaintances. Their intrusion into the company of friars was strange, especially since they showed no prior interest. However, after briefly interfering in our conversation, they revealed the real reason for coming. They began explaining, to the friars of the Fojnica monastery, the “deleterious” and “historically harmful” role of Fra. Anđeo Zvizdović who, coming out of that particular monastery, greeted Sultan Muhammad II, the conqueror of Bosnia, in 1463, demanded and then received the protection of his Catholic followers. If it was not for that, they argued, today’s Bosnia would have neither Catholics norCroats – Bosnia would probably not even exist and “Croatian politics” would not have the problem it does. That problem was clearly defined: the existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the existence of Bosnia beside Herzegovina, and the existence of Croats within Bosnia. In that conversation, they did not only propose a single historically-political hypothesis by which someone can, more or less, side; in their words, in the manner in which they were uttered, in their sharp gestures, in their faces, in their eyes, there was hatred. My guest friars were stupefied, they remained speechless and with pale faces left dinner. All that was long before anybody even thought of war.

That was the first time in Bosnia I heard negative comments about the Franciscans and their historical role, especially when charismatic people, like Fra. Andeo Zvizdović, were in question. In the extensive Franciscan literature, or in the literature about them, I never before came across a single reference to a negative relationship of the Catholic people with their friars, who were even referred to as uncles. It was always a general understanding that it was them who were the protectors of Bosnia, the Catholic people, and their tradition.

Tudman’s hatred for Bosnia and Herzegovina was already established as a framework for every relationship towards it as well as for all who sympathized with it. He despised Fra. Petar Andelović, the Provincial of Bosnian Franciscans, despised Fra. Luka Markešić, the former Provincial of two terms, despised Fra. Ljubo Lucić, one of the most respectable and most influential Bosnian Franciscans, both among intellectuals and the people – and that hatred Tudman could not hide. In one of the conversations I had with him in 1993, he openly, and with reproach, told me that he believed I was smarter than they were and that I would not follow their actions. The problem is not the position he took against them, everybody has the right to criticize others, but there have to be arguments for it, it must be rationally elucidated. For him there was no explanation other than the fact that the friars

agreed with that which should not exist – with that which he despised. He spread that hatred to everybody around him, and transferred it to public politics. Why else would he be against the Franciscans, and against all who sympathized with Bosnia and Herzegovina. He could have doubted my Croatian-ness and Catholic-ness, and that of others, perhaps we are not sufficiently Croat or Catholic for his nationalistic standard, but he could not doubt the authenticity of the Franciscans, historically the most distinguished Catholics (and not just in Bosnia), most dedicated protectors of the Croatian tradition. His only foundation of that hatred, it seemed, was their historical identification with Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Similarly, Tuđman held the same opinion about anybody who identified with Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of their religious or national affiliation, and regardless where they came from.

Bosniaks always believed Tuđman despised them because they were Muslim. He pronounced their national name “Muslims” with ridicule and disdain (I have heard it myriad times). But it was not a question of that. He did not despise Bosniaks because they were Muslim, since he did not despise them all. He despised only those who identified themselves with Bosnia and Herzegovina, who resisted the aggression, and who fought for her existence. He had close friends among the Muslims in Croatia, people he played tennis with, people he installed as ambassadors and other public functions. He had Bosnian Muslim friends and favored them in political and national relations. He was not bothered by Muslims as a religious group, only those who were Bosnian patriots (nearly all mosques in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of HVO were demolished while the mosque in Zagreb survived the war intact). His entire politics towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, even internationally, was founded on hatred. That is why he did not have a rational approach to the Bosnian crisis in circumstances of Yugoslavia’s collapse. He only wished that Bosnia and Herzegovina would perish as an autonomous and internationally recognized nation. What was to become of the Croats in that country was irrelevant and left to chance. In his suggestions for dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina, the historically vital Croatian areas were not included in the so-called Croatian Republic, which would later join Croatia proper. The Croats of central Bosnia, from Posavina and Krajina, were insignificant for him. During the peace negotiations in Geneva, 1993, I was vehemently opposed to his division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I claimed that Kruševo, Fojnica, and Kraljeva Sutjeska (or Vareš), were the three points of Croatian and Catholic planes in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that the interest of those Croats must inform both the Bosnian and Croatian politics. He reacted aversely to my devotion and claimed that I was fighting for a cause that did not exist. The executer of his politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mate Boban, urged the archbishop Puljić to move the bishops, along with the Cathedral itself, out of Sarajevo. But, since Tuđman institutionalized his hatred towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, even those who did not agree with his policies had to remain silent before him. His ambassador in Brussels, Graf Vranyczany, the acting member of the Geneva peace negotiations who listened upon our discussion, approached me during a break and quietly told me not to wane, that I was right, and that Bosnia and Herzegovina must not be divided, above all else by Croatians. A similar opinion during those negotiations was expressed by the then acting commander of HVO, general Ante Roso. But such opinions could not be signified – they instead remained subjective, irrelevant and incidental. When Stjepan Mesić and Josip Manolić started expressing their opinions publically, not even the highest national functions could save them from Tuđman’s fury. They were not only removed from their positions, but they became the objects of Tuđman’s hatred – he endeavored to dispose of them both politically and materially. Still, they were lucky and did not end up like Ante Paradžik, Blaž Kraljević, Fra, Ljubo Lucić, and others who lost their lives in “undetermined circumstances” or “by mistake.”
On the other side of the conflict, Milošević’s politics towards Bosnia and Herzegovina were based on interest. Milošević was achieving the goals of greater Serbia and all his actions were bent towards that function. That goal was rationally determined, meaning without emotion or subjectivity. He was precisely elaborate, he had a maximum and minimum version, he had clear opening moves, he had contractors, as well as anticipated material, moral, and political support. Too, like any other project it was all about timing, because any hesitation had to be paid twice fold – Milošević took action with this in mind. His project included “Serbian areas” in Croatia, from Karlobag to Virovitica, roughly the borders of the Medieval Ottoman Empire in Europe, as well all of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia. That idea was first proposed by the professor of history at the Faculty of Philosophy, Sarajevo, Milorad Ekmečić, in March, 1991, as a member of the political advisory board for SDS as well as the co-author of the Serbian national program with Dobrica Ćosić. That was all the maximal version of that program. As a first associate in that program, Milošević wished to attain the support of Alija Izetbegović because he believed that is how he would acquire the entirety of Bosnia and Herzegovina with least effort. In contrast to Tudman, Milošević rationally estimated the need to have the strongest and most influential ally in the realization of that program because his success in Bosnia and Herzegovina would depend on that person. When Izetbegović denied his request, Milošević did not hesitate to look for an ally in Tudman, despite being at war with Croatia. Tudman acquiesced his request, which led to a most absurd alliance of any war – two presidents and two nations at war with one another simultaneously join efforts in a war against a third nation. Of course, neither the reasons nor the motives of that alliance agree. Tudman despised Bosnia and Herzegovina and wished it to expire, along with all its sympathizers. Milošević had a rational goal in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and even if he could not acquire it in its entirety, he was content with half its territory – the other half he left to Tudman and spurred him into war with the Bosniaks.

Since, in this project, his evaluation of the Bosniaks’ role was not founded on hatred but on rational insight, Milošević needed an ally, and found one easily in Tudman. He assessed that the military advantage must be realized in the shortest time possible and that the use of force must be brutal in order to have effect. Crimes were part of the project. Milošević did not allow Bosniaks to be killed in Serbia, where they lived in the hundreds of thousands, but he sent armed forces and employed paramilitary formations to kill them in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in areas where they were getting in the way of his project. It was all almost over in two or three months, with the exception of Srebrenica and Žepa, which were declared safe zones and liquidated three years later. Milošević insisted on accepting both the Vance-Owen as well as the Owen-Stoltenberg peace plans since he already attained his minimalistic boundaries for greater Serbia. Each prolongation of the peace treaty undermined his project, and he knew it.

Suddenly, Karadžić and Mladić, who did not recognize and who doubted the project due to their own interests, were a problem. When Milošević arrived in Dayton, he did not allow the representatives of the Republika Srpska to take part in peace negotiations, despite being present at his table. On different occasions, he prohibited them to even informally sit alongside him. They did not know the contents of the Dayton Agreement until its very initialization.

Milošević removed, or tried to remove, tried to brutally remove all his political adversaries in Serbia, from Dragiša Pavlović to Ivan Stambolić. His desire for power and leadership informed all his political actions. When he could not dominate SKJ (The League of Communists of Yugoslavia), he disassembled the party at the 14th congress. When he realized

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he could not have Izetbegović for an ally, he allied with Tudman and negotiated the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia. When Izetbegović formed an army and began a tenacious resistance for the future of his people, Milošević adopted the third, the minimal version of his project, that being the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into three parts. Bosniaks were not his problem as long as they were part of his project, just as they posed no problems for Tudman as long they did not identify themselves with Bosnia and Herzegovina. (When Bosniaks fled from Serbian aggression, Croatia accepted some 300 thousand refugees). Milošević neither hated nor sympathized with the Bosniaks. Tudman despised them because they eroded his delusion, which he transformed into a historical study, that they were Croatians of Islamic denomination. Milošević was a criminal, Tudman a historical mistake. Criminals are forgotten in time, historical mistakes remembered.

Milošević was not a nationalist, he only used nationalism to acquire and maintain power; he established institutions of power which made that possible. Tudman was a nationalist and he used his power as a means of nationalizing society in order to institutionalize it as a collective ruling conscience.

On the other side of all this was Alija Izetbegović with his subjectivisms and personal weaknesses which he objectified in public politics.¹⁶ I observed him from up close, we were in frequent contact even before I became a member of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Presidency in 1993. From then, however, we were colleagues in the same chief institution of the nation, which was also the executive power, and the legislative body that was responsible for all decisions and all judicial power. Izetbegović’s fundamental characteristic, manifest in his national demeanor and action, was his indecision. He elevated these characteristics to the ranks of national procedure when reaching decisions. In normal circumstances and in a wealthy nation, indecision would be characterized as caution and wisdom, however, in a country at war where decisions must be made quickly and unambiguously, it presents a problem.

Izetbegović displayed traits of indecision even before the war. When Radovan Karadžić, as leader of SDS, said the famous threatening words in Congress, that the independence for Bosnia and Herzegovina will bring it to hell and its people to oblivion, I approached Izetbegović during a congressional break and asked if he planned on arresting Karadžić. Izetbegović was surprised and told me that he expected that question from anyone other than me, a “convinced supporter of democracy” who challenged oppressive measures even in the old regime. I then told him that democracy cannot give space to what Karadžić said and that it was precisely democracy that requires such action from him. I added that I knew very well what a country is and how it should be protected. Izetbegović was indecisive and did nothing. He let Karadžić, in collaboration with Milošević and JNA, arm Bosnian Serbs, form his own army, and carry out the threat.

Same indecision was there when the war started. Karadžić executed the first siege of Sarajevo, as a trial, a day after Bosnia and Herzegovina was internationally recognized, while the actual and complete siege about a month later, on May 2nd, 1992. The bombing and destruction of the city began immediately, along with sniper fire on the civilians. In the meantime, Izetbegović was in captivity with JNA in Lukavica and was exchanged for general Kukanjac, who kept Sarajevo under siege from within his garrisons. Parallel with that, SDS, as part of the national government, demolished the national institutions. Yet, despite all that, Izetbegović still did not declare a state of war, and the remainder of the national institutions did not function as if in war, at least not as proclaimed in the Constitution. He was indecisive,

¹⁶ It is possible to talk about the other subjectivities of Tudman, Milošević, and Izetbegović – here, we have counted only those that had a strong objective impact and which I witnessed personally.
he even believed in pacifism of JNA\textsuperscript{17}, while Karadžić, with the help of Milošević, delineated borders of his country within Bosnia and Herzegovina and carried out ethnic cleansing. A state of war was declared when Milošević had already achieved the bulk of his plans for Bosnia and Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{18}

Izetbegović’s indecision was also apparent in his choice of ally, both during and before the war. It was with his suggestions on an asymmetric federally-confederate country that he instilled a prolonged sense of hope in Milošević to retain Bosnia and Herzegovina within Yugoslavia while both Slovenia and Croatia declared independence. It was not a strategy of buying time and preparing for war, which was by now inevitable. The time he gained was not seized by him but by others, systematically preparing for war and aggression on the country. Even during that phase he displayed something he would later admit publically – I hold one opinion before noon, and quite another by the afternoon.

In the end he rejected an alliance with Milošević and hurried with the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but before securing allies elsewhere. He neither secured nor formalized that alliance – which should be part of the preparation for war and quite indispensable during war. He was convinced that Tudman was an ally through the sets of circumstances – that the alliance was inevitable. When I once warned him that he should not believe Tudman at face value, he told me that alliance was necessary since we shall all be attacked by a common enemy. I warned him that it was obvious from Tudman’s public assertions that he intends to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina, but I could not convince him of it. Worst of all, he did not actualize and formalize the alliance with Tudman that was to officially bind them. Naturally, Tudman did not behave as expected and entered an alliance with Milošević, a plan which was later elaborated and specified by Boban and Karadžić in Graz.\textsuperscript{19}

Izetbegović had to secure an alliance with Croatia before Tudman reached an agreement with Milošević, regardless of the actions he had to take. He was ready to act only when he saw he was at war with two nations, two para-nations, blocked from within and surrounded from without.\textsuperscript{20} His relationship with Tudman became so radical that he no longer wished to negotiate, much less trust him. During that time I was constantly travelling between Sarajevo and Zagreb because they were negotiating through me. I tried to convince Izetbegović on an alliance with Croatia despite the relations and despite the tragic war that was being waged between the Army of B&H and HVO. Izetbegović, in light of his indecisiveness which he transformed into strategy, hesitated by saying how he could not allow a legal entrance of the Croatian army (HV) into Bosnia and Herzegovina – that would be the essence of an agreement with Tudman as well as the real outline of the alliance. He claimed that he would not be able to force HV out of the country and that it would spell the legalization of an occupation. I trusted Tudman even less than he did, but I had a different opinion on the matter. I tried to convince him that he should enter an alliance with Tudman which would offer the Croatians equality within Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a strong guarantee from Croatia, including the confederalization of the two countries, where a military


\textsuperscript{18} The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was declared on the 20\textsuperscript{th}. of June 1992. See more in: Addendum ; Presidency documents. p.


\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., str. 311-314.
alliance would take shape as a means of achieving those ends.\textsuperscript{21} That is how HV would have a temporary tactical role in Bosnia and Herzegovina, not a permanent one. It would take on the role of a foreign military power regardless of the conditions under which it arrived, and it would have to leave after accomplishing that task. If it was to reject that, with such a request towards the international community, it would have to carry it out. Such a request could not be made to the army of Republika Srpska because it had the guise of a domestic army, regardless of the role it played.

Izetbegović did not understand the difference between the two, and before-noon he believed that such an alliance should be established, while in the after-noon that is should not. Such state of things lasted until the summer of 1995, when the liberation of Sarajevo was attempted and when Mladić took over the protected enclaves Srebrenica and Žepa, and in there carried out the genocide. Also, in the western end of the warzone, Bihać weathered the coordinated attacks from the RS Army, along with Abdić’s autonomists, with great difficulty. Ejup Ganić (then member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and I incessantly pressured Izetbegović to enter an alliance with Tuđman under the strategies and tactics I suggested. Ganić was completely for such an agreement. Under that pressure and under the pressure of a difficult positioning of Bihać, Izetbegović finally agreed to negotiate with Tuđman. The Split Agreement, which would have Croatia liberate parts of its territory from the so-called Army of Knin, while the Army of B&H, HVO, and HV come within reach of Banja Luka, was reached.

Izetbegović was indecisive even in the use of the Army of B&H in military operations. It was agreed that the 5\textsuperscript{th} corps from Bihać would have the primary line of offense towards Prijedor, Bosanski Novi, and Bosanska Kostajnica, with the intent of taking the Unska railroad and keeping Karadžić away from Croatia. However, that route was amended and part of the 5\textsuperscript{th} corps headed towards Banja Luka, in particular towards Manjača, where Croatian forces had already arrived. On that occasion it even came to a military tussle between the two armies. It is hard to believe that the commanders of military units would alter the strategic directions of their actions on their own accord. However, if they did attempt just that, Izetbegović had to be decisive and prevent it. It so happened that the Army of B&H reached neither Kostajnica nor Banja Luka. That was the big limitation at the negotiations in Dayton, because the position of the armed forces was the starting point of political negotiations.

Izetbegović’s indecision in peace negotiations for Bosnia and Herzegovina had a particularly significant role. He accepted all proposals, even participated them, despite them all being founded on the division of the country. Only when the negotiations were near final he would find ways to withdraw or in some manner reject them. He never decisively denied negotiations of dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina or declared a clear position on the matter, nor did he try to impose it and stick by it. He advocated for the entirety of the country, its multiculturalism, and equality among people, yet he negotiated its division along ethnic lines. His personal indecision was the strategy of national delegation which he led during the peace negotiations.

Today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina, in its arrangement and position, is to a great degree the consequence of the objectified and institutionalized subjectivisms and psychisms of chief leaders and military actors of the nineties. Tuđman, Milošević, and Izetbegović have transformed their characteristics, psychoses, and passions into procedures which were followed by entire peoples and countries, including the international community.

In sociological doctrines, even in the philosophy of history, it must be taken into consideration that subjectivisms and various psychotic states can be transformed into

objectively social and historical facts which then achieve the significance of social and historical causality.

In order to overcome this sort of “necessity” of individual delusions, a creative power of mind, not merely cognitive and practical, is needed; the creative power is the means of exiting this sphere of “necessity,” and its elements, which make up its existing reality, must be “annulled” and reality established anew.

A nation is not established by immanency of an individual’s conscience, but by conception of new relations which are congruent with truth.

If the country can be likened to a nervous system of an organism, with all its affiliated and differentiated functions, then that organism cannot be regarded only from the point of view of its automatism. The autonomy of the nervous system is not given only in the autonomy in the functionality of its articulation, but before all else in the autonomy of mind which can be separated, in its function, from the biological functionality given in autonomy. The nervous system automatically controls the organism but in its mind it possesses a particular type of autonomy – it can think beyond its biological autonomy, that is, it has an opinion wholly different from it and wholly autonomous. The autonomous power of mind is not separate from the immanency of the nervous system which is given in each organ of the organism and in each of its concrete actions. The power of mind is autonomous and particular, and the biological autonomy of the nervous system is just one of the cases to which it relates with its cognitive power.

Within the autonomy of mind is the creative power of mind and it is separate from external necessity of the nervous and biological automatism and functionalism; it relates to them through its creation.

The political conviction which Hegel evokes and which overcomes “necessity” of delusions and coincidences, must also be developed. It does not simply arise from the immanency of the universal, it arises in the confrontation with the existing and institutionalized delusions and coincidences which hold individuals in their brace. In order to form new ones, the old ones have to be demolished or changed; for the new ones to be veracious, they must be understood and wanted as such.

But they are not the only interest of the mind. The creative mind has the freedom of movement from one necessity to another – from general to particular, and the freedom of their overcoming, or even remaining with them. The certainty of truth is not the only certainty the mind seeks – it can have the certainty of the immediate interest, mythic certainty, ideological or religious certainty.

The central point from which a certain path of egression, from the particular and the immediate, lies – happens – in paragraph 270 and its addendum, in Hegel’s *Elements of the Philosophy of Right.*

Hegel defines the nation as a general aim of particular interests because it is the substance of those interests. A nation, therefore, is an abstract reality or the substantiality of those interests. That substantiality is the necessity of particular interests which maintains them in difference and activity of the nation – difference as in a conceptual and factual rigid disposition, as well as substantiality as a spirit which passed through the forms of erudition, a spirit which knows and wants itself. “Therefore the state knows what it wills and knows it as something thought” (Hegel, 2008, 254).

The reality of the country – that is, its truth – consists in that the interest of the whole (substantiality) is realized in the particular. Insofar as this unity does not exist, there is no reality because particularity losses its substance and appears as the independent which does not remain whole; on the other hand, the nation exists only as an abstraction without reality, as “bad state.” “A bad state is one which merely exists; a sick body exists too, but it has no

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genuine reality. A hand which is cut off still looks like a hand, and it exists, but without being actual. Genuine actuality is necessity; what is actual is inherently necessary” (Hegel, 2008, 235).

Society develops its cognitive identity within the nation.

Without this cognition, society would stagnate or atrophy in the various and contradicting partial interests. That means that the country and its institutions present the interest of the whole, which must then be realized through particular or even individual interests of the people.

Therefore, as long as partial interests, not collective and general, are privileged, the nation is not “real” but merely “exists.”

The cognition of particular and individual interests, be it class or national, or even the foundational human, it is given as a whole – the nation. It is the substance of political conscience which must appear in its reality as a subjective conscience of the individuals and social groups, including nations. The nation that does not endure the subjective political conscience is an abstract nation, with poor existence, because it does not contain social interests. The cognition of the nation, as a substance of political conscience, must have its real bearer – the subject of that conscience; on the other hand, citizens or collectives achieve and confirm their political subjectivity only within the nation, while all other content of identity within society. Insofar as that does not exist, neither does the real nation, and neither does the real bearer of political subjectivity as the cardinal content of identity.

A political de-subjectivization, or de-politicization, of people happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina, meaning that they were left without this cognitive political substance of which Hegel talks about.

The political subjectivity of people is related, before all else, to its constituency in the country; the loss of that subjectivity is related to the loss of constituency, or rather, its national identity. No group of people can live in one country while searching for their political identity in another. Such division is insurmountable and leads the people towards a state of schizophrenia, and its political practice towards isolationism or emigration. The process of de-politicization the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina is, therefore, congruent with the process of the estrangement from the country – that is a particular process.

This process began in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the nineties. For Croatians it began when they formed their first national party, which was to mark the beginning of the people’s political subjectivity and its internal democratization under new conditions.

However, that process was taken in the opposite direction – national politics directed it towards the nationalization of territories, that is, towards political and territorial emancipation and isolation. Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a socio-political unit, was abandoned as the grounds and framework of political identity of the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

It is a fact that the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, like other peoples in the republics of the former collective country, maintained dual political subjectivity – identifying themselves with both Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Yugoslavia. However, with the ascendance of Serbian nationalism, which transformed that country into a country of that people, political subjectivity of other peoples was radically goaded towards a national and republic identity. In order to establish a new fabric of national identity, the political subjectivism of the people, as part of that identity, stemmed from other nationalistic content – history, culture, religion, etc.

It was strongly expressed even among the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina who had the deepest historical roots in the country, a deep history of culture, national tradition and religion, as well as the oldest and most developed institutions on which to rely. That became apparent even in the first step in expressing the Croatian political subjectivism
in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Croatians were the loudest and most decisive when it came to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s autonomy – its independence from Yugoslavia. The Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ B&H), as a national political party, got plebiscitary support from the people of its establishment and thus became a new and distinct political consciousness. Its political subjectivism was manifested in firm identity with the possibility of Bosnian and Herzegovinian independence. The fact that the political party was established with the aid of HDZ Croatia, as part of a particular HDZ organization from Zagreb (statute HDZ B&H, article 4), had been previewed by Croatian people of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a “sister party” which had the same political interests within that country, or in other words, which encouraged Croatian political subjectivism and national identity with that of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The discrepancy which would lead to destruction was found on the level of the realization of political interests when the representatives of HDZ B&H, in the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Congress, January 24th and 25th, 1993, reached a decision on the referendum which proved the path of independence for Bosnia and Herzegovina and its international recognition, and with that legitimized their political identity. The Croatian HDZ, which already took power in Croatia and gained that country’s independence from Yugoslavia, attempted to de-legitimize HDZ B&H and change the referendum question at the “Livno meeting” on February 9th, 1992, and thus separate Bosnian and Herzegovinian independence from Yugoslavia from its constitution as an independent state, equal to Croatia or Slovenia which already achieved this feat. The attempt to enforce the “Livno” referendum question meant a clear political message for the Croatians in Bosnia and Herzegovina: you can announce the divorce of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Yugoslavia but you cannot constitute that country as an autonomous state. That was one of the first visual forms of political pressure performed on Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats, and the failed attempts of their de-politicization. This relationship between HDZ Croatia and HDZ B&H was confirmed by then Secretary General Ivan Markešić in his book “How We Saved Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Synopsis, Sarajevo, 2004). He claims that HDZ B&H, under the influence of HDZ Croatia, did not call the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats to the referendum, but did it voluntarily as the party’s Secretary General.

Despite all that, Croats turned up to the referendum and voted for an independent and autonomous Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina – a nation of citizens and peoples: Muslims, Serbs, and Croats, as well as others living there, just as the referendum question dictated. According to the Republic voting report, out of the 64.31% of the voters, over 99% (63.95%) voted for the referendum. That means that almost all Croats with the right to vote, came out to the referendum and voted “yes”; a number of Serbs also came out despite Radovan Karadžić’s urge to boycott the referendum.

The referendum was one of few opportunities in the recent history of Bosnia and Herzegovina that people freely, expressing their political will, opted for their nation and country.

However, the process of de-politicizing people, especially the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats, was led in continuity. The leaders of HDZ Croatia changed the leadership of HDZ B&H until the right group of officials came along who merged their own political program with the previously neutral political subjectivity of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats.

The interest of the people for declaring Bosnian and Herzegovina independent, along with its national sovereignty, was only supported insofar as that interest was directed against Serbian nationalist politics from Belgrade and the construction of Greater Serbia. The political enthusiasm of Croatians in Bosnia and Herzegovina served the Croatian HDZ
politics in Zagreb only as a partition behind which to create the conditions for segregating “Croatian parts” in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the “Croatian national politics.”

So, at the second regular conference of the Croatian Presidency of Herzeg-Bosnia (HZ H-B) – expanded by the membership of the HDZ B&H Presidency from the H-B grounds and the representatives of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Congress, held on December 23rd, 1991 – the following was said:

“The Croatian Union of Herzeg-Bosnia once again confirms the will of the entirety of Croatian people of Herzog-Bosnia, declared November 18th, 1991, in Grude, bringing a historical decision about the Croatian Union of Herzeg-Bosnia, which presents the foundation of having these territories join the Republic of Croatia.

The Croatian Union of Herzeg-Bosnia grants full legitimacy to Dr. Franjo Tuđman, as president of the Republic of Croatia as well as Croatian Democratic Union, to represent the interests of the Croatian Union of Herzeg-Bosnia in international factors and the inter-party and inter-republic negotiations on the final boundaries of the Republic of Croatia.”

From these briefs it is clear that the leaders of Herzeg-Bosnia considered the boundaries of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina inconclusive despite the fact that the matter was never under discussion and that nobody brought the borders under question. All discussion was geared towards the international recognition of the Republic of Croatia.

Secondly, the president of HDZ B&H, who was simultaneously a member of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Presidency and who was democratically elected by the free will of the people, was stripped of his legitimacy and the power was transferred to a president of another country.

At a meeting in Zagreb, December 27th, 1991, Franjo Tuđman (the president of Croatia, along with the delegation of HDZ B&H, and in the presence of an official from the Republic of Croatia), explained his twofold political approach towards Bosnia and Herzegovina.

He said:

“Therefore, there is no perspective of Bosnian and Herzegovinian sovereignty… We were under those conditions when we talked, we favored the politics of maintaining the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly because the Serbian national politics created problems of separating Serbian territory from Croatia.

Thus, in such circumstances it would be politically unadvisable if we opened the problem of delineation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but, if you recall in 1989, in our proclamation, the historical Proclamation of HDZ, we said that we are for the contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina but if its survival depends from the perspective of the Croatian people we must bring under question, the question of Croatian borders.

Under today’s circumstances gentlemen,, from the Croatian point of view, we favor delineation, from the general Croatian point of view and the point of view of the Croatian direction in Bosnia and Herzegovina…for tactical reasons we did not declare that, because we did not want to be those who brought the matter of borders under question” (cited shorthand from the recording of the meeting).

It was a matter of an already finished project of dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina, and politically affiliating Bosnian Herzegovinian Croats to Croatia, a fact that was testified in Tuđman’s further reasoning at that meeting.

He said:

“Therefore, I think, as we capitalized on this historical moment to create an internationally recognized independent Croatia. I similarly think that it is time to seize the opportunity to gather the Croatian national being around maximum limits.

If that is to be 30 districts or 28, that is, from this point of view, less relevant.
Therefore, I think, with clever politics we can get even there – with a clever delineation of borders, an agreement with the Serbians in Bosnia – that we can come to a point that instead of war, which threatens this sort of an undetermined question and the congestion of the army, that even the army be the pledge of execution of that border delineation” (cited from the same recording).

These positions were also confirmed by Božo Raić, vice-president of HZ Herzeg-Bosnia, in his presentation at the same meeting, where he explained the conflict between HDZ B&H, claiming that they (meaning the top of HZ Herzeg-Bosnia) are “in a trail of information given by the head of party of Republic of Croatia” and that it is a continuity, not a reversion, of the politics from Zagreb regarding Bosnian and Herzegovinian sovereignty. He is unambiguous: “we cannot accept these claims that stem from the fact that the contemporary ethnic structure on the territory of Herzeg-Bosnia is a merit factor which will decide everything. We begin with historical rights of the Croatian people, a country that existed in 1939 as a minimum, and with an observation of the ethnic structure in continuity” (same recording). For the sake of clarity, this is about the Cvetković-Maček Agreement.

Continuing with his presentation at this meeting, Božo Raić took a clearer position that the rest when he said: “in fact, it is up to us, it is a matter of a single attempt, a matter that under the aegis HDZ B&H we install so-called autonomous Croatian politics, separate from Croatian corps and separate from the particular politics of HDZ, and that’s where the greatest danger lies” (same recording).

At that very meeting, Martin Udovičić, a member of HDZ B&H Presidency and the president of HDZ Travnik, following the speech of Raić, noted: “However, we never said we were against a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina and that’s why we had a great, very good cooperation of the Muslims.”

Dario Kordić, at the same meeting, also confirmed the continuity of Tudman’s politics of depoliticizing the Croatians of Bosnia and Herzegovina: “Six months we arduously worked out our ideas, from the 13th to the 20th of June, which you presented here...

The Croatian people of the Travnik region – its sub-regional union – lived with the idea of a final annexation to Croatia, and they are ready to achieve that by any means, and the Croatian spirit burns within the youth.”

It should be said that Kordić alludes to the meetings held with the representatives of the HDZ unions of central Bosnia on the 13th and 20th of June, 1991, which were not attended by the Bosnian and Herzegovinian party leaders, and the stand which Tuđman proposed to them at that time. Five months prior to this meeting, just five months since taking power in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a part of HDZ B&H was given the task of disintegrating the national autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina and politically identifying its Croatian population with the Republic of Croatia. That was a “bloody operation.”

Ivan Markešić, than Secretary General of HDZ B&H, discussing this “bloody” elaborate project of dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina and a complete de-politicization of the people, stripping the political sovereignty of the party which the people bestowed with legitimacy and power, declared an altogether different reasoning: “it is a unique decision (the archdiocese and Franciscan province “Bosna Srebrena”), which I stand by, that an intact, modern, and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina is the best solution for the Croatian people of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Damjan Vlašić, a representative in the Herzeg-Bosnia Congress and a former president of HDZ Mostar, also held this position and at the meeting said the following: “I ask myself now, that which is good for the Croatian people, why conceal it so jealously from others, in the human sense of the word…” With that, Damjan Vlašić expressed the essence of political identity and subjectivity of each side – that which is good for the people can only be the greater good and every particular interest must have the general interest in target, and that, in the nation, is achieved through public political action.
It was Tuđman, after the talks, who gave the summary of it all: “That general politics advocated, therefore, maintaining sovereignty up to the moment it suited Croatia. But it no longer suits Croatia... Therefore, that is the path we must reach in order to get to Croatia.” In other words, Tuđman lead the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats onto a path of destruction of his own political substance that was given in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a historical people’s nation.

The intervention of Jerko Doko, the then Minister of Defense of B&H, “we will never get there like this, Mr. President,” did not help. De-politicization and destruction of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats’ political subjectivity was continued by other means.

The decision to form the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) of the HZ Herzeg-Bosnia, in April, 1992, during the international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a new organization of the government, along with the mechanism of its operation, was established. HVO got a special task at the Statutory Decision on May 15th, and the amendments of July 3rd, 1992, which confirmed the structure of executive power and management on the territories of HZ Herzeg-Bosnia. HVO, and each of its articles, were responsible for its own work for the Presidency HZ Herzeg-Bosnia. HVO was organized like the government, with the president and vice-president, as well as departmental presidents with the status of minister – defense, internal affairs, economy, finance, social activities, justice, and administration.

So, the organization of the executive government, along with the administration, was carried out as a military organization with a firm hierarchy and it was centralized in the Presidency of HZ Herzeg-Bosnia. From the “supreme body of defense of the Croatian people in HZ Herzeg-Bosnia,” as it stands in the Resolution of the HVO establishment, this institution of defense and security of the people in three months transformed into a particular, and only, form of government. That is how every trace of political subjectivism that was institutionalized in a political party was erased. Keeping in mind that the Presidency of HZ Herzeg-Bosnia was inhibited by people who transferred their political subjectivism to Franjo Tuđman, the process of de-politicization was complete and objectified in HVO as a military organization. In the meantime, from top positions of HDZ B&H, everybody who defended the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina was removed. With that, all official, political, and institutionalized conditions for war against the sovereignty of an internationally recognized nation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while including all the means-at-hand which Dario Kordić spoke about at the meeting on December 27th, 1991.

The subordination of HVO, as a military governed organization, did not end at the Presidency of HZ Herzeg-Bosnia but stretched over the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Croatia, which took over HZ Herzeg-Bosnia as its own military logistics, financial aid, humanitarian aid, official politics, and the rest. The form of the aid is perceivable from the fact that it was through the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Croatia, under the leadership of Gojko Šušak, 30 million DM made its way into the country monthly, apart from military equipment and armament, and that the entire military structure of HVO Herzeg-Bosnia was established from Croatia.

The process of de-politicizing Croatians in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not end with the establishment of institutions which distanced the people from Bosnia and Herzegovina and its clearly stated political and national conscience for the defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with the Croatian people in it, from Serbian aggression, transformed into an attack of that nation’s sovereignty. HVO, when being established, was accepted by the people as the defending army, Alija Izetbegović even urged Muslims to join with the HVO because it was their army as well.

De-politicization continued through a process of bringing Croatian politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina under Tuđman’s influence, which was rather obvious in the bilateral and international negotiations regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the name of HZ, or rather
HZ Herzeg-Bosnia, negotiations were led by Tuđman who called upon the legitimacy, which neither the Croatian people of central Bosnia and Posavina, nor their chief religious, cultural, educational, or any other national institutions, ever approved.

All negotiations led by Tuđman in the name of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats and in the name of the Republic of Croatia, were established on his foundational political idea of a spent sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on the need for ethnic delineation of borders which must be discussed with the Serbs (Muslims are not mentioned as a political factor or a political faction), and, too, on the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) as a “pawn” in that border delineation.

The first and foundational agreement about that was reached between Tuđman and Milošević in Karadordevo, March 3rd, 1991. Despite Tuđman’s (and his political circle) adamant effort to dispute the agreement – an effort still relevant today – there is an entire chain of undisputable evidence about that agreement and its contents. It could be directly and indirectly concluded from the handwritings of various authors from both Serbia and Croatia (M. Minić, H. Šarinić, S. Avramov, D. Bilandžić, B. Jović), and directly from the very witnesses of the agreement, Stipe Mesić, Dušan Bilandžić, Josip Šentija, Snilja Aramov. Mesić was the mediator for setting the meeting, while Bilandžić, Šentija, and Avramov, along with Zvonko Lerotić, Kosta Mihailović, and Vladan Kutleš, were members of a mixed commission for the “delineation.” Šentija and Bilandžić immediately quit the commission, but the fact that the commission had the task of confirming the ethnic territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina due to the delineation of borders, was verified by Bilandžić in an interview for the National, October 25th, 1996. Agreements on the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina were continued on April 15th, 1991, in Tikveš, taking place in continuity in different locations and times under various circumstances. The refinement of these agreements, up to their practical implementation, were continued by the representatives of those politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina with agreements in Graz – Mate Boban, Radovan Karadžić, Franjo Boras, Momčilo Krajšnik, along with the representatives of the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia and Republika Srpska, as well as the military groups HVO and the Army of the Republika Srpska, on various levels. Two points of the agreement, reached between Boban and Karadžić in Graz, May 5th, 1992, are of note: “that all disputable issues, including the delineation of the two constitutional units – Croatian and Serbian in Bosnia and Herzegovina, should be solved through peaceful means and agreements,” and that “in the delineation of the two constitutional units on the territory of Kupres and Bosanska Posavina (Odžak, Derventa, Bosanski Brod, Bosanski Šamac, Orašje, Modriča, and Brčko), the question of compactability and communication should be kept in mind.”

This agreement regarding “delineation” was in fact an agreement on ethnic relocation, which for the Croats meant an egress from Bosanska Posavina, and for the Serbs egress from Kupres, Glamoča, Drvar. The enigma and silence of the main actors of this agreement from Karadordevo was annulled in Dayton. At a plenary conference, on November 8th, before all participants of the meeting, Milošević concurred that he already “agreed with Franjo and there were no negotiations about Posavina.” That is how, in Dayton, “delineations” and “compactness and communication” became historical facts noted into an international agreement and lines drawn on a map.

What de-politicization of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats really meant could be easily spotted in Posavina; thousands of completely destroyed estates that were developed over generations, a bridge over Sava between the two Brods destroyed, around two thousand refugees, and a thousand more killed and wounded. Particularly tragic and impressive was the humiliation of the HVO army, which had defended Posavina against Serbian aggression. When it already reached the village of Rudanke, within reach of Doboj, and when it was
separated from the Army of B&H by just three kilometers, Tuđman retreated for “a break,” introduced “fresh forces” to their positions, and then suddenly retreated over river Sava. It was such a surprise that not even the entire Croatian Army (HV) was able to retreat in time, instead, panicking, they crossed the river together with the civilians.23 The fact that the Dayton Agreement was a legitimization of Tuđman’s influence on Croatian politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina is evident with another crucial detail.

Directly following “Operation Storm,” about two months prior to the Dayton negotiations, when the combined forces of HV, HVO, and Army of B&H occupied around 65% of the territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and when “Croatian forces” were within reach of Banja Luka and held everything from Livno through Drvar, Šipovo, Mrkonjić to Manjača, Tuđman drew a map according to the old (new) delineation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.24 On first sight it was not clear how the new map represented the current situation, or the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, since it did not correspond with any of the previous agreements. It did not even correspond to a plan from the contact group which already proposed unifying Posavina into a single canton which would join the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The proposal’s only problem was the size of the corridor, or even its existence, towards Banja Luka through Posavina. The map also opposed the existing cantonal arrangement of the Federation because it included the so-called Croatian parts into the Cazin region which had absolutely no Croatians in it, as well as part on inland behind Dubrovnik which was under the military control of Karadžić. The map stood in particular contrast to the conditions after “Operation Storm,” and which were the foundations of border delineation in the Dayton Agreement. However, as negotiations in Dayton advanced, the military advantage of the Croatian-Bosnian alliance waned on the map and slowly became what Tuđman drew long ago. He finally surrendered everything that HV and HVO conquered back to Milošević – retreated from the threshold to Banja Luka, from Mrkonjić, Šipovo, Manjača, and Jajce. He held onto Drvar, Glamač, and Grahovo, places which he designated as Croatian on his map.

Croats who were members of Bosnian and Herzegovinian unique delegation in these negotiations, excluding Jadranko Prlić, were opposed to these solutions; but the problem was that even the mediators of these talks accepted Tuđman’s legitimacy which he secured from Herzeg-Bosnia in 1991. The Dayton Agreement, in large part, is the result of the depoliticization of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats and Tuđman’s politics towards the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It can be clearly determined that the constitutional position of Croatians in that agreement is the direct consequence of it.

Another vital agent of that positioning was the Republika Srpska, which had Tuđman’s blessing at its inauguration and held a positive position in his politics towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, and which was finally legitimized by Izetbegović through his than Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Muhamed Šačirbegović, without the knowledge or attendance of the national presidency or any other institutions. This legitimation happened in Geneva, nearly two months prior to the Dayton Agreement, September 8th, 1995, and served as an irrefutable fact in those negotiations. That is how the Dayton Agreement ended up dividing the country by entities, not by cantons and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which the American administration promised in 1994 during Washington’s construction of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This amendment of the American political strategy fell hardest on the Croatians in the country. The Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats installed the Croatian para-national division through the Washington Agreement into a common state which was supposed to, in the

24 Chart in the addendum, p. 191.
extension of political negotiations and military pressure, be expanded into the territories of the Republika Srpska, just as the Serbian para-national divisions had done in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The creation of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was therefore not a temporary measure of stopping the war between the Army of B&H and the HVO, instead it was the restoration of a new model of arranging the country by the regional unionization principle and not delineating it, as well as the strategic basis for approaching the Serbian question in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Dayton Agreement changed both of them, the Federation remained at 51% of the territory, while the rest of the territory was legitimized as the military concoction Republika Srpska, established on crime and genocide. Too, the Federation remained an agreeable entity, both in the ethnic and national structure, while the Republika Srpska remained uni-national and centralized. With each of its structures, each entity was installed into a common Bosnia and Herzegovina, which remained without a determining attribute of being a republic. These unequal structures of entities reflected the position of the people in the country, and that inequality was institutionalized as a discrimination of the people in the very Constitution. The chief location of that inequality was the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was converted into a double entity structure on both levels, the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples. The House of Representatives only appears, in its multi-party composition, as a legislative body, but really it is a body of the entity in which the representatives are sorted out by election. In other words, the Federation and the Republika Srpska “represents” their entity parliaments in the national parliament, but continue to act by their entities and not as a union.

That practically means:

First, not a single decision in the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina can be made until it is separately accepted by both the representatives from the Republic and Srpska and the representatives from the Federation.

Second, decision making in the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been reduced to parity and consensus of the entities, because each entity has one vote despite the number of foreign representatives. That means that the representatives from the Republika Srpska, the Serbs, have a vote, while the Bosniaks and the Croats have the other.

Third, in this procedure of voting both the Serbs and Bosniaks can bring or block laws, or make any other decisions (regarding the budget, the ratification of international agreements, financial arrangements, etc.). Only the Croats cannot do this, regardless of their interests, because in this voting structure they cannot secure the necessary third of votes from their own entity, without which a decision could not be made. The constitutional position of the Croats is such that they can always be out-voted. This is the result of the contemporary structure of the population in the Federation and the Republic, because through elections it is immediately imposed onto the legislative body of the country. The number of Croats in that structure is the consequence of Tuđman’s negotiations with Milošević about the “delineation,” on the one hand, and the politics of contesting the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina which led to a conflict with the Army of B&H, or with the Bosniaks, on the other hand. (Of course, Tuđman is not the only one responsible for creating these circumstances).

Fourth, the House of Representatives within the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which consists of political party representatives, loses its political essence since representatives are divided by their affiliation to their entity – which essentially means divided by ethnicity. That is how the House of Representatives is indirectly turning into a biased House of Peoples, and the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in its entirety, into an ethnically assembled body.

Fifth, the Parliamentary Assembly is practically run by the national parties and their elite, and not by all citizens of the country, regardless of the ethnic group. The legislative body, with the Ministry Council as the executive power, is the captive of national parties and
their leaders. With the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina the national agencies have been turned into a testing ground for measuring influence and interests of each minority, rather, they have become the generators of nationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, all its national conflicts and crises.

This constitutional-legal positioning is the process of de-politicizing Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina in their overall de-construction. The constituency of the people is guaranteed by the Dayton Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that HDZ B&H, as a leading Croatian party, seeks to reduce its influence to a limited area of some imaginary entity, not in the entire country, that is, not within both entities. Along the line of least resistance, this party reasserts its 1991 policies – the politics of delineation which always includes the politics of a restricted sovereignty of the country. And now, just as in 1991, the leader of HDZ B&H has the leader of the Republika Srpska as his chief partner, and, just as Tuđman, he hopes that the pursuit of a Serbian entity (with the inevitable deprivation of sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina) will help to establish the old lines of delineation. The difference today is that the leader of Republika Srpska does not have an army – something Tuđman had used as collateral in his project.

Marx was the first to point out the depth and the historical significance between a “real” nation and its non-real historical form. That difference is at the center of his critique of Hegel’s philosophy of nations. With Marx, it was not a matter of non-reality of the feudal monarchical constitutions which Hegel refers to, but about the non-reality of the nation in all its familiar historical forms.

Marx observes the legality and necessity of another kind that determines a nation – “reality” of the nation depends on the institutionalization of justice in the distribution of social wealth and not from the degree of knowledge of general interests, which are then made necessary precisely by this knowledge. Marx demonstrated that knowledge does not appoint necessity since it is only part of the determined and differentiated interests, it always remains at the level of Hegel’s conceptual differences. For knowledge to be true, or necessary, meaning that it would also be “real” active (that which is known as truth is also wanted), it must be at the level of the universal. Marx understands that knowledge is always at the level of difference, and that the nation is the institutionalization of those differences. These differences are necessary, not real, their conscience exists but it is not true since the differences are given in the foundation of the economic system which institutionalizes those differences and which it finds necessary – the system prevails through them.

To discover the center of this institutionalization and the center of the distortion of truth, Marx undertakes the analysis of the national economy as the conscience and as the mirror of the economic structure of modern society. For him, the term national economy is an economic expression of basic structural elements of that society – private property, labor, capital and land, and its separation, but also the separation of wages, capital profit and land rents. The national economy, not unlike Hegel’s philosophy, which is the philosophical expression for the development of consciousness and the categories of consciousness, presumes the thing it is yet to prove – that the theoretical categories are the laws of reality. For that to be verified, we must show how laws emerge from the essence of reality.

National economy and Hegel’s philosophy are, therefore, at the same methodological position; that is why the critique of one is the critique of the other.

Since the base of the national economy (private property, labor, capital) is the real which Hegel’s philosophy presumes – the reality of mind objectified in society and nation – it is the critique of Hegel’s philosophy that is truly possible only as the critique of the national economy. That critique, as a matter of fact, ends with the critique of Hegel’s dialectic
philosophy in general – as Marx put it in his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.*

The critique of national economy is the critique of its presumptions, a critique of economic categories which it does not observe in reality, in the process of their gestation, as social relations. That critique, established on “contemporary facts,” that is, on the actual social relations which give new shape to those facts, is the new theory that has “practical energy.” That “energy” rests on the demand for changing those “facts,” which in turn makes it practical. The social facts alone, the social form of actual life, require alternation because they are unsustainable – their form is perverse, inhuman, unbearable, in a word, untrue. The reality itself gravitates towards truth and truthful knowledge, and as such gives the knowledge “practical energy” – a revolutionary dimension.

The “practical energy” of theory is given in its “radicalism,” that is, its reversal towards “the root of things,” the root of man, his history, nation, law, etc. The reversal of theory towards “the root” cancels out the theory as theory and establishes a demand (“task”) for a practical alternation of the very “thing” – man and his position in history and theory, be it a question of philosophy (law, nation, history) or religion. The “radicalization” of philosophy is actually its realization, rather, its abolition and reversal into practice. Philosophy is “abolished” by being realized, by abolishing the ulteriority (of its) truth and establishing the truth of this world. That is how philosophy, from theory reverses into historical practice, becoming practical – “It is, therefore, the task of history, once the other-world of truth has vanished, to establish the truth of this world” (available at: www.marxist.org). Only then does the critique of philosophy become the critique of economy, the critique of religion the critique of law, and the critique of theology the critique of politics.

Because of that Marx would observe German philosophy and law only as an abstract continuation of German opportunities, and place German philosophy into the “circle of German reality.” From that, the real overcoming of philosophy as critique and knowledge, presupposes the annulment of the very reality which finds philosophy as its conscience. The critique of the speculative philosophy of law (as theory in general) “to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice” (ibid). Theory, therefore, is not its own ends, it assigns tasks that are only solved practically, through action. Philosophy, as a critique of theory, becomes “revolutionary” when it becomes practical, when it becomes the principal of action. In order to become that, it ought to be the realization of the actual needs of man – theoretical needs must immanently be the practical needs. “It is not enough for thought to strive for realization, reality must itself strive towards thought” (ibid). In the analogy of Protestantism, where the authority of religion becomes an internal principle of an individual’s actions, Marx demands for the German speculative philosophy that, with its own authority of truth as universal, becomes the principal of action for the German people; that is, that the general human emancipation becomes the requirement for the emancipation of people. The theoretical needs expressed philosophically should speculatively be of immediate practical necessity. Practical overcoming is revolutionary because it is the radical overcoming of both the theory and the existing requirements – it is the general human emancipation.

How do we get to this emancipatory position?

Radical change must be a general human emancipation from every single and particular interest. That means it must be executed by the society at large and not a particular class or individual. Radical revolution is not a “political” revolution but universal, and it must belong to the people, and because of that it needs a universal subject, a subject that undertakes the universal as its content and aim (substance). That can only be the subject that adds within

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itself the interest of the entire society, whose position is a general social position. In order to attain this emancipatory position it is not sufficient to just have the emancipatory energy and the understanding about one’s own social position, there also needs to be a social standing in which the entire social navigation is stored, a standing which is the personification of “crime” of the entire society. “so that liberation from that sphere appears as general self-liberation” (ibid). “For one estate to be par excellence the estate of liberation, another estate must conversely be the obvious estate of oppression” (ibid).

That “standing” is the proletariat because it is not a special class of civic society, its social position is universal and not particular, its law is not historical but human; the proletariat was established at the decay of all social standings, it finds itself in the state of the universal, not particular torment, and therefore has a universal task. The principal of its action must be established at the factual and real social standing – and that is the general, universal, human. The proletariat is not in opposition to some specific social interests and their representatives, no injustice was done to it, it is in opposition with the human, with man’s general being, it is in opposition with the social presuppositions in which it exists.

General emancipation is possible only when the proletariat finds its spiritual tools in philosophy, just as philosophy must find its material tools in the proletariat.

Philosophy, as knowledge and theory, remains a speculation without this “material” element. The proletariat is active, and the principle of its action is not philosophy, as a speculative theory of the universal (truth), but its real social position which is simultaneously understood as universal. Theory, in order to inspire action, must be the theory of the real social positioning of the proletariat, the theory of its universal suffering and poverty, and the theory of its social liberation. It is possible to act universally through the real, for all people, while remaining with the principle of particularity – acting only in the interest of one’s class. The proletariat cannot liberate itself in reality without liberating the entire society (humanity), because such is its social position. “The only liberation (of Germany) which is practically possible is liberation from the point of view of that theory which declares man to be the supreme being for man” (ibid).

The proletariat is practical, through social action elevated to the universal – the human within it is defeated and lost, and only it can recapture it. The universal, the general as human truth, cannot be known without knowing the position of the proletariat – that is its real position. The problem of truth is not theoretical, it is practical; the principles of knowledge are practically given while the truth and untruth is resolved practically. Knowledge that is not practical is only speculation – it orbits around itself. The conscience does not recognize itself, its categories or shapes, but it understands reality, the actual position of the proletariat as the principal of universal action – the theory is self-knowledge of the proletariat, not a knowledge of movement of consciousness through its phenomena.

The proletariat, through its own labor, which society determines, alienates itself from the universal community (the human beings) and now must return to it. This knowledge is about action – “Since human nature is the true community of men” (ibid).

The return to this community is not achievable through a political revolution, which is in the population of particular interest, but through a social revolution – “even if it happened in a single factory district” – which is always in the entirety of the population. “The social entity which is no abstract universal power opposed to the single individual, but is the essential nature of each individual, his own activity, his own life, his own spirit, his own wealth” (ibid).

In analyzing the social condition of the proletariat and its understanding, Marx does not begin at the concept of man, nor from his theoretical potential, but from his social activity. That activity is not natural, nor ontological, but social and real, bound to a single social form – its arrangement. A proletarian is a worker, in an actual social position of work, a particular
type of action determined by society without his consent. The worker belongs to the proletariat class through his work so that the position of the proletariat already acquires its universality in its work. That is not the theoretical but practical position expressed by practical action – through work.

Reality is man’s active world, regardless of the degree of understanding that world. Man creates himself in creating the world, society, nation; that action can be authentic or alienating, but it is real in any case – the world and man that emerge out of that are either authentic or non-authentic, true or untrue. Theory is founded in action, and the character of the theory depends on the character of action, its trueness or un-trueness.

Overcoming illusions or deformed conscience is linked with the reality of man – is the man alone a real man, is he authentic or merely an existence, alienated and lost in his creations which are also non-real, illusionary. “To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions” (Ibid).

The “practical energy” of theory is in its positive relationship towards itself, not in its negation. The negation of philosophy, religion, law, and nation, is likewise a theoretical relationship towards their truths, not towards instituting truth itself. Theory has an acting force or “practical energy” as long as it is a historical practice, and not just any practice, but the one that is radical, groundbreaking, which strikes at the very “root of things.” The truth or untruth of theory is not illuminated with that in theory but practice – historically. Theoretical truth is historical truth, truth about the history of man and his world, about the real status of society, about the real status of law and nation, religion and politics. If not that, theory is an illusionary conscience and ideology.

The status quo must be broken on that theory (philosophy). The “practical energy” of theory differs from the understanding of possibilities of theory and its drive that is raised to absolute knowledge; it is not a cycle within itself, which depends on the ability of pursuing internal laws of thinking, and the application of those laws onto the objects of thinking. The practicality of theory is the power of its internal reversal into practice, into historical action.

Marx abandons Hegel’s concept of dialectics of consciousness when he poses yet another condition to this reversal – reality itself must gravitate towards it. With Hegel, consciousness itself fulfills all the conditions of its growth and development, it has that energy within it; with Marx, the theory realizes its practical energy only if reality itself gravitates towards it – he is the “material force” of historical reversal.

“For revolutions require a passive element, a material basis. Theories fulfilled in a people only so far as it is the fulfillment of the needs of that people” (Ibid)

“It is not enough for thought to strive for realization, reality must itself strive towards thought” (Ibid).

Hegel presumes that reality is cognitive, missionary, and the task of philosophy is merely to understand it. Marx, on the other hand, sees a great difference between the real and the cognitive, historical situations and the state of consciences in which philosophy is found.

Society, the human interplay, and man’s real life, all give meaning and truthfulness to the categories of understanding, and their lawful forms. That is how man’s labor – means of producing social life, and the relations constructed in that production – becomes the foundation of all economic categories, which only in those relations acquire their true form. In the nationally-economic state, man’s achievement in work comes through his reification, de-realization, loss of the object, both as the object of work and the object of life – that is, both as the product and as nature, which is in any case man’s other body. But that simultaneously means that work itself, as a means of realizing the worker, becomes external, alien to him, it becomes a process which belongs to someone else, “turned against him, independent of him, and not belonging to him” (Ibid). Thus, the very act of production becomes active alienation – an action of draining the objectivity of man and his work. In such production, man loses his
life activity, that is, loses the essence of his work – the universality which connotes true production of man and nature. The universality of man’s working life becomes the means of his individual physical life, where the human becomes animalistic.

The active working life is man’s real doubling because nature and man’s life appear as kindred in his action – man observes himself in the world which he created, not just in the conscience of action, not just intellectually. In the nationally-economic theory, this is concealed. The form of human production and self-production in the nationally-economic state is appropriated as presupposition, and not explained. Human labor is taken as part of capital – that is, as wages, capital itself is appropriated as value, not as a form of private property or a social relation. This is how capital gain is perceived as the circulation of capital, and not as cluttered work within determined social relations.

Due to that understanding, Marx’s critique of Hegel’s philosophy, as the highest expression of civic society, begins with the critique of national economy and its categories – that is, with the analysis of wages and capital, capital profit and land rents, as well as the alienation of labor and private property as foundational social relations, and in that order too; that is how we get to presumptions in the critique of Hegel’s dialectics, and philosophy in general.

“Let us provisionally say just this much in advance: Hegel’s standpoint is that of modern political economy. He grasps labor as the essence of man – as man’s essence which stands the test: he sees only the positive, not the negative side of labor. Labor is man’s coming-to-be for himself within alienation, or as alienated man. The only labor which Hegel knows and recognizes is abstractly mental labor” (Ibid).

The only work that modern national economy understands and recognizes is abstractly economic. That is the work that lost or concealed its concrete qualitative form, and appears only in the form of work time, and constitutes the essence of capital. Capital generates and maintains itself by relating back to itself, making it the essence of its being; it reproduces itself through the other which it reduces to its essence – through means of production, the objects of work, and human labor. They all appear as fixed moments or parts of capital, without possible relation towards the self – meaning, without its internal essence. That is how labor, as man’s active depletion of mental and physical strength, transformed into working power, or more accurately, into wages as yet another circulation of capital.

That which Marx deems outstanding in Hegel’s “negative dialectics as the moving and generating principle” is the thing that conceives the essence of labor – that is, comprehends work as a process of objectification and loss of the object, as alienation and the transcendence of alienation.

Labor is creative, but with Hegel it is abstractly spiritual, not real. This creative power of work, which is both the foundation of national economy and Hegel’s philosophy, Marx wishes to appoint as the basis of man’s self-genesis, universally understood, through material and spiritual reproduction, and the reproduction of history itself, which in turn incorporates the reproduction of social relations and nation, human interaction itself.

Man, his private rights and property, his morality, family, society and nation, are for Marx not moments and objects of movement of self-genesis, which is their “real” existence. For Marx, man is objectified, his action is objectified, both in the material and spiritual sense. Man is created through objectifying action, which is determined in the national-economic state as well as Hegel’s philosophy of estrangement – an action which is the alienation and loss of objectivity.

For Hegel, the “creative mind” is the mind that overcomes object-ness in the process of understanding because the reality of an object is given in the “mobile nature.” For Marx,

the “mobile nature,” that which moves man to action, is man’s objectivity – the objectification of his natural strengths. That action is not blind, since knowledge too is man’s natural strength, therefore objective. Un-objectifiable knowledge, which is equally realized in the elementary objective action (work), and action of the mind (the production of human interplay), is “abstractly spiritual.” Knowledge is creative only if objectified – only if it is “material strength.” The creative mind is only the mind capable of achieving, which understood the reality of man as an “object,” while history itself, along with society and nation, as the activity of that “objectification.”

Knowledge is still decisive in action, but only if understood as the objective power of man, “when wooing the masses.”

Communism, as the understood reality of man, is the moving principle of history, just as labor is the mobile nature of private property and capital (as objective labor), and knowledge the general mobile power.

Communism first appears as a positive expression in the abolition of private property – as the general private property. Communism, even in this form, can be the mobile power in abolishing private property, but instead it is the fulfillment of private property – the private property that came to be through general social relations. That further suggests that the disposition of workers is not abolished, but now incorporates other people – that is the “the relationship of the community to the world of things” (Ibid).

For Marx, this is primitive communism with a primeval form that turns everything into general property, from things to women. Labor becomes the general disposition for all, and capital the “and capital (as) the acknowledged universality and power of the community” (ibid).

Too, political communism, as a negative abolition of private property, with the annulment of the nation – either democratic or despotic – is an incomplete form of communism. This form of communism fails to comprehend the positive nature of private property and remains under its designation.

Finally, “communism as the positive transcendence of private property as human self-estrangement, and therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man; communism therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., human) being – a return accomplished consciously and embracing the entire wealth of previous development” (Ibid).

This communism comprehends the comprehensive movement of history as an act of man’s development, as a process of completing the “naturalism” of man and the “humanism” of nature. This movement is the “realized and conscious movement of its development” – the development of communism.

Creative energy, or the mobile principle, is given in the understanding that all of history is the nascency of communism, a positive process of its realization (Ibid).

This positive conscience of man, and his development as man, is no longer mediated by the negation of his “non-real being;” his objectification and sensuosity in theoretical knowledge or religion, nor the negation of philosophy or theology, but the conscience of man’s sensory nature and his “natural conscience” – the conscience necessary for appropriating that nature.

Communism, as knowledge, takes the position of negating negation “for the next stage of historical development in the process of human emancipation and rehabilitation” (Ibid). On the other hand, it is the “energetic principle of the immediate future” – that is, it is the practical demand for the negation of man’s “negative” existence, his existence in the economic-national state, and then in the philosophical and theological state.
As the mobile principle, communism is not, nor could it be, a form of society or the
goal of human development. Communism only grants the possibility of man’s development as
a social being.

Communism, therefore, is not a theory of social form, but the position of negating a
negative form of human existence, along with all its forms of alienation. As a position of
negating negation, it is the “energetic principal” of action – that is, a demand for action. The
presupposition of that action is not a theory of some social form (some sort of utopia), but an
existing negative state in which man lives and which needs to be changed. Communism, as
the conscience of that state, is the moment of change, and as such, for Marx, represents the
creative mind. That conscience is part of man’s natural strengths, and must be shown as such;
it is “objective,” not because it relates to objects, but because it is reified in an objective form
– given social relations.

That is why Marx, in the second thesis about Feuerbach, says: “The question whether
objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical
question” (Ibid). Knowledge is objective and demonstrates its truth in practice – it is active.
“The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a
purely scholastic question” (Ibid).

For Marx, communism is a practice which simultaneously changes the actor and the
circumstances in which the actor acts; it is the “revolutionary practice.” The population of this
new materialism is human society of social humanity, not civic society founded on isolated
individuals and their interests. The world must change in the light of this new knowledge –
with the population of social humanism – and not only be interpreted; interpretation remains
spiritually abstract.
11. Truth as a Linguistic Creation

The search for true certainty of man’s action could be interrupted if we were to abandon the idea of a priori truth, regardless if we presupposed it in reality or mind.

Richard Rorty thus regards truth as a human creation, not an ability of discovering or entering the secrets of its latency. According to him, the world, as the existent, does not determine truth or the truth of our statements, even if they did relate to the world. Truth is the property of linguistic units given in speeches and language, and language is a human creation – truth cannot exist without sentences. “The world is out there, but the descriptions of the world are not” (Rorty, 1989, 5). “Descriptions of the world” can be true or untrue, but the world by itself cannot. If we can describe the “world” easier in Newton’s language than, say, Aristotle’s, it does not mean that the world “speaks” Newtonian. “The world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have programmed ourselves with language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it cannot propose a language for us to speak. Only other human beings can do that” (Rorty, 1989, 6).

The decision to transgress from one language to another, from one linguistic game to another, is not arbitrary or founded in some criterion or choice, because they always presuppose truth. The so-called objective criterion, by which we could manage ourselves, does not exist – nor do we possess subjective criterion: intelligent, volitional, emotional. According to Rorty, we simply lose the habit of using some words and gain the habit of using others. The reference to the criterion of presumption is that the world and human property have an internal nature – a being which must be discovered, a being in which we must manage ourselves according to thought and action. In that case, we oscillate between different vocabularies and give advantage to one of the many languages, the very thing to avoid. Philosophical or scientific development, in that context, is not the development of their truthfulness, but the language they speak. Hegel’s concept of spirit, or Marx concept of dialectical materialism, could be paraphrased in another language as a spiritual transformation or “revolution,” or even a process of learning. With an alternation of language, utopian politicians foreshadowed the possibility of “reproducing” new human beings which did not previously exist. At the center of their interests there was no critique of social institutions that repressed or subjugated “human nature,” its “un-naturalness” or “irrationality,” but the creation of language and discourse which speaks about man.

In most dire situations of Bosnian and Herzegovinian survival, in the fight for its entirety and multi-ethnicity, pressed by “historical facts” and the alleged real-politics – meaning, the establishment of military and political forces which were even recognized by the international community as final and unyielding – a new discourse needed to emerge, along with a new language with which to discuss it. That language was already developed, we tried implementing it among the public, the military-political agents, and among the members of the international community. However, the language of war, hatred, ethnic divisions, lack of trust, etc., created a deafening noise where nothing else could be heard. The language which we formed and spoke could neither penetrate the media blockades which war propaganda already established, nor the procedures and rules at the so-called peace conferences about Bosnia and Herzegovina, where historical decisions were being made.

It was known what had to be done at that phase. The blockades needed to be eradicated, the domestic and foreign public needed to hear the alternative language, while a new discourse needed to prevail at the peace negotiations led by Lord Owen and Thorvald
Stoltenberg in Geneva, 1993. However, the problem lay in legitimizing the new language, and giving it binding strength, otherwise it would remain part of subjective desires – a conviction deprived of power and energy. Behind the existing and applicatory language, there were weapons, political power, money, diplomatic sway, and the pragmatism of the international community. Standing behind the new language was a hand-full of individuals, an informal group isolated from the world and the public while under siege in Sarajevo. We neither had the weapons, the army, money, media, nor diplomacy; we did not have a single element of war or political power at that moment. We only had a new language and a new discourse among ourselves. For the language to be heard and become accepted, we needed to act differently from the usual political ways, we needed to abandon the often-called “art of possibility” and create conditions for the “impossible.” That could not solely be achieved with analytically-systematic procedures of comprehending reality, nor solely with the pragmatic participation in that reality. We needed to transgress it, form something altogether new and offer it to the world. That “offer” had to be such an event where people would first believe in it and only then understand and discern it. With that, the event had to have legitimizing power – it had to be presented as universal and binding, not coincidental and facultative.

To achieve all that, we needed to develop the procedure of the event, which would have that legitimizing power equal to a new language of discursive power. That procedure included several methods.

First, a new political power needed to be established – one which would oppose the existing political powers of national division and destruction. The new language and discourse had to be formalized within that political power. That language needed to slowly seep into the public ear; the domestic and foreign public needed to hear something new, even if it evoked criticism and rejection. In that procedure, something of that language should have been heard. The new language had to draw attention to itself even if it resembled an out-of-tone note in a tuned orchestra, a tone which repeats itself and incessantly ruins the expected harmony.

Second, that alternative power should have been rapidly spread and strengthened. It was clear that in conditions of war it could not have spread spatially because space was occupied, divided, and impervious. Additionally, there was no free public to gravitate towards, there were no social groups outside the already formed war structures which could be persuaded. The only option was to act upon the existing institutions which could recognize their interests in the new alternative.

Since the established discourses were nationalistic, the alternative was supposed to be nationalistic as well, yet different. The opposition to nationalist politics with a developed national structure could not take some liberal democratic form, but precisely a nationalistic one. Such an alternative option could only bind the existing nationalist structures – that was the path of expanding the influence of the new alternative power.

Third, the new language and discourse needed to be established in Sarajevo. Sarajevo, apart from being the capital, was the center of all political, intellectual, religious, humanitarian, and other significant institutions. That fact that it was under siege, systematically ravaged and razed, made it the center of the world and the center of all military and political action which all media talked about. Only that which happens in Sarajevo could be of global significance. That which happened in Grude, Mostar, Pale, or anywhere else in the country, did not carry the same weight, despite its atrocity.

Fourth, the new language and discourse needed to be legitimized outside of Sarajevo as well. Insofar as it aspires to impose itself on the world – watching and listening with open eyes and attentive ears, what was going on in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sarajevo – than its legitimization needed to be extensive. The peace negotiating structures, domestic as well as foreign, were already established and locked into a discourse of division, territorial delineation, and demographic numbers. The new language was supposed to contain all that as
well, but in a different discourse, a different program, a new form. World politics loves numbers, attempting to justify each prediction statistically: numbers of soldiers, number of arms, number of square meters occupied, number of allies, number of enemies, amount of money at disposition, etc. We had nothing of importance at our disposition – we had nothing numerable. We even had to form new numbers as part of the new language. In any case, without an army, without weapons, money, media, and other things, we stood no chance. History is not written by such people; in war they are artillery targets, in peace they are marginalized.

Fifth, we needed to create an event which would draw attention from the whole world, and therefore make people aware of this new language. That very event needed to “speak” the new language, it needed to oppose all accustomed and valid events that related to the war and our country (peace negotiations, diplomatic activity, etc.). Furthermore, the event needed to be loud enough to drown out the noise of artillery and the language of the coeval peace conferences. The language of the event had to be so new and surprising that it simply had to be heard, that it could not be ignored. It had to be significant just by the way it sounded. Only after that could we expect it to be understood and discerned. Therefore, the language had to have its own power of validity – its “new” had to be coherent, logically and semantically sustainable, simple and acceptable.

A small number of people started realizing these thoughts. We went in order. First, we formed a political party which stood in opposition to all existing national parties, in particular the Croatian national party HDZ. We formed HSS B&H, or better said, revamped the old and affirmed Croatian national party with deep roots in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which already had a formed sister party in Croatia (led by the Bosnian Drago Stipac). Insofar as we wanted to save Bosnia and Herzegovina from division and destruction, relations between the political powers needed to change. The relations between the military forces were untouchable for us, and we needed to change it where it first began: politics. The political alliance, on which all other alliances were founded, was the alliance between Tuđman and Milošević about the parceling of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Izetbegović opposed that alliance both politically and militarily, and turned the defense of the country into a Bosniak national program. However, the thing that escaped the mind of every politician at the time, including Izetbegović, is that Bosnia and Herzegovina could neither be destroyed nor saved by a single people. I repeated that hypothesis countless times in public, hoping people would understand what we tried to do. In the context of the alliance between Tuđman and Milošević, Croats practically had the main role in Bosnia and Herzegovina because all of Milošević’s endeavors regarding the Serbian national agenda were in vain without Croatian assistance. The Croats had both the historical responsibility and the historic opportunity. A radical reversal needed to take place in Croatian politics, from the destructive position of Tuđman to something more constructive.

The reformed Croatian Peasant Party needed to take on that arduous task. Its role was not only to openly oppose Tuđman’s politics of division, which he already turned into Croatian national politics, but to presuppose a legitimate rejection of every national monopoly on Bosnia and Herzegovina – which could have been a central political interest in the second phase.

The domestic and foreign public had already accepted, with the Cutileiro Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the language and discourse of division along ethnic lines – the only language spoken – along with the language of weapons, which delineated the borders of the country. When we appeared as HSS, we were heavily criticized by the Croats, especially from Zagreb. (The formation of the party was condemned even by Stipac, the leader of HSS in Croatia). We expected that; we were neither surprised nor unnerved. We welcomed attacks because they meant opening a dialogue – even a small opportunity for our new language had
to be created, an opportunity for a new discourse for solving the “crisis” in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The stronger and more frequent the attacks, the more significant the discourse. When we went public, the discourse could no longer be ignored.

It was with that language and discourse that I went to Zagreb in 1993, during the worst conflicts between the Army of B&H and HVO, and all media wanted to hear this new language directly, not through attacks. All Croatian politicians wanted to hear this language, including a large number of HDZ members, even the highest officials of the nation (Stjepan Mesić and Josip Manolić). Drago Stipac was among all the most open in his support of our party, he even ensured me participation at their media conferences as well as participation before chief bodies and party members in Croatia. The new language we spoke could no longer be ignored, not even by Tudman, who finally wanted to hear it directly. After our encounter, which was televised prime time on HTV, the language earned a legitimization which could no longer be erased. It, of course, did not yet have the status of a valid language, but despite all vehement attacks, particularly from Grude, the seat of Herzeg-Bosnia, it became an alternative language of the public. The a priori animosity slowly turned into a biased dialogue, but a dialogue nevertheless. Arguments ignited around the new language and discourse, and although the challenges remained, the language drew attention and discern.

The political party we established was weak and affected only Sarajevo. It could not bear the weight of being an alternative to HDZ, Herzeg-Bosnia, and Tudman’s national politics, all by itself. Too, we were aware that the existing religious and national Croatian institutions in Sarajevo could not directly participate in the party. The majority of Croats supported the new party, either publically or secretly, but they could still not join. We, on the other hand, could not remain alone and take everything headed our way. I, in particular, the leader of the party, was exposed to attacks and threats, from arrest to liquidation. (My immediate family, in Kiseljak, was in a difficult position at the center of the Croatian calamitous politics in central Bosnia). Because of that we had to expand the front of our activity and include into our new discourse as many Croatian institutions as possible, operating out of Sarajevo. That is how we formed the Croatian Coordination Council (HKO), which incorporated all religious, cultural, scientific, charitable, among other Croatian institutions in Sarajevo, but also HSS, HDZ Sarajevo, and HVO, which played a key role in the defense of the city. Through this active coordination of almost all Croats in Sarajevo, the weight of the new language and political discourse was evenly distributed. Apart from HSS, key roles were taken on by the religious institutions, particularly the Catholic diocese of Sarajevo under the archbishop Puljić, the Franciscan province under Petar Andelović, and HKD “Napredak” under Franjo Topić. The group of intellectuals surrounding the HSS, and the institutions mentioned above, could now expand the field of influence outside of Sarajevo – into Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and especially Zagreb. The territory legitimizing the new language had increased.

In the meantime, HKO reached a decision that I should join the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, since it collapsed for the second time after the Croatian members left.27

The admission enabled our new language and discourse to reach a legal and legitimizing stage (a national institution), and through that into an international public, since the Presidency participated in all negotiations regarding the country. And that is how our language got the opportunity to directly access the Bosnian and Herzegovinian peace conferences.

Also, as a member of the national presidency I got a chance to legitimize the language within Bosnia and Herzegovina, I could transgress barriers, and visit the areas at war –

anywhere from Tuzla to Bihać and Mostar. During those visits the new language was supported by not only Croats, but Bosniaks and sometimes Serbs, which I encountered first hand. They all suffered the war equally, and they all wished its swift end. The majority of them did not accept the language of war and the discourse of division, persecution, and the displacement of people.

As a member of the presidency of the Rep. of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I had the opportunity to travel outside the country, not just as part of the peace negotiation groups and conferences, but beyond that. First, I established a close bond with our group in Zagreb, which was at the old “Napredak” location (rather, “Matica Hrvatska” which “Napredak” used), and then at Petar Jozelić’s, in Radnička 5, where a significant number of refugees from Posavina and central Bosnia resided – the bulk of Croatian resistance in the party. Through our embassy in Zagreb, I got into contact with the refugees now living in Croatia, particularly those who went to Slavonia and Istra. They were already formed and organized refugee groups, associated by where they came from – Posavina, central Bosnia, Krajina. It was important to legitimize the new language and establish the new dialogue among them because they were heavily under the influence of Tuđman’s propaganda. Insofar as we wanted to offer the world a new solution to the Bosnian and Herzegovinian crisis (outside the established discourse of division), than it had to have this extended authority. That is why we had a series of meetings with the refugee organizations to reject, even publically, the language of division which was already common in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as within the international community.

It could now be statistically showed: all Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, outside Herzeg-Bosnia, reject the ethnic division of the country and request an end to the agreements on division – according to the 1991 census, that was about two-thirds of the people. That was our legitimizing statistics, which still rested on the fact that nearly all Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats showed up for the referendum of 1992 and voted for an independent and sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina.28

Besides this, as a member of the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I visited a great deal of our refugees in Europe, particularly Germany, including a great number of our economic migration from before the war. They were all organized in clubs and organizations, or at least grouped around Catholic missions. The majority of them participated in anti-war demonstrations (which I even attended) and were openly against the partition of their homeland. They easily supported the new language, quickly accepting it.

I employed my position at the Presidency of the Rep. of Bosnia and Herzegovina to affirm the new language in diplomatic correspondence with representative of other nations, other presidents, premiers, and ministers of foreign affairs. Such activity was particularly alive in Sarajevo, where a number of nations that recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina opened their embassies. It was through them that their national and political leaders could receive all information regarding the formation of the new political discourse and language.

In the end it was a matter of making the last move and producing an event which would formalize and institutionalize the new language as the language of discourse – a new way of speaking about Bosnia and Herzegovina and its future.

That event was merely a conclusion to what was already done, itself expressed and justified, something that could only sustain itself.

Large groups of refugee organizations were summoned, the displaced from Posavina, central Bosnia, and Krajina, who advocated the legitimized political position of rejecting the division of the nation, territory exchange, and “humane removal” (Tuđman euphemism for genocide). That essentially meant that Tuđman’s politics, along with the politics of HDZ and

28 64.3% of the Voting body voted in the referendum, and 98% of them voted FOR.
Herzeg-Bosnia, were being rejected as the solution for the Croatian question in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of course, that did not go smoothly; Tuđman bound the Croats from Posavina with Herzeg-Bosnia through HVO and HV, claiming that the interests of the former could only be realized through the para-national status of the latter. That was not too difficult especially since HVO Orašje, the last Croatian stronghold in Posavina, was logistically dependent on Croatia, while the Posavina refugees in Croatia depended on the Croatian, and Tuđman’s, humanitarian drives. The Croats of central Bosnia and Krajina, primarily concentrated in Zagreb and Rijeka, depended less on Croatian aid than on HKO, which was active in Zagreb and other centers; the refugees also depended on a group of intellectuals who sought a new political solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the end we managed to reach a unique Resolution in tune with the position of the Croatian Assembly, as well as two working groups operating out of Zagreb and Sarajevo. This Resolution should have been, by the logic of events we produced, adopted at the great communal congress of the Assembly of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats in Sarajevo.

The Croats of central Bosnia and Sarajevo who did not flee showed great interest in such gathering, and prepared to come out. It was not expected from Herzegovinian Croats to show any support, after all they were under the complete control of Herzeg-Bosnia and its authorities.

The biggest obstacle of this gathering lay in bringing foreign delegates into a sieged Sarajevo, susceptible to constant artillery and sniper fire.

I again employed my position at the Presidency of the Rep. of Bosnia and Herzegovina to organize flights with UNHRC planes for the participants of the gathering. I agreed with the late, imbued Sergio De Mello, the director of that mission for Bosnia and Herzegovina, about three destinations for flying the delegates in and out of Sarajevo: Split, Zagreb, and Frankfurt (those three were mainly used for humanitarian flights for Sarajevo). All our delegates from Croatia were set to arrive from Zagreb and Split, while those from Europe and the United States were set to arrive from Frankfurt. The employees of UNHRC received clear lists of participating individuals, and those who responded were taken to Sarajevo. There were of course abstractions and difficulties on the airports themselves. Certain delegates could not make the scheduled flights, nor were they allowed to board the subsequent planes. This excessive thoroughness by soldiers who conducted airport traffic made it difficult for some delegates to make it to the city. That is how Petar Anđelović, who was particularly active in the preparation for the Assembly, was left behind in Zagreb; similarly, Mile Stojić missed his flight from Frankfurt.

Groups from Tuzla and Zenica could unfortunately not make it to Sarajevo due to numerous blockades, instead they remained in Zenica and from there followed and actively participated via radio.

The Croatian Assembly was held in Sarajevo on January 6th, 1994. A day before, when most of the delegates already arrived in Sarajevo, a bomb was dropped on “Markele.” That was the biggest mass killing of people in Sarajevo since the beginning of war.

The Assembly was attended, apart from our own delegates, by the opposition from the Rep. of Croatia (Drago Stipac, Zvonimir Šeparović, Dobroslav Paraga), representatives of certain agencies from the Rep. Bosnia and Herzegovina operating out of Sarajevo, representatives of international organizations working out of Sarajevo, and several ambassadors.

The meeting was followed by a large number of journalists who reported on everything that went on in Sarajevo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. TV Sarajevo broadcast the entire meeting live.

29 Sixty-seven people were killed, over a hundred injured.
The event had been created. The domestic and world public, which was committed to the happenings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, turned their attention towards Sarajevo and that particular event. Nobody could ignore it any longer, regardless of what they thought of it, regardless of how acclaimed it was.

The Assembly adopted the Resolution, the motion to organize the country by cantons (supplying a cantonal map of the country, its borders and demographic structures). Also, the Assembly elected its executive power, the Croatian National Council (HNV), which had the task of carrying out all decisions of the Assembly.30

What was the new discourse of the Assembly?

First, the Assembly was timed well. It was held a day before the assembly of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Rep. of Bosnia and Herzegovina which was set to discuss the adaptation of the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan for dividing the country into three republics, and two days before the national delegation left for Geneva to sign that plan. Izetbegović was ready to accept the plan, so the decision of the Assembly was merely formal in legitimizing his decision. Knowing that, I acquainted the Presidency with the plans of our Assembly and the decisions we would make. That was necessary for two reasons. I needed technical and logistic support in preparation for the Assembly, and I needed political support for a project that was essentially opposed to the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, which Izetbegović had already openly accepted. I knew that the members of the Presidency, including Izetbegović, could not reject the new initiative in peace negotiations in Geneva, even if they were substantially completed. Izetbegović himself reacted positively, even though he expressed doubt in the success of any other new plan. He said he needed to give me another chance to see if anything could be done from the Croatian side, even though he doubted it – he believed it was too late, negotiations were practically done.

Real melodrama took place at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Rep. of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a day after the Assembly, February 7th, 1994. I urged the Parliament to adopt the plan of the Croatian National Council, which was adopted by the Assembly a day prior as a plan of national delegation, and for that plan to be imposed upon the Geneva negotiations, in addition to abandoning all further talks on the division of the country. After a precise explanation of the new cantonal arrangement, I was unanimously supported by all participants of the Assembly in both of my requests. When I thought everything was done, the president of the club SDA, Muhamed Kupusović, came out with a shocking counter-suggestion which I never expected, I was never even acquainted with. He suggested that the Assembly, during the meeting, proclaim the country a Muslim republic, with a Muslim government, with Izetbegović as president. It was a great change with a great dispute in further sessions of the Assembly, it was unclear how it was all to end. Participants began associating themselves with the suggestions of HNV and SDA. Izetbegović put an end to it by suggesting that both options be presented in Geneva as final resolutions for the negotiations. Of course, HNV had no real chance in that ultimatum, it opposed the beliefs of the Geneva negotiations and its final results. The suggestion of SDA was compatible with the final resolution of dividing the country into three republics, with the fact that Central Bosnian Republic would have form and content (in name at least) – it would be Muslim. The Parliamentary Assembly accepted Izetbegović’s suggestion.

However, Izetbegović’s indecision would return once again. When he was supposed to determine the delegation which would travel to Geneva to complete the division of the country, he excluded himself and requested that the delegation be run by Silajdžić. The delegation would additionally include Miro Lazović and myself. We were essentially selected

to complete the Geneva negotiations, under the legal authorities of the Rep. of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and sign the partition of the country into three ethnic territories. Since I was going to Geneva as a double representative, part of the national delegation and the leader of HNV, I seized the opportunity to request a large company of HNV delegates which would present our new plan – which was anyway the decision of the Assembly. We knew we had no chance before Owen and Stoltenberg, but our goal was to acquaint the world with the new plan in the corridors of the conference as well as in the attentive international press center. We knew the world would be watching. And so it was. Owen and Stoltenberg rejected any mention of the new plan and insisted we concentrate on finalizing the negotiations about the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the three ethnic parts. I was persistent in imposing the HNV plan as legitimized for discussion, but to no avail. However, after my presentation in the international press center before hundreds of journalists, and after my further insistence, the mediators permitted me to discuss my plan at that very conference. Silajdžić played an important role by not mentioning the SDA plan, but confirming the legitimacy of the HNV plan, along with its affirmation at the Assembly of the Rep. of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the national delegation. Although Owen carefully listened to the plan, in the end he insisted that discussion can only be held about his and Stoltenberg’s plan, which was already nearing completion and which awaited to be signed. At that moment our delegation quit the Geneva negotiations and rejected all talks regarding the partition of the country. Silajdžić, Lazović, and myself, were unanimous in that, and the decision was ours to make.

It is interesting that everybody to whom we introduced our HNV plan in Geneva claimed that it was good and reasonable but that it came a little too late and nothing could be done with it (exactly what Izetbegović had said). In a way, Karadžić confirmed it as well.31

After Geneva, where the plan was made public, we began with, on the one hand, the propaganda through the media, while on the other hand, propaganda directed towards diplomats and representatives of the international community. In all, everybody reacted in much the same way – the plan was good but a little too late. That was also the reaction of Alois Mock32, who incessantly supported all efforts of keeping Bosnia and Herzegovina intact.

The big presentation of the plan after Geneva was held in Zagreb. The presentation was followed by all Croatian politicians and media. I was so preoccupied with everything that I did not have time to return to Sarajevo, but instead stayed in Zagreb. Even Tudman was interested in the plan but his vanity prevented him from hearing it first hand, instead he learned about it through his minister of foreign affairs, Mate Granić. Every day, twice a day, I met with Granić. It was soon clear that Granić transmitted our morning conversations, held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Tudman, and then, under his instructions, continued in the afternoon. He wanted to know every detail of the plan; he was particularly interested in the map of the cantons, their borders, the possibility of mutual affiliation, variety A, variety B, etc. During the talks there were increasingly less comments about the plan and increasingly more about the possibility of his involvement.

In the midst of these talks I received a message from Silajdžić, through the Bosnian and Herzegovinian embassy in Zagreb, that I should travel to Frankfurt with the plan in hand immediately; he said we were going to Washington at the request of United States government. During our brief stay in Frankfurt we would meet with Granić.

32 Documents, Mock’s telegram of support to Assembly, Ibid., p. 215.
I was certain that the plan was accepted by the United States, that it would be imposed on Croatia, and that Bosnia and Herzegovina was delivered from division. Even in Frankfurt, at the meeting with Granić, it was clear that Tuđman would accept the plan, meaning the end of Herzeg-Bosnia. That is in fact what happened in Washington.

When it was heard back home that Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina started negotiating the cantonal arrangement of the country, the armed conflicts between the Army of B&H and HVO immediately seized, and there were no more military conflicts after that.

Second, the new discourse, which was opened with the HNV plan, was contained in the plan itself. The plan itself was consistent, objective, and rational. It did not include war as the means of its actualization, but a new language of peace, tolerance, trust, responsibility. The plan did not have an inherent need for a conflict of territory like other plans, from Cutileiro to Owen-Stoltenberg. They all divided the country and thus conquered territory. The ethnic countries within Bosnia and Herzegovina, for which blood was spilled, were however not self-sufficient, they did not have a purpose within themselves but without, in, say, Serbia or Croatia. Also, the proposed Bosniak nation in central Bosnia could not have been self-sufficient, it would have to be sustainable from without, it would be in someone’s hands. They were all temporary solutions that led to the displacement of people and their actual disappearance.

HNV offered a plan that was sustainable, that had an end in itself which kept it relevant and constantly improving. That solution contained the creative mind which was capable of maintaining the ends through its own strength.

The plan was founded on the universal principles contained in the Assembly Delegation. The fundamental principal was the maintenance of national and territorial totality of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the vital interest of all people of the nation, especially the Croats. This totality guaranteed, in modern regionalism and decentralism, the sovereignty and equality of all peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a democratic arrangement, a parity and proportional participation in the national and local government, and the return of those displaced.

The principles of the Declaration enabled a reversal in peace negotiations and its redirection towards an internal reorganization of Bosnia and Herzegovina, not towards finding the best way to divide and dismember the country. The plan, as the groundwork for the new peace initiative, had two variations – A and B.33

In the first case it would be communication directly from the national parliament, and in the second case, indirectly through the “republics.” The second option was a trap which was supposed to enable negotiations because it was admissible even by an achieved level of negotiations in Geneva. In any further talks about it, it would be clear that advantage lied with option A.

The entire Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be a cantonal federation formed on the basis of spatially-communicational, economic, gravitational, and ethnic measures. There would be sixteen cantons, the seventeenth would be the Sarajevo district. Eleven cantons would have a distinct national majority of one peoples, while five would have a relative population, with a near balanced national structure. This type of internal arrangement eliminates the reason for war – a fight for ethnically designated territories which ignite displacement of people, crime, and genocide. The canons received enough autonomy to put the doubt of supremacy behind them, but not enough to declare independence. Their


federation protects the nation and enables its proper functioning. National equality is achieved in Bosnia and Herzegovina through an equal distribution of power, not outside it.

In option B, each republic would contain two cantons each with a relative majority of the other peoples, meaning that the republics would not be ethnical. That would encourage the return of refugees, as well as an end to war for territory.

In Washington we did not even mention option B. Agreement was made on an elaborated option A.

We created a new language, not to describe the old conditions in a new way, but to create new conditions. Language is the form of creating the new, and the first means by which it is done. That which took place in the spirit with Hegel, in critique with Marx, occurred in language with us.

If we cannot describe the existing and desirable condition with a vocabulary (established and generally accepted), then its alternation cannot be conducted through a search of its internal inconsistencies, but through the creation of a new language. Arguments against an existing language can never be expressed because they would have to be spoken in that language. In that case, the only way to establish a new language is to describe what is existing in a new way until the introduction of a new form of linguistic behavior which would then cause another form of non-linguistic behavior. In that sense we abandon the philosophy of “internal nature,” along with the language, and face the contingency of language we use. Contingency of conscience emerges from contingency of language, and ultimately, from these contingencies emerges a new “picture of intellectual and moral progress as a history of increasingly useful metaphors rather than of increasing understanding of how things really are” (Rorty, 1989, 9).

“Old metaphors are constantly dying off into literalness, and then serving as platform and foil for new metaphors.” Using analogy with Darwin’s description of genesis in the coral reef, Rorty continues: “this analogy lets us think of ‘our language’ – that is, of the science and culture of twentieth-century Europe – as something that took shape as a result of a great number of sheer contingencies.” (Rorty, 1989, 16).

The question of making the vocabulary and new metaphors the contenders of new value was for us a question of dealing with that which was dubbed real-politics, and which was determined, in the existing circumstances, as unappealing and unchanging circumstances of war and politics of war. Advocates of those politics tenaciously maintain their military and political power, insured by their military units and their actions on the battlefield, as well as the daily use of propaganda in the media.

International factors that were involved in finding a way out of the situation, also act upon those facts as presumptions. What is overlooked in all this is the fact that the advocates of the existing situation produced that situation, and then transformed it into a primary premise from which to make a “logical” conclusion. This situation could not be solved by the logic of that situation, or by the “language” of those facts, or by the political practice which rested on reality positioned as such. A way out stood outside that situation, those facts, and those politics; they should have been recognized under other presumptions and other guises. Just as something was made absolute from a single subjectivity and relative situation, it should likewise be relativized and its absolute and unchanging cover revealed.

In these situations the logic of the real must not be pursued, instead a finger must be pointed at the falsity and unsustainability of the primary premise – that Bosnia and Herzegovina is not possible, that “delineation” must take place, and that Bosnia and Herzegovina should solve the “historical” relationship between Croats and Serbs.

The primary premise had to be exposed as unsustainable from the perspective of other elementary facts – Bosnia and Herzegovina is authorized by the long history of cohabitation of its peoples, “delineation” is not possible because the lattice of life would mean its
destruction, every historical solution for the Serbian and Croatian people through Bosnia and Herzegovina did not succeed if Bosnia and Herzegovina was at stake, therefore the basic circumstance changed because a third national minority appeared, without which no decisions are possible. Therefore, the primary premise is unsustainable from the historical and political, moral and cultural, as well as religious standpoint. It is even untruthful because it includes moral decay and crime. The approach to the entire situation, then, must be critical of the primary premise while solutions must be completely external to the logic of finding a way out of the existing situation. There must be talk about something external to the real, with a language of sharp critique, supported by information of crime, both towards common people and the internationally recognized country, as well as towards its history – political, cultural, religious, plain, etc. The real must be discussed as the un-real, the truth as lies, historical rights as historical frustration, from exiting the existing as a blind alley, etc. That which is called a way out, or solution, cannot at all relate to the given because it is assigned. A way out must be something completely new and different, which cannot in any way comply with the existing. That new must be produced. The primary premise should read: the new is not the continuity of the existing.

Rorty avers that continuity should be recognized as the freedom that is not necessary (just like Hegel and Marx). If freedom is recognized or understood as necessity, then it is the continuity of necessity, it is inevitability, it has certainty which understanding itself legitimizes, it actually legitimizes what it presupposes itself. A philosopher (poet, scientist, etc.) is not the discoverer of truth, he is the creator of truth – a creator from contingency (singularity, historicity), not transcendence, overcoming the contingent with the presupposed universal and general. The philosopher does not search for an imprint of the eternal, an ahistorical context of human life, original “nature” of reality, the conditions of possible experience. The existing, possible, and significant is not that which is as such. Man creates spirit through the creation of language; language inherited from others is not the measure of one’s own spirit. Knowledge is not the knowledge of truth within or without us; that is self-knowledge as self-creation. Rorty calls on Nietzsche, re-interpreting him: “the process of coming to know oneself, confronting one’s contingency, tracking one’s causes home, is identical with the process of inventing a new language — that is, of thinking up some new metaphors” (Rorty, 1989, 27). The person ready to estimate his own contingency, propels himself from one perspective to another, from one metaphor to another, and is truth as far as he is concerned – better said in Nietzschean terms, “the mobile army of metaphors.” The will for truth becomes the will for self-overcoming; the self is that which was not anticipated as possible.

Explaining his position, Rorty calls on Freud (Rorty, 1989, 30-36), who showed how to overcome opaque cases of “blindness,” how to explain the “particular ideality” of certain events which were expressed in, say, sexual abuse, extreme cruelty, or aggression.

We always sought to uncover some hidden meaning in Tuđman’s political positions, and that was primarily the problem. When he spoke of national interests, Croatian national politics and its strategy, and “realistic politics,” we always believed it was a matter of something clandestine, something fathomless, because we were not susceptible to certain information, or we failed to understand the actual state of things.

We should have abandoned his position, we should have abandoned the illusion that he was honest and rational in what he did and said. We even needed to abandon the point of view that he errs, that he is delusional, and that he is in need of new information, new ideas, new possibilities. Only when we abandon all that, when we see that he does not err because he is delusional, only then does it become clear what he wants and what he does.
His ideas and procedures were not delusions and mistakes emerging out of them; they were part of his political strategy, they were cleverly designed and developed. If we view them in the context of a developed strategy, they become quite clear.

It was not necessary persuading him that Croats of central Bosnia needed protection, that they should remain where they were, and that politics should be adjusted to reflect their best interests. It was not necessary persuading him that there was a way of stopping the war between the Croats and Muslims. When he mentioned that Bosnia and Herzegovina need not be autonomous, that the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats should fight for their independence (but in their constitutional unit), when he mentioned the constitutionality of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian people, etc. – those were not mistakes stemming from a lack of information or from not understanding the historical and contemporary position of the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. With him, it was all well planned and incorporated into a strategy that was in fact neither the strategy of Croatian national institutions, nor the Croatian general politics, nor the Croatian public. It was his personal strategy which had a wrong primary and founding premise, which had roots in his personality and his opaque political conscience. It was not a question of not knowing the circumstance and relationships between people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or that he was unfamiliar with the history of the country and the Croats within it. He knew it all, but his politics towards Bosnia and Herzegovina was characterized by hatred. As much he wished to conceal his hatred it always seeped, directly or indirectly, through his so-called Croatian national politics. Meanwhile, the Croatian national interest in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia was easily determined due to its rationality. A Bosnia and Herzegovina in its entirety most suited the Croats within it. They were the smallest, most dispersed of the three peoples, spanning from western Herzegovina to Posavina. Every partition of the country leaves the Croats in small groups without much perspective. Only the entire country guarantees future and longevity.

In an ethnically arranged nation, the least numerous people always favor a constitutionality of people as the principle of organization, because equality is best achieved through such principle. In an ethnic and territorial division of a nation, the least numerous people become an overall minority, while in the selected part of the country, where they form their union, they become isolated and enter a process of atrophy and extinction. This especially applies to a period of imposed homogenization because the least numerous people have the biggest cohesive strength, which essentially means that nationalism becomes the sole political ideology. With such ideology there is a slim possibility of a democratic political development, instead nationalization takes effect.

That would be particularly dangerous for the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina because their little enclave would depend on Croatia, and over time be drained by both Croatia and the Croatian political and economic partners. A Croatian country in Bosnia and Herzegovina would quickly be bereft of Croats.

Salvation lies in binding the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats to the other two peoples within the country. Only that insinuates an incessant effort towards equality and democracy.

On the other hand, the interest of that Croatian country is also very clear and unambiguous. Under the conditions of Serbia fabricating a Greater Serbia through war, and claiming a third of Croatia, the defense of Croatia begins in Bosnia and Herzegovina – rather, along the river Drina, the historical and natural border between Serbia and Bosnia. The guarantee of survival and protection of Croatia from Serbian encroachment lays in an intact Bosnia and Herzegovina. With the creation of the “Republika Srpska,” as part of greater Serbia, Serbia advances to the river Una, within 50km of Zagreb. The border between
Croatia and Serbia becomes too vast to properly control – stretching along the rivers Dunav, Sava, Una, Neretva, Trebišnjica.

Croatia had the greatest interest in maintaining Bosnia and Herzegovina whole and sovereign. The Croats within the country were the guarantors of this interest since their efforts for constitutionality insured it.

Tuđman’s Croatian national politics completely opposed these rational interests. He believed it to be premeditated and strategically posed, he believed it to be traitorous. It was directly opposed to Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to Croats in Croatia, and against both countries.

Rorty believes that Nietzsche, James, and Proust made possible a re-description of a single event, different portrayals “without asking which one was right — to see redescription as a tool rather than a claim to have discovered essence” (Rorty, 1989, 39).

“This sort of phenomenon is tempting to describe in terms of the march of the World-Spirit toward clearer self-consciousness, or as the length of man’s mind gradually coming to match that of the universe. But any such description would betray the spirit of playfulness and irony which links the figures I have been describing” (Rorty, 1989, 39).

Rorty tests his idea on a liberal union, claiming that liberal societies create people who are capable of recognizing the contingency of a vocabulary in which they express their greatest aspirations – the contingency of their own conscience – and yet remain loyal to that conscience. Rorty then claims that freedom is the recognition of contingency – the virtue of liberal society which should cure us of our “deep metaphysical need.”

“We should see allegiance to social institutions as no more matters for justification by reference to familiar, commonly accepted premises – but also as no more arbitrary – than choices of friends or heroes” (Rorty, 1989, 54).

Social community is the result of a shift in time and circumstance. The heroes of liberal societies are “strong poets” and “utopian revolutionaries” who revolt in the name of society against the aspects that clash with the image of itself. That rebellion cancels out the difference between the revolutionary and the reformist because as the revolutionary rejects the wrong image of society about itself, the reformist wishes to perfect it. “A liberal society is one whose ideals can be fulfilled by persuasion rather than force, by reform rather than revolution, by the free and open encounters of present linguistic and other practices with suggestion for new practices. But this is to say that an ideal liberal society is one which has no purpose except freedom, no goal except willingness to see how such encounters go and to abide by the outcome” (Rorty, 1989, 60).

Rorty confirms that liberal society is the institutionalization of freedom, or rather the plain of freedom which has its own “outcome.” Freedom is the aim of social practices – it maintains itself in them; it has no aim outside itself, it is sufficient to itself. That is how Rorty approaches the sphere of Aristotle and his notion of doing which has a goal in itself – the “outcome” of action must maintain itself, it must have a goal within itself, as opposed to those which have the goal within the doer, external to itself and dependent on the doer. The freedom of a liberal society is not just a social form but the value of that society – that which maintains itself. Rorty, thus, paradoxically presupposes to his very theory of contingency of social practice, the freedom as a value which eludes that contingency.

Indeed, freedom that is not just a form of human relations but also the “outcome,” is realized in tune with time and circumstance which makes this “outcome” (institutionalization) variable, not permanent. It will again change with time and circumstance – rather, it will get its new linguistic statements and vocabularies which will no longer be suitable for expression. Statements about freedom are linked to time, they are changeable, but freedom is that which they form around, it is the same value regardless if it changed its form or content of institutionalization.
Social institutions, despite being institutions of freedom, as objectifications in time, prevent reform and change; that type of socialization renders man useless in any other alternative.
12. Poeticized Culture and Communicative Rationalism

Man, and the self, is that which was created through acculturation and which cannot be fled. However, Rorty believes that the self, or autonomy of man, cannot be imbedded into social institutions – that it is a private sphere. He separates the yearning for avoiding cruelty and pain from the yearning for autonomy (Nietzsche, Derrida, Freud). This attempt at authenticity should be privatized, according to Rorty, thus preventing deviation towards a politics which believes in a social aim more important than avoiding cruelty. For Rorty, liberal utopia is poeticized culture. It is established on new concepts and self-invention.

In contrast to this, Habermas rationalizes what Rorty poeticizes. He seeks to solve problems rather than uncover them, and within the communicative discourse too. Habermas believes that specific languages (of science, politics, morality, etc.) have an eternally vital strength and that they can be reconstructed. He believes that we must always test the benevolence of a “discovered world” – new metaphors, taking into account the intramundane practice. Habermas has a greater aversion towards the “revolutionary” overturning of established institutions than towards their pressure on discovering “new worlds.” The “revolutionary” overturning erases everything within those institutions, more radically than the very “shells” suffocating their content.

Nationalistic overrunning of communist institutions eradicated all vibrant and productive content of that system, despite all systemic pressures. Then, it was not only a matter of eradicating a supranational country and establishing new national systems, it was also a matter of some life institutions – solidarity between more developed and less developed regions, productive compatibility of regional and republic economies, a simple market, general social solidarity expressed through unity and brotherhood as well as religious tolerance, etc.

With the annihilation of the communist system the national revolutions created an unprecedented space for terror and cruelty.

What the “self-creating ironic thinkers,” like Nietzsche, Derrida, and Freud, wish to maintain and reflect in the “institutions,” which is autonomy itself, is the very thing which Habermas fears more than the inability of “expert cultures” to display “bio-power.” The institutionalization of subjective concepts does not rest on clouds of rationality or on its reconstructions. “Revolution” consists of a rejection of that rationality.

Habermas believes that both forms of fear – the power of institutions and the power of autonomy – could be avoided through communicative practice. Only as such could changes be made in the public institutions and in the behavior of people without domination, while avoiding an eternal revamping of cruelty. Habermas, therefore, through his reconstructed concept of rationality, offers an alternative to Rorty’s concept of poeticized culture.

Habermas believes that “reconstruction” maintains certain universality and a form of enlightened rationality. This process takes place within the communicative mind which updates the rational and which differs from the mind moored in the subject.

In contrast to that, Rorty abandons the possibility of established harmony between the subject and object of knowledge, and advocates a form of “unclouded communication,” without “truth,” “justice,” and “correctness,” then leaves the possibility to “win” the best position. For him, a free and open communication is important, without conditions or external orientation, without limits on the socially established institutions, but also without longing for self-creation and subject autonomy. Habermas insists on the convergence of communication
because it is the guarantee of its rationality. Rorty insists on the contingency of language because it rejects all universal goodness that is merely a replacement for the super-historical. It advocates pluralism, not universalism.

“I want to see freely arrived at agreement as agreement on how to accomplish common purposes (e.g., prediction and control of the behavior of atoms or people, equalizing life-chances, decreasing cruelty), but I want to see these common purposes against the background of an increasing sense of the radical diversity of private purposes, of the radically poetic character of individual lives, and of the merely poetic foundations of the „we-consciousness“ which lies behind our social institutions” (Rorty, 1989, 67,68).

We can talk about the foundations of „we-consciousness“ with Karadžić, but not because he wrote poetry and penetrated the history of Serbian culture as a poet, but because his “poetic character of life” was so “individual” that his suggestions for “the agreement of common aims” led straight to crime and unprecedented cruelty. He fused his “poetic” and public role to such an extent that the common aims of his nationalistic program could no longer be distinguished from his fantasies and conceit. On one occasion, during the elections for Republika Srpska officials, he publically said that he has a proposal that he needs not declare, nor the people vote for, because he was certain that everybody already held it in their hearts. That was followed with a thundering applause, and the elections were closed.

During the peace negotiations in Geneva, December 1st, 1993, when the status of Sarajevo was in question, as completely normal, he proposed dividing the city in two; the central part of the city, encircled and exposed to intense shelling by his army, would be one Sarajevo, while the other Sarajevo would be the part of the city which he held under his political and military might – one Sarajevo encircling the other. When confronted with a question about the functioning of such a division – one Sarajevo keeping the other under siege – he callously responded: for the Muslims a tunnel that would link them with the territories they had been settling outside the city, for the Croats an overpass that would link them with Croatian territories, and for the Serbs the existing roads leading in and out of the city. The problem was not just in his proposal but in the fact that his proposal was discussed as a real possibility; serious discussions were held regarding the cost of building a tunnel for the Muslims and an overpass for the Croats, how much would it all cost and who would eventually pay for these investments. Those proposals were valid objective facts which were foundations of communication, foundations of social relations, which determined the future course of negotiations and decided about war and peace. They demonstrate how the irrational and the unreal gains rationality and reality, and how it conceals that which is truthfully real and given (the social and political state, as well as the frame of mind).

It was the same story with the fate of Brčko. Upon Izetbegović’s insistence that Bosniaks have access to the river Sava via the port in Brčko, Karadžić proposed a 20 km bridge that would link the isolated enclave within the city with the territory outside the city where Bosniaks live.

The other problem was that this communication was not possible from the viewpoint of request for validity. An understanding within a communication is not the same as accepting request for validity, leading to a rejection of Karadžić’s proposals. Linguistic communication is not identical with social communication. In the background of every linguistic communication is a social communication which, in addition to the request for understanding, has a request for validity. (Cited from the Geneva peace negotiations recording, December 1st, 1993).

Karadžić almost certainly never read Rorty, nor do his works have anything to do with him. Yet nobody had ever so tenaciously held on to the idea that a “poeticized” culture must abandon the attempt of consolidating the private manner of dealing with finiteness and man’s
feeling of obligation towards other human beings, like Rorty. It is as if he listened to Karadžić.

Rorty was aware of the dangers of synthesizing private emotions of identity with the public, so instead of this synthesis he offered to bring one close to the other. This synthesis occurred in all tyrannies where ideology was in the public, with the private concealed behind it. Tyrants always separated the two, and cloaked it with their deceptive identification of public interest.

In order to avoid that, Rorty maintains the dichotomized self as cognitive and contingent parts, which is unacceptable to Habermas because rights are given even to that which it non-cognitive. With Habermas, the mind is a unifying and atoning power – the source of solidarity. With Rorty, such central power does not exist, and solidarity is simply a “creation of favorable circumstances” which does not necessarily require a “communicative mind.” Rorty believes that the “we do not need to replace religion with a philosophical account of a healing and unifying power which will do the work once done by God.”

Rorty changes the ideas about super-historical foundations of history with a narrative of establishment of liberal institutions and customs which are stimulated by the desire to reduce brutality and which allow the government to support those who are governed as well as a communication without domination. With that, the old concept of truth (adekvacio) is replaced by the new – a truth that emerges in free and open encounters. That is the move from epistemology to politics, from truth that explains the relationship between mind and reality to political freedom that becomes the potential of every investigation.

However, in order for the government to have support from those it governs, in order for communication to flow without domination, there must be mutual accord and solidarity. They can be instituted only if there is something mutual that enables them; accord and solidarity cannot be instituted between those who have nothing in common – be it a different language or different “metaphors.” According to the theory of language, there is nothing beyond the different vocabularies that would serve as the criteria of choice between them. Such a metaphysical layout from which vocabularies would emerge, and then, through practice, differentiate among themselves, does not exist. There are absolutely no rules outside the vocabularies which could be used to compare them, or which would guide the decision in their selection – moral, cultural, intellectual, political, or anything else. The critique of some finite vocabulary could be interpreted only through another vocabulary. “Nothing can serve as a criticism of a person save another person, of a culture save an alternative culture – for persons and cultures are, for us, incarnated vocabularies” (Rorty, 1989, 80).

Rorty’s ironist rests on the opposition of the finite vocabulary which he inherits as well as the vocabulary which he creates. This creativity is not founded on some external principal or norm, but on the doubt in the finitude of the existing vocabulary and its permanent use.

Irony is reactive in itself – it is the awareness of the power of re-description. “The re-describing ironist, by threatening one’s final vocabulary, and thus one’s ability to make sense of one self in one’s own terms rather hers, suggests that one’s self and one’s world are futile, obsolete, powerless. Re-description often humiliates” (Rorty, 1989, 90).

This ironic re-description is neither founded on the arguments of power, which would strengthen it, or the illusion of markers; it does not offer the type of social hope as presented by the metaphysicists.

“Her sense of human solidarity is based on a sense of a common danger, not on a common possession or a shared power” (Rorty, 1989, 91).

How do we develop a re-descriptive innovative vocabulary if it is without a cause, if it is contingent, and if its intention is to be comprehensible and relative? It cannot simply arise out of a critical relationship with the existing vocabulary, nor simply out of recognizing the
insufficiency of that vocabulary. Aware of that, Rorty introduces the concept of “imaginative knowledge” as a twofold function – for personal development and innovation, and for recognizing others who use alternative vocabulary. The concept of “imaginative thinking” is synonymous with creative action, with the act of creating re-descriptive vocabularies. This “knowledge” is the abandoning of the need for everybody to describe themselves in their own way, and instead a search for a unique language to describe public and private ends as single and unifying – the language of self-identification with others. For Rorty, parts of the spirit and the country do not correspond with one another – the difference between the important and the incidental within the spirit will not help to distinguish justice from injustice within the country. “For the liberal ironist, skill at imaginative identification does the work which the liberal metaphysician would like to have done by a specifically moral motivation — rationality, or the love of God, or the love of truth” (Rorty, 1989, 93).

The time factor is important in the development of a new vocabulary; social action accelerates in relation to the circumstances, meaning that the new vocabulary must be developed in transition, not in continuity. Historical circumstances always determine this transition, and they distinguish between what is referred to as reform and what is referred to as revolution. This historical time can be more or less condensed, which means that action depends on the assessment of the very actors.

Because of that, the formation of HSS B&H could not wait, it needed to act fast and develop a new vocabulary which would describe the war and the new relations that ensued. Time in Sarajevo and time outside Sarajevo was not the same time – one was extensive, the other intensive. I realized that only on April 7th, 1993, when I went from Kiseljak to Sarajevo. It was Palm Sunday, I promised my family I would be back by Easter. I went into the occupied city completely unprepared, without a change of clothes or money. When I arrived in Sarajevo, which was secluded and tortured, I realized the time was different and from then on I did not even contemplate going back home.

A new party needed to be formed as soon as possible, otherwise the speed of events would render it redundant and useless. A “new vocabulary” needed to develop quickly, it needed to describe what was happening and what was to happen, otherwise it would only describe what did happen. New political stands needed to adopt their own language and needed to institutionalize themselves in a political organization in order not to remain single, incidental, sporadic, and without any influence. The new politics and its language had to reach a wider audience and form a new social situation, and only in that situation could a political (and military) change take place. The sequence of those actions is as follows: the development of a new vocabulary, the institutionalization of that vocabulary, the emergence of a new social standing (through the new language), alternating the relationship between social powers.

For Rorty, “imaginative knowledge” is the ability to foreshadow, and he does not distinguish it from other abilities; that ability is not essentially more human than other abilities – for instance, the ability of forming differential equations. It is the ability of “recognizing” and “describing” the little things around which individuals and communities focus their fantasies and lives. Those “small things” are no smaller than those “foundational” for metaphysics, or those which followers of some religion or political ideology subscribe to. Rorty’s liberalism is not the adoration of words that describe “small things,” but the ability to understand “the function of many different sequences of words.”

“Imaginative knowledge,” the ability to recognize and describe, the ability to read the various vocabularies without referencing any one in particular – that is the mark of a “liberal ironic thinker” and the “essence” of his philosophy.

“Solidarity has to be constructed out of little pieces, rather than found already waiting, in the form of an un-language which all of us recognize when we hear it” (Rorty, 1989, 94).
The goal of ironic theory is to understand the metaphysical need for theorization in order to completely reject it. The method of that theory is a description that rejects the very thing it describes, a re-description that liberates from the thing described – a finally determined concept, canon, object of faith, etc. The result is the language itself, unrepeatable and finite – a language which allows the inherited contingencies to be substituted for self-created contingencies.

Rorty’s distinction between “theorists” and “novel writers” suggests a distinction between theory and creativity – an analytical and cognitive theory, and a re-constructed and re-described creativity. “Because the theorist wants to see rather than rearrange” (Rorty, 1989, 104).

“Adjustment” is, before all else, self-creation; a reaction to the “past,” a reaction within some perspective, it is not external to time and contingency, it is not the eternal as the finite of all perspective. Self-creation is not a promotion in the “end” (of history), it is not a finalizing of that which was and which could no longer be different, it is not a raising but a reaction, a reaction among others, from a single limited perspective. This self-creation is not even concerned if the “perspective” is a true theory. Rorty thus writes: “so the lesson I draw from Proust’s example is that novels are a safer medium than theory for expressing one’s recognition of the relativity and contingency of authority figures” (Rorty, 1989, 107).

The contingencies of the “figures of authority,” if we were to delve into the particulars of those contingencies, could more successfully and more truthfully analyze historical events, the “new in history,” the “true in history,” the “real and possible,” etc.

Historical figures only skillfully concealed their contingencies (frustrations, antipathies and sympathies, insanity, etc.) behind a cloak of the particular and the universal, historical or saintly missions, the will of the people or social classes.

However, Rorty underestimates precisely the possibility of showing the contingent as the objective, the real, the universal, as fate or necessity. It acquires the power and significance by being objectified through institutions, or by being canonized as normative. In order to penetrate the cloak of the contingent it is not sufficient to indicate the limitedness of the contingency in the creation of a new vocabulary, because in such a situation it would not be heard. The objective has the power of abstraction, it devours everything on its horizon. The new vocabulary must create a new reality and new possibilities. Those possibilities are not finite, they are merely an answer to the power of the objective, which is established and seemingly unchangeable. In realizing them, we institute a new standing which is also not finite, and which too will have a new vocabulary. In time, each of these vocabularies will lose their descriptive power, which will then allow new possibilities.

In 1992, we already had an elaborate new vocabulary but it did not have the strength of discourse. We could not wait for its gradual adoption, its gradual acclimatization, because everything was in a state of atrocity. The language we spoke about the objective was heard by nobody because nobody could acquire the power of request for validity, and those who endured were replaced. The response to the state of atrocity was supposed to be piercingly loud, but in a different vocabulary; our language had to be “objective” and accessible, and without delay.

Those who suffer cannot wait, the victims cannot be comforted with the fact that their names will later be mourned or that the criminals will be punished. For the victims it is important that atrocities should end when they are most damaging and most concealed.

The political and practical discourse cannot be analyzed through a model of linguistic-literary discourse which involves no public action – it is subjective and self-building. Public

34 See documents; Memorandum for saving Bosnia and Herzegovina and the letter to Tuđman, p. 216-218.
action takes place through the institutions; selected action can only mean sacrifice. Self-
creation is not preoccupied with the public.

With Heidegger, man is occupied and determined through formation and language –
they determine what man can undertake as a possible project. “Dasein” and the “authentic
being” are different because the first one is determined yet does not know it, while the second
one is aware of its determinations, or contingencies, and wishes to free itself from them and in
turn determine itself alone under new contingencies. Rorty maintains the linguistic paradigm,
the irreducibility of language, from which only style and beauty can emerge in particular use,
in unique descriptions. Just as language cannot have a general or heightened meaning outside
that, it cannot be the paradigm for public use, either as general, universal, or fundamental. It is
always unique and unrepeatable in style. Language is actually the paradigm in the self-
creation of the ironic thinker, the paradigm of ironic culture and the ironic liberal, and not a
model of public action; the ironic liberal is not publically useful, nor is the ironic culture a
form of an institutionalized ironic speech and action in either philosophy, theory, or politics.

Rorty believes that there is no “unifying name,” “elementary word,” “unconditional
condition of possibility” – same as all other metaphysical thinkers, including Nietzsche and
Heidegger. For him, there is no final analysis, a true analysis of neither philosophy nor
history – both are constantly open to re-description and re-analysis, without the preference of
that analysis. Self-creation and re-description are a nice and fantastical “rearrangement of its
own memory.” That is what could be called expanding the limits of possibility.
13. Extending the Limits of Possibility

What is it to extend the limits of possibility?

In self-creation it is a new style (description) and fantasy – that is the method in use. The existing is not neglected, the enduring influences and “necessities,” but they are not subject to same relations as the propound and the unchangeable. Everything that can be labeled as memory in that subjective sphere (culture, tradition, complete heritage, language) is susceptible to re-description and stylization.

However, when it is a question of a sphere beside or outside the subjective, which is “fixed” differently than it is in our own memory, which is objectified and institutionalized with a compulsion for the public (law, morals, customs, social relations, social status, etc.), then “re-description” and “stylization” take on a different meaning and definition. Then they suggest change, reformation, and institutional realization, not only the building of the subject, the self-creation. Self-creation can be a starting point for “other” re-stylization, but not in the sense of appointing for the sake of appointing, from its subjective core as a being which must be objectified. It is a matter of a different type of relationship between the subjective and the objective – not a cognitive relationship between S and O – in order to determine one from another as from its unchanging basis. Self-creation, a stylization of memory (with Rorty), opens the present for other possibilities, changes the context of the approach of the given to the assigned. With that, “authority” itself collapses, which creates conditions for the collapse of every other authority, even the given. That is the presumption of change, but not as a foundation of self, from which the given is re-described, but as style, as a relationship from which new possibilities stem.

The method of stylization and fantasy, however, cannot remain the same until the end because the given resists that method, as oppose to the subjective content. Stylization and fantasy are only parts of the spoken discourse, while the change of the “objective” occurs within the sphere of action. It is not sufficient to merely describe the new possibility (stylize it), it needs to be objectified in the givens.

The “self” has three parts: the cognitive quest for truth, the moral quest for rules of action, the aesthetic quest for rules of exploration-creation.

Rorty is aware that the pursuit of self-creation can render man insensible towards atrocity – the pursuit of autonomy could evolve into indifference towards others. Atrocity could be given in the distinction between the aesthetic and the moral, or between the individual and the public. In order to avoid that, both must be taken as “bundles of idiosyncratic beliefs and desires,” and not as some fundamental abilities which wish to be objectified. The problem of tension between autonomy and the public, obligation towards the self and obligation towards others, is solved within the autonomy of the individual and his “final vocabulary.” Then, it is not a matter of weather that vocabulary is true or untrue, but weather it exists or does not exist – weather we are worthy of it. For Rorty, “truth” external to the individual is unimportant, what is important is the possibility of self-creating the individual through language, or, rather, the freedom of that self-creation. Society should enable that freedom, but only as far as man is interested in it. “If we take care of freedom the truth can take care of itself” (Rorty, 1989, 176). In other words, truth should emerge in the vocabulary which we develop in freedom. Vocabularies depend on capabilities of self-construction – they depend on the autonomy of the individual, and, subsequently, truth will depend on it too. Autonomy is untouchable, it does not depend directly on society, on man’s
position within society, or on the so-called “final public vocabulary.” It is enough to be “ironic,” in other words, critical towards our final vocabulary and curious about the vocabularies of others, to overcome the difference between autonomy and the objectively existing atrocity, the private and the public. In order to overcome this, Rorty does not request an understanding of truth or the rules of proper conduct.

Rorty resists the idea of human nature as socialized, as existing only as socialized. He believes that there is some embedded human solidarity in man which neither derives from ulteriority nor is it transcendental. The thin thread of natural solidarity is useful as a “moral reference point” and it does not depend on socialization but on the autonomy of the individual. It must not be lost through socialization – and that is possible through political and religious ideologies. The potential of feeling pain is not linked with socialization, and Rorty wishes to maintain that. The self-construction of the individual revolves around what is “natural” within man, the potential of solidarity, and not some particular human pathos. The greatest form of inflicting pain is the destruction of capabilities for feeling pain, as well as the solidarity with those who experience it.

The capability for atrocity can emerge through man’s negation of his autonomy or its destruction through “socialization” – some sort of general idea and truth. That is why Rorty insists on the autonomy of the liberal ironic thinker who is always awake and critical, because such being allows him to be solidary. If it is destroyed, everything falls apart – the autonomy, the feeling for justice, the feeling for others.

Atrocity is therefore always directed towards the destruction of autonomy, the destruction of the single final vocabulary and the “truth” which it produces. The pain that is suffered relates to this destruction; it is not a common pain which humans share with animals, it is the pain of the victim. Victims, like animals, cannot express their pain because they do not possess the vocabulary for it, the pain has outgrown them, it is non-experiential because we cannot get used to it. The pain is degrading, the annihilation of autonomy, characteristics, and the fact that it destroys the capability of discourse about it. Degradation is destruction that allows the individual to establish and find its vocabulary once again. It is deprived of speech through brutality, it is forced to say or do things which it will later, after the humiliation passes, fail to comprehend as its previous thoughts or actions. Degradation is the depredation of the individual’s world and the incapability of using language to describe what had happened. It destroys the self which could be designed. “There is no world in which I can picture myself as living, because there is no vocabulary in which I can tell a coherent story about myself” (Rorty, 1989, 179).

During the nineties, we experienced the destruction of autonomy in two ways, that of the oppressor and that of the oppressed. The world of the victim is destroyed through suffering, which in turn destroys the “truth” through which to speak – it is forced to renunciate from the things it identified itself with (religion, people, homeland, feeling of solidarity, love, thoughts, etc.).

The world of the oppressor is likewise destroyed because he seizes to oppress for an “idea” and “truth,” and instead oppresses to oppression sake. Oppressors essentially transgress the realm of order which had been reserved for military targets and tactics, the political ideas that fuel war. They tortured for the sake of torturing, in order to inflict pain on others.

Rorty does not offer a solution to the perceived contradictions of the autonomous and the public, the personal and the objectively given worlds. He does not point to the necessary road from the present to some different future. “We can picture various socioeconomic setups which would be preferable to the present one. But we have no clear sense of how to get from the actual world to these theoretically possible worlds, and thus no clear idea of what to work for” (Rorty, 1989, 182).
For Rorty, this impossibility is not the result of a particular necessity – neither the historical, nor the logical-cognitive – but the result of accidentally positioned circumstances. That is simply how it is, and that hinders all liberal scenarios.

Rorty creates a space between the particular final vocabulary and the public final vocabulary, but he does not fill it. He is missing a binding article between these two vocabularies and he relies on the imaginative capability of the speaker who will change one vocabulary for the other – one more suitable for determining truth. He does not see the creative power of mind which uses the imagination, which creates a new vocabulary and holds the individual on the dividing line of language – the dividing line of the aesthetic and the moral, the autonomous and the public.
14. Understanding as Practical Activity

If we neglect the philosophical essence or truth, being, nature, and so on, we find ourselves in an empty space of ambiguity, uncertainty, and different sorts of contingency. Rorty approaches that space and demonstrates that the adherence to contingency does not ultimately suggest ambiguity and uncertainty. If “truth” is not presupposed, it must not be produced. This “production” from “nothing,” from the ambiguous and the uncertain, even without presupposed rules of conduct, is on one hand an existential situation, and on the other a request for “overcoming” that situation. Man’s speech, scientific research, artistic creativity, political practice, they are all activities and forms of that “overcoming.” Precisely because of this encounter with the empty field, or because of the intersection of various contingencies without hierarchy or any other order between them, man is directed towards creating language, scientific facts, artistic work, social institutions. However, as soon as every form of the presupposed truth is removed, this creativity is original and authentic, appointed to the contingencies. Contingencies insure its particularity and recognition – a historical uniqueness. This action does not have an aim or truth in creating permanent forms or laws, rather, it is temporary, it is a historical performance. Its “aim” is in the unrepeatable self-confirmation which is not left as heirloom – posterity is insignificant because it is not capable of self-determination. Self-determination, self-construction in language, art, history, is not falling into relativism, illusion, and untruth, but, on the contrary, producing truth from the contingent. That is not the truth that could be advanced in continuity, at best it can be repeated and maintained. That is the truth that sinks with its creator, yet directs us towards the creation of a new one, from new unrepeatable contingencies.

In this empty field between the presupposed and the possible enters Charles Taylor, wishing to create a civil society within it.

The theoretical questions cannot be resolved within the framework of theory itself because it is always founded on assumptions; we would have to discuss the validity and truthfulness of assumptions, and that is an endless road. Because of that, theoretical questions are resolved through practice. Practice shows that it does not need any high resolution or establishment, any justification. If we apply this model of practice to a theoretical mind, we conclude that “rules” are neither necessary nor possible to understand – they simply exist as such and should be adhered to blindly.

The other possibility is that we understand the background of our actions, and that it is even possible to understand it. That actually means that our background is devised. Meaning is acquired when the background of our practice is placed in a social space (with Rorty, this social space does not exist).

Taylor seeks to reclaim the thinking that perceives man as a being involved in various forms of activity, who acts within the world as well as in relation to the world, and not the thinking that perceives him as the subject of representation (monologue).

Taylor classifies such “understanding” under practical action – he considers it implicit in action. This implies that “understanding” goes beyond the represented.

Intelligent behavior in the greatest degree is not consciously expressed, it is not previously given in presentation – it stems from unarticulated “understanding.” “Unarticulated understanding” is the background of understanding given in presentation (“representatio”), the context in which only “representations” are possible. “Rather than representations being the
primary locus of understanding, they are only islands in the sea of our unformulated practical grasp on the world” (Taylor, 1995, 170).

“Understanding” is not the presumption of action, but it emerges from action of an unarticulated background. “Unarticulated understanding” does not negate an overall existence of understanding, but there is a background of our actions that is not articulated, not completely comprehensible, but that exists nevertheless; action does not occur elsewhere, nowhere and in nothing. The very fact that we are physical beings suggests that we manage ourselves physically in concrete circumstances and concrete situations, and that our understanding is embodied as well. “I know how to manipulate and use the familiar instruments in my world, usually in the same inarticulate fashion” (Taylor, 1995, 170).

Capabilities of understanding and acting are different from one another. Action is followed by patterns, or it creates them without representations, feelings of suitability, and correctness. Also, action is linked to the activities of other people, it is dialogical and it has a social backdrop. This backdrop is the foundation of understanding which members of a social community share. Language is merely a means of establishing the space of common action. “Much of our understanding of the self, society, and world is carried through dialogical action” (Taylor, 1995, 173).

The “embodied understanding,” located between the intellectual representation and the “unarticulated understanding” which does not need understanding at all, enables a connection between understanding and social practice. Without the social context, understanding (rules) would not be possible; subjugation to rules is a social practice – customs or a social proficiency (Ibid).

However, this relation between action and its social connection should not be interpreted as a causal association. Action does not emerge from a direct causal association from a social context. The meaning that social practice bestows upon action is not presented but “embodied.” The causality, which is here imposed, is the inheritance of an intellectual epistemology that penetrates into social sciences. Actually, social practice only offers meaning to action, it does not cause it. The represented rule must not be perceived as causally efficacious, nor should we regard it as the determination for some “structure” upon which behavior rests. We then place it behind the subjects’ backs who act and who do not think about it at all.

“It is a philosophy of action designated at times as dispositional which notes the potentiality inscribed in the body of agents and in the structure of the situation where they act, or more precisely, in the relations between them” (Bourdieu quoted in Taylor, 1995, 175).

The laws by which we abide do not have to be effective. Practical capability, as oppose to the theoretical, is effective – it is always realized in space and time. “Maps or representations, by their nature, abstract from lived time and space. To make something like this the ultimate causal factor is to make the actual practice in time and space derivative, a mere application of a disengaged scheme. It is the ultimate end in Platonism” (Taylor, 1995, 176).

The relations between laws and procedures must be regarded reciprocally, not causatively. A law does not apply to itself; it must be applied to in some social practice. Such application is always uncertain because human situations are infinitely diverse. There is no single application of laws, despite the fact that rules are rules. Taylor reminds us again of Aristotle’s phronetic gap between formulating law and putting it into practice. Law essentially rests on an uncertain application of itself. Law, therefore, is no better than what practice makes it. Its usefulness and truthfulness does not emerge from it, but from its application. A distinctly poor social practice cannot vindicate itself on “good” laws, nor can law vindicate itself on “poor” social practice.
Law does not have to be formulated or expressed at all. It exists in an “embodied understanding” – what Bourdieu calls the “habitus” –35 in the disposition towards physical behavior, action, abstinence, movement. These behaviors do not require explicit laws, they are simply present in the physical disposition.” The habitus has an expressive dimension, “it gives expression to certain meanings that things and people have for us, and it is precisely by giving such expression that it makes these meanings exist” (Taylor, 1195, 178).

Even the formulation of laws is closely related to everything incorporated under the term “habitus.” The habitus, as a style of behavior, and the institution, as established laws of social behavior, are only two forms of that which had already taken place in history. Institutions are expressions of laws and norms – laws which are not just dead letters upon a page, but forms of behavior, and in close relation to that which they apply to. Institutions are practical because they demand certain behavior that incessantly revitalizes what is objective within them: the laws and norms.

Laws that are understood as such cannot be interpreted causally, as constituents for behavior – they do not constitute anything. They are embodied in behavior, just as they are embodied in institutions. The habitus, as a style of (physical) behavior, activates laws, not the other way around. This conclusion suggests that the “world of life,” as the immanency of life, ought to be revised as well. Even Aristotle advised that the point of political association is not only life, because then people would be equal to their biological life. The point of a nation is “a good life,” because life has a purpose only if it is the foundation of a good life acquired in a political community.

Classical political theory, including Aristotle, makes the distinction between the plain life and the good life, perceiving them hierarchically. The good life is a higher form of life, and it is determined rationally, not biologically; that is, theoretically within knowledge and practically within the nation, as the general good. Modernity would change this relationship and demand that ordinary, every-day life be the good life, not just the biological basis for it. This change was also enabled by different circumstances of life in the new century; work and production became the foundations of life, the nuptial family became the care for others, modern science took it upon itself to improve ordinary life, as well as the reformation that underlines the fundamental theological thought about the affirmation of life. The common line among all reformists – religious as well as political – is the idea of denying “greater vocation” in favor of the ordinary life whose fulfillment is achieved in marriage, family, profession, success, production, and creation. The spiritual foundation of this shift resided in the Judeo-Christian tradition through which God affirmed life – “And God saw that it was good” 36. The good does not derive from some principle, it is instead manifested from that which is created – it is the result of the creation. The life of the modern man is not dedicated to a higher authority, instead he needs to give allotment in God’s affirmation of life.

Modern knowledge – scientific or philosophic – analyses this shift by placing instrumentalized reason into the foundation of ordinary life. That is how enlightened humanism, in a certain way, turns against reformed religion, even if it did inherit the resources of critique from it – it rejects Christianity in its entirety, along with all its limitations of ordinary life. Life has its inherent value, regardless if we perceive it as part of nature that celebrates life, or an act of a liberated mind. Life rests on nature and the mind – they manage all of life’s processes; life has no ontological value outside them.

Descartes gave us the philosophical basis for returning to the rationalized ordinary life. He is the creator of philosophical subjectivism which, in man’s mind, finds the creative power as well as the capability of thought and expression in the first person.

36 The Book of Genesis, 1-10
Descartes’ “construction” of knowledge is rational, but not cognitive. The presentation on which knowledge is formed is a construction that ensued from a proper conduct of mind. An “idea,” as an archetype of mind and personification of Good, is not found or “uncovered” in thought – it is not of an ontological nature, it is instead “developed” by method. Method records truthfulness because it is the only reliable process of arriving there – the “idea” emerges in the process. Performance must follow method in its very existence – from simple to complex – since its certainty is recorded only in such way. The rules of the method include the “gathering” and “ordering” of things which relate to thought – the “cogitare.”

Rationality is the capacity of the construction of order along the standards of knowledge, or understanding, or certitude. This capacity, and not the senses, is the controlling element of life because it is shaped by the order constructed by this very capacity, in accordance with particular rules.

That which relates to knowledge also relates to action. Just as knowledge is instrumentalized in cognition, so is the will from which action emerges; passion is not denied as the opposite of reason, it is instead put under its control. Reason has the power to objectify body, passion, and the world, and thus places them under its control. With this, the source of moral strength is internalized. Shaping life by order that controls reason (the ethics of rational control) brings man’s life to sublimity – the central concept of modern ethics and politics.

“We could say that rationality is no longer defined substantively, in terms of the order of being, but rather procedurally, in terms of the standards by which we construct orders in science and life” (Taylor, 1989).

Reason has the potential of offering itself the certainty for the performances it creates – evidence outside that is not necessary. It has the self-evidence which is not conditioned by anything external, instead it is given in the rules which reason itself developed and which it abides by in practice.

This is the path towards creating the modern idea of the subject, to which autonomy, and the creative, poetic ability, is attributed.

Modern humanism is actually a fusion of ethics of ordinary life and this idea of rationalization, or rational subjectivism, autonomous and qualified for “creativity.” In it, it is implied that only the rational mind can affirm nature and its values, and that the values of the “ordinary life” can only be understood through it.

Natural life and man’s ordinary life have their inherent values which man should realize and recognize. Nature is “good” and human life is “good” – man should recognize that himself, not seek recognition elsewhere. This “confirmation” is not in man’s natural impulses and desires, which would lead to naturalism, but in the mind which controls them. Employing the Cartesian idea, Taylor abandons naturalism and returns to the idea of a dignified rational thinker who rises above mainstream life and controls it by some design.

“Recognizing inherent values would not consist so much of spontaneous exaltation of life and natural impulses as such, but in the exaltation of power of mind, in the confirmation of dignity of that mind” (Taylor, 2000, 305).

“Inherent values” can be affirmed by man’s “poetic abilities,” representing the ability of the creative imagination, which differs from rational ability whose rationality consists of a proper conduct of reason.

With Kant that meant searching for the origin of a new and radical freedom on the basis of which people would determine laws for themselves. This idea will anyway have enormous significance for modern culture, from Fichte, Hegel, and Marx, till today.

The concept of freedom as private activity is the foundation of culture which rests on the perspective of first person. Freedom understood as such liberates us from our poetic abilities – constituting life on the foundation of constituted reason, or on the foundation of its
procedures (which Habermas would further develop through his theory of communication as rational procedure).

To organize life according to the order of organizing reason is the poetic ability that differs from the organization of scientific representation as well as creative imagination, since they neither bring the concept of “organized reason” into question nor do they problematize it.

Taylor is aware of the problematic structures that construct procedural reason, regardless if communication, or instrumentalization dealing with practical association with the corporeal world, is in question. Man’s task is to turn towards the faculties that affirm life, which history of thought and history itself had liberated from both cosmic captivity and theological perspective. Those are the creative abilities ready to reveal the “inherent values” of man. Those values are unconditionally good, regardless if nature, man, or their relationship, is in question.

However, we must also be aware that the “creative imagination” could be identified with egocentric reason which appoints itself either ontologically or procedurally, or, even has it within itself to lead us to relativism.

The creative imagination knows what it expresses is not only subjective, but, before all else, what is outside it, and to what it subjectively reacts; this type of creativity holds within itself the Augustinian path which leads from the inside out, into the eternal and universal.

On the other hand, creative ability must not collapse under the pressure of that which is “outside,” and negate the immanency of life and its world. Man himself must realize that life is good, meaning he must create it to be good. The creative imagination is the good life – good, unconditionally.37

Applying the method of natural sciences to the object of man and society requires us to separate that “object,” or that reality, from experience, and to describe it in unconditional terms. As long as it is separated, we cannot describe it either as desirable or undesirable. Still, if we call upon that reality to explain or justify our actions, we have some pre-position in it; we should entrust that pre-position to a neutral or unconditional description. There is a contradiction in this method if we apply it to man or society.

This contradiction was at the bottom of each analysis of our war situation, along with all activities relating to that situation. The situation created by war was understood as unconditional, as something for-itself (specific terms of general meaning – hatred, criminal, difference, civil war, revenge, nation, religion, etc.), and not as conditional. All political and war activities were interpreted as if nothing preceded them, no pre-opinions, private and collective historical motivation, culture, religion, tradition. War and political activities were undertaken with a presupposition “if we don’t do it, they will,” or “let’s do it before they do.” The justification of all activities was some preemptive reasoning, some previous or foreseeable experience.

The scientific (theoretic) mind did not want the responsibility for what was not justified in advance by rules and norms.

The creative power of mind does not need such justification; it can be understood or taken out of some “solid” cause in advance. Neither the causality of nature nor the causality of reason, which encourages itself to act out of principle which it assigned itself in advance, does not apply to the creative mind.

The creative power operates in uncertainty and insecurity, it creates without solid assumptions, unexpectedly and unpredictably.

37 In the Book of Genesis, God gradually creates the world, piece by piece, but after each act he recognizes how he created good – that is the condition for continuing to create. Then, creation is conditioned by goodness. The good is recognized by its internal ends and by its sustainability as such. It is truthful. An act of the creative mind is an act of goodness, which is simultaneously good and true. The creation that does not have good inherent ends of what it creates, cannot be truthful and beautiful.
That power is not less cognitive than the analytical or normative, since everything that the mind can construct within itself it can also construct without itself, everything it can “reveal” in the given it can assign as given.

We must believe in the power of mind – not in its creations, which can sometimes be a little undesirable, but in its creative power. It is the power of self-reflection which always overcomes the theoretical and practical creations of mind. Only the mind has this power and capacity, only the mind can reflect itself and its power, and determine itself according to it. The mind determines the nature of its power through self-reflection – the mind has the capacity to judge itself, its nature, its creation.

The mind can determine the limits of all its power; overcoming those limits is its creative power.

The limits of theoretical power are given in nature, by the subject, and the mind is capable of such understanding.

The limits of the practical mind are given to man’s goals and the reasons for his action. Reflecting those limits gives man a technical edge as well as an edge in developing social institutions.

The creative power of mind is the power of this reflection – the power of determining and overcoming these limits. The mind is capable of reflecting on its power and determining it as the nature of its content. It is capable of realizing the limit, then transgressing it in knowledge and practical activity – it is capable in new forms of knowledge, in new contents of awareness, and its incessant overcoming. But, the mind is also capable of determining if its creations are good, or merely efficient and true.38

38 The advocates of destroying and dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina justified their stand with historical facts that were “firmly” founded, without any right to action motivated by the relationship towards the existing unbearable conditions – towards the crimes and sufferings of everyday conditions. It is the denial to the right of freedom for something to be done in such conditions; to position ourselves subjectively and in a new way towards these conditions. Each division of facts regarding foundation and performance suspends freedom of thought and action.
15. A Political Overcoming of the Comprehensive Doctrine

In order to free man and his actions from all conditionality, John Rawls draws out both the theoretical and practical reason from doctrinal domains, regardless if they are philosophical, religious, or moral. He believes that under the conditions of insurmountable conflict over religion, philosophic perspectives, and moral concepts of goodness, a free and just cooperation between free and equal citizens is not possible. According to him, these conflicts are insurmountable because it is a matter of concepts which are “reasonable” – that is, which are systematically explained and consistent, and whose results come from procedures of certainty presented as necessity. This is why Rawls believes that man’s actions, establishment of social communities, and communication among people, must be distinguished from the “comprehensive doctrine” and placed squarely into the field of the political. It is the only way to achieve a stable and just society of free and equal citizens despite being partitioned by various doctrines. Rawls realizes that the power of human reason is given precisely because reason is present within the established social institutions, in addition to the citizens being divided by their religious, philosophical, and moral commitments. Rawls imagines the “public mind,” which is objective in its social goals ordered by precedence as well as in the activities implemented by that precedence. Public mind is actually the intellectual and moral power of citizens to determine common goals in some order, and then to act on those goals. The goals are for the good of all citizens – social institutions favor them.

Despite the fact that Rawls holds “public mind” far from any doctrine, it is inevitable to conclude that this reason incorporates cognitive reason – the only reason to determine social goals – as well as practical reason, through which they all take shape.

Rawls does not deal with the relationship between the cognitive and the practical moment of “public mind,” nor does he particularly problematize its understanding of practicality. “Public mind” is the possible one – it does not possess certainty within itself which would make it a necessity; it is not doctrinaire, but neither is it imposed by some power external to it. In a democratic society, its “necessity,” or power of coercion, stems from its institutionalization within the national constitution or laws.

Rawls does not question the manner in which it gets there, the procedure or the type of cognizance – “public mind” is presupposed.

This presupposition rests on the principle of legitimacy – citizens accept the limitations determined by “public mind.” The obligation of courtesy is the obligation that obliges citizens to accept a political power that stems from the legality of the constitution and the institutions of the nation as an expression of “public mind.” Additionally, Rawls does not believe that the ideal of “public mind” is a political compromise, as in modus vivendi, but that it is the proof of its citizens’ comprehensive doctrine. In other words, Rawls wants to bridge the comprehensive doctrine with public mind, without the contradiction linked to their truths that transcend “public mind.” This contradiction is overcome through the obligation of courtesy because that obligation is actually the readiness of the citizens to explain to one another the basis of their actions, and accept them as reasonable and consistent. In other words, the overall reasonable doctrines are not rejected, citizens remain loyal to their doctrine beliefs and truths, but they understand one another.

How is this understanding possible when citizens come from different structures of society, and when they are determined by different public mind which holds compulsive power over them?
Understanding or judgment includes fundamental notions and principles of reason, as well as rules of integrity and criteria of justification. The basic social structure (the political, economic, or social institution) must be founded on principles of equality, and they should be solidified principles of judgment and laws of assertion that show if the basic principles are applied. Then, even Rawls has, on one hand, the foundational principles on which to establish social and national institutions, and on the other, cognitive principles that enable an examination of the practical function of those principles.

The practical side of Rawls’ political conception (equality) has to be justified theoretically. The possibility of that justification is given in principles of knowledge, or rather, in the reasoning of the function of basic principles. This theoretical legitimation is founded on “common sense” and on uncontested cognitive methods, not on comprehensive reasonable doctrines – religious, philosophical, or moral. “Common sense” is, therefore, a clear and generally accepted truth available to all citizens, otherwise a political option does not have public justification. “Public mind” must possess the ability to resolve social dilemmas encompassed in conceptions of political liberalisms – important constitutional elements and basis of equality as equity.

“In describing the public mind we must possess a reasonable answer, or think that we can find a reasonable answer in due time for all, or nearly all, of the cases” (Rawls, 2000, 202).

Public mind is public footing in determining truth of belief as well as the positions of citizens’ emerged in different comprehensive doctrines; without this, doctrines remain unapproachable and irreconcilable, which means that the “overlapping consensus,” as a field of communication and action, is not possible.

“Doctrines” must become a part of the citizen’s own convictions and not that which transcends those convictions, and which then divides the doctrinal and the personal, the general and the particular” (Rawls, 2000, 221-224).

Political doctrine, as the foundation of public mind, can include and exclude from itself the “reasonable comprehensive doctrines” – that is, political doctrine can be supported by the “comprehensive doctrine” in these two ways. The point of view by which public mind will justify itself depends on which of the two encourages citizens to respect the ideal of public mind. That will again depend on the different political and social conditions. In addition, the political conception of justice and the ideal of complying with public mind, should be upheld.

“A well-regulated society that is publically and effectively regulated by a recognized political conception shapes the climate within which its citizens acquire a feeling of justice that leads them towards meeting their civil obligations, without creating strong opposing interests” (Rawls, 2000, 226).

The ideal of public mind encompasses public values – the ones supported by others – as well as the readiness to adapt and adjust its stand, the balance of value that is explicaded, or at least the unreasonable ones, to understand them as reasonable even by those against them.

The contents of public mind are not given in political morality, but in the political conception appropriate to institutionalization (within the constitution). Abiding by the ideal of public mind means abiding by the ideal of the constitution, or rather, order as “constitution,” not real, but ideal. Understanding public mind means understanding the ideal of order which is given in some reasonable and acceptable political conception. These conceptions can “exclude” the reasonable general doctrines, or be supported by them, but they cannot be replaced by them because they cannot be coordinated – consensus is not possible between them. The goal of political theory is to find the conception which ensures the establishment and functionality of civil law institutions in various areas – the constitution, familiar forms of ownership, organized economy, etc.
According to Rawls, this is the conception of justice as equity because it establishes the social structure on freedom and fair agreement, or rather on fair social conditions from which social structure and its institutions emerge. “The role of the institutions that belong to the basic structure is to secure just background conditions against which the actions of individuals and associations take place” (Rawls, 1995, 266).

This initial righteous relation can be undermined in time because the initial social structure is never completely regulated and organized – fairness can become unfair. For instance, the fairness of the free market is not fair if the distribution of wealth and the structure of the market system are not fair. Is the existing wealth fairly accumulated, did everybody have a fair go at the acquisition of wealth, did everybody have a fair accumulation of knowledge and dexterity?

The political conception of fairness must incorporate some ideal form in a basic structure which limits the current social process, and by which they adjust. Such ideal is necessary to maintain the “background justice.”

Even in a well-organized society, “background justice” is undermined or distanced, since society is dynamic and susceptible to change. That is why customizing, in order to maintain its “background justice,” is necessary in the basic structure. “A purely procedural theory that contained no structural principles for a just social order would be of no use in our world, where the political goal is to eliminate injustice and to guide change toward a fair basic structure.” (Rawls 1995, 285).

On one hand it is necessary to make the structural principles specific, while on the other hand it is necessary to determine a general direction of political action. Political action without this “ideal” foundation which steers it, will not contribute to any particular fairness. “Thus ideal theory, which defines a perfectly just basic structure, is a necessary complement to none ideal theory without which the desire for change lacks and aim” (Ibid).

Because of that, thinks Rawls, Kant’s conception of fairness should be separated from its transcendental background and be given a procedural analysis, not an idealistic one, in order to “construct” an original position contained in the social contract.

The idealistic objection to this conception of fairness stems from the “original position” of those who negotiate the social contract – it results from misunderstanding the difference between society and other ordinary private people. Within its foundation is the assessment of the general form and content of public law, as incidental and private interest, which means that the social contract understood as such is nothing more than the expanding of civic society – Hegel’s notion of civic society. Also, this idea of “contracts” does not recognize the social nature of the individual, but bases itself on their natural determinations, which are given precedence over the social.

Rawls overcomes these potential negotiations with his idea of “basic structure,” based in “background justice.” That means that the “original position” is the foundation of original fairness, as agreeable situations of free and equal moral individuals attaining rational agreement. This agreement regarding the conception of fairness, which determines original position, differs from other agreements because it appoints the principles for the basic structure. In addition, Rawls predicts that fairness, as the principle of social structure, can adjust to the social character of human beings. Also, the conception of fairness ensures a place for social values, while safeguarding the freedom and integrity of the individual founding this conception – the original source is just because it begins at free and equal moral individuals.

According to Rawls, other doctrines of the social contract – Hobbes’, Locke’s, etc. – cannot argumentatively reject the idealistic objections of this theory.

Rawls’ “original position” is imagined as reasonable and rational, and it presents a framework within which reasonable and rational citizens reach an agreement.
Habermas’ objection to the “original position” is founded on the assumption of the ideal discourse, which is founded on truth and virtue of theoretical and practical reason. The difference, therefore, lays in the fact that the “original position” is a political doctrine, while the “ideal discourse” is a comprehensive philosophical doctrine.

With Rawls, the “principles” of the original position are reasonable for rational citizens, and acceptable because of it; with Habermas, principles of discourse are truthful and virtuous, and communication is only possible through them – communication confirms truth and virtue. Rawls does not establish the principles of political agreement on the theory of truth or the logic of virtue, but on reasonability of citizens who are free and equal, reasonable and rational. This assumption could be false, that is why it should be evaluated at different levels of universality. We must always question the sustainability of the assumption, as well as the applicability of its principles to democratic institutions.

Habermas establishes the rational consensus on truth and virtue.

The two different starting points, two different assumptions, should be examined through the culture of civil society – the public sphere. Habermas’ “public sphere” is not the same as Rawls’ “public mind.” Habermas’ “public” presents a background culture which encompasses the overall doctrines that are mutually in conflict; that is the culture of the social, not the public-political – the culture of everyday life presented in various associations (university, church, scientific societies, etc.). With Rawls, public mind is a political public, or rather the reasoning of executive and judicial authority, the reasoning of politicians and political subjects, and the reasoning of citizens regarding vital elements of fairness and constitution. Public mind incorporates differences, and it does not have particular demands; it incorporates all citizens, while the public sphere, or background culture, incorporates “experts,” the representatives of comprehensive doctrines who are in conflict and who reach rational consensus. The arguments of public mind, or the truthfulness of discourse, can be more or less reasonable, or true, depending on the level of the participant. Arguments, then, on the one hand relate to the political, while on the other to the doctrinal – that is, they are either reasonable or truthful. The reasonable is founded on “reflective equilibrium,” while the truthful on the “rationality” of proof. The reasonable – “it is a point at infinity we can never reach, though we may get closer to it in the sense that through discussion, our ideals, principles, and judgments seem more reasonable to us and we regard them as better founded than they were before” (Rawls, 1995, 385).

Political society cannot be publically legitimized – be it Rawls’ of Habermas’ notion of the public – without the reasonable “overlapping consensus.” This consensus is the premise and justification of the social political form. The consensus is not a political compromise or coalition, but an elaborate independent perspective which justifies pro tanto without taking into consideration any comprehensive doctrines – it does not even need to know about them. This consensus rests on the fact that it excludes every idea that goes beyond the political, and can only participate in some comprehensive doctrine. The consensus is a mutual rational basis of political conception (justice, for instance), which we can assume will be confirmed by others (the reasonable and the rational). Then, despite reasonable pluralism, it is possible to democratically legitimize reasonable consensus.

Rawls did not convincingly and argumentatively (reasonably) reject Habermas’ objection to his theory of justice founded on “original position,” because it brings the political autonomy of citizens into question.39

39Bosnian – Herzegovinian philosopher Nijaz Ibrulj observes the problem of crossing from one political system to another, from one “social ontology” to another in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a problem of “freeing the possible.” For that “possible” (the intended) to be liberated and understood, as well as to be succeeded, it is necessary to find a logical path to symbols and status functions for which those symbols are used. Symbols enable consent regarding the comprehension of what is intended, which opens the possibility of an agreed
Under the established constitution – that is, under the conditions of the existing, overlapping consensus that presents a final resolution of various political conceptions – emerges a question that asks, what impels citizens to change the institutionalized perspective, what happens with the political autonomy of citizens who inherit the established political order. How do we reach the original position once again – how is it instituted, and by what principles?

The political conception on which some constitutional status had been achieved actually denies citizens the possibility of a new consensus which is vital to any generation. Habermas correctly notices that from (Rawls’) perspective of theory of fairness, it is not possible to overcome the institutional social framework of an already constituted society, and reach a new “original position” in the form of a new constitution, nor is it possible to insure fundamental human rights on the existing social basis in a new systematic way.40

In such a situation, the constitution, as the result of a determined political conception and overlapping consensus, is not a project but an indicator of maintaining political stability; the constitution does not unfold creative possibility of perfection and change. For that possibility to occur, a new political conception must emerge that cannot be founded on itself – it must be theoretically anchored, and it must be legitimized by some general theory, even if it means being motivated by the existing poor constitutional order, or just by its need to change. Critique of that condition alone is not sufficient for a new political theory; a new theory, which can only be the result of a new creative effort of mind, is needed.

Rawls believes that it is sufficient to have a “political autonomy” of citizens that is not theoretically-moral, but instead given in the thought about the existing constitution and in the behavior towards it. This thought is not theoretically-moral, but political – that is, it is not determined by some comprehensive theory, but by “categories” of political institutions. These institutions are nothing more than political parties and their officials. However, their interests are partial because their programs are always oriented towards limited social interests; they can never embrace the entirety of social interests. Rawls therefore believes that political autonomy, and everything it can accomplish, is sufficient for political liberalism. Habermas denies that very thing, because political autonomy is insufficient for a fair order; this order must be justified theoretically, not politically, because political discourse can be, and mainly is, unfair.

practice. Ibrulj proposes a solution to the problem of understanding the condition of unity in achieving agreed interactive reactions (status functions), by introducing the background element that consolidates them, and that is the identity. “The question of identity is part of every question of logic, ontology, and epistemology of society” because everyone wishes to be understood in thought and action in the way he understands himself (Davidson’s Radical Interpretation). Further reading see: N. Ibrulj’s National Dogmatism or the Logic of Consociation?, Survey, 1-2, January-April 2006. Sarajevo)

16. Creative Overcoming of Political Pragmatism and Transcendentalism

Comprehensive liberalism founded on the ideology of autonomy, which has a regulatory role for practical reason, cannot offer itself a public basis of justification – political constructivism can, at best, ground it in reason. For political liberalism, the political autonomy is connected to the relationship towards the already arranged political values and conceptions of society and individuals, and not towards the autonomy of practical reason which is constituted to political and moral values.

Conceptions of society and individuals are not founded by transcendental idealism, but by political ideas of freedom and equality which implement justice as fairness for civil society. Justice as fairness reveals the public basis of vindicating political justice under the assumption of reasonable pluralism. This public basis of justification encompasses a common ground – common fundamental ideas which are implicit in the public political culture, and which could enable free and prudent communication. It is not a question of coherency and unity of reason – theoretical and practical – with itself and the supreme judgment of itself; Kant’s categorical imperative is not taken constitutively, but only procedurally, like the one who makes requests on our rational maxims. In that context, courts are reasonable and virtuous if they emerge from the correct procedure, and if they rest on correct premises. This equally applies to mathematics, morality, and politics.

Rawls’ political constructivism (justice as fairness) differs from Kant’s constructivism, which is linked to the constitutionality of reason.

In political constructivism the content of the political conception of justice is constructed; these are the principles of justice in the original position which the citizens chose. This brings into question, is the original position itself constructed? It is not – it is merely appointed, while the principles of justice are constructed, and they specify the content of the political conception of justice.

“We start from fundamental idea of a well-ordered society as a fair system of cooperation between reasonable and rational citizens understood as free and equal (Rawls, 1995, 104).

Constructivism is the unity of practical reason and the appropriate conception of society and the individual. The conception of society and the individual should be modeled on a determined procedure. “The principles of practical reason – and reasonable and rational – and the conceptions of society and the individual are complementary” (Rawls, 1995, 52).

Conceptions of society and the individual are actually conceptions of “practical reason” – these conceptions are determining for those who act, because they determine the context of action. On one hand is the reasoning (of practical reason), and on the other the individual that acts on the basis of the conception of society and the individual.

Rawls’ fundamental idea is the idea of reasonableness, not truth. He assumes that free and equal citizens are reasonable because that is what enables them a fair system of cooperation, or rather, sustains the very idea of society. Reasonable pluralism, or civic pluralism, is possible and is the foundation of public reason, as oppose to the idea of truth, which does not allow pluralism. Political conception, therefore, does not rest on truth but on reasonableness, because truth is neither the result of the consensus nor is it the content of
public reason. It is always single and exclusive so that political order cannot be moral order, but only political, with presupposed and constructed principles.

Today, in the “culture” of power, economy, politics, and military, we can neither declare reason lost, excessive, or impotent. Reason perhaps spent its analytical, normative, and reconstructive capabilities, and reached its own limits which again facilitate survival through their reflection. This (self)reflection is still the only way to defend its power and to endure by incessantly referring to its limits. But its analytical, normative, and reconstructive capacities are spent, meaning that each response to them leads to self-contradiction, even to negation. Neither modern science, nor political theory, and especially not philosophy of any type, offer any hope for the reaffirmation of any type of power of mind; in fact, they take it, through their greatest results, to a dead end and drive it into a field of uncertainty or relative utility. Its truths have denied themselves on all planes. What is it that remains?

What remains is what the mind has not yet been called upon for, what its role has not been observed for, because it steered itself towards a seemingly safe and certain direction. It is that plane that remained in the dark, cloaked in subjectivity and pragmatism, without firm base or regularity. That is the plane of particular type of creation, a plane which denied reason any proximity, a plane which has not been observed as its own, because its creation was exclusively associated with pragmatism, art, and culture. Reason itself avoided uncertainties and constantly found itself in situations where it could express and justify itself unambiguously.

The creative power of mind was concealed from the mind itself because it perceived itself only through forms of representation or through normative forms, refraining from creating something new. Reason always wanted to justify itself, even if it meant engaging in creative and pragmatic activities, it only wished to restore order. It always wanted a firm base beneath it, and even if it portended its creative power, it did not use it because it could not justify it, it could not clearly establish it and present it as vital.

The creative power of mind appears, before all else, as a creativity of direct experience. It includes, first, the creativity which is neither conditioned nor determined by anything (laws, ideas, norms). The power of the creative mind on this level is given in management within uncertainty, in establishing certainty in uncertainty – the ordering of the disordered.

Second, it incorporates “determined” creativity. That is the creative action that is conditioned by specific, established laws, norms, institutions, customs, etc. In this conditioned creativity, the power of the creative mind is given in a new establishment of conditions and presuppositions – establishing the new, within the existing social relations, giving new forms, creating new realities. At this level, reason must first resolve its conditionality, regardless if it ignores them as though they do not exist, or if it fully comprehends them – and only after that can it change them.

What type of creativity is in question in both cases?

Regarding creativity of direct experience, it is determined through an interest established in every pragmatic situation. The goal of that experience is success – to convince oneself that it is created as good and that it is sustainable as such. This sustainability is given in the tools and the learned rationality of order, and it is repeatable as such. This good is not a normative good but a pragmatic good – that which is immediately proven as good and susceptible to repetition.

The origin of this good is not in its creation, but in its creator who bestows it with a purpose. Giving a material form in a purpose, man creates an objective world which becomes independent and accessible to all people; equally, rationalizing its actions, it objectifies it into procedures and tools which evolve into general material presuppositions of human action.
Regarding the action that is conditioned by the understanding of the given and the positioned (social relations, values, customs, existing rules and norms), it is a matter of an understanding whose purpose is not knowing but changing – establishing a new reality. That new does not need to follow the given as the means of necessity. The objectively given and the existing emerge through subjective ends, and maintain its viability as such. True, this type of reality has its particular being and power, but its internal purposefulness surfaces only if it is human – insofar as it is the subjective substance of man, insofar as it spurs man to action. The very objectivity of this reality, separated from human fears and interests, becomes the limit of action.

Both the materially and spiritually objectified worlds have this limit within them, because that limit is immanent. This immanency originates in the limitedness of fathoming the very objectification of purpose. Indeed, man’s purpose is subjective, determined by limitless reason, while all his objectifications are limited by some determined space and time; they are expendable, the strength of their comprehension is finite and diminishes in time until it is completely spent.

That is when self-maintenance of the entire spiritual world halts, its objectivity an empty shell without substantial strength, transformed into the confines of reason. (Just as veteran tools and standardized procedures of a materialized culture become anachronized and irrational, and then placed into a museum).

The creative mind sees the opportunity to inlay reality in a new way – to produce it. It is not a matter of a theoretical, doctrinal understanding, nor a practical, experienced understanding, but a particular creative power of mind.

The mind that declares a demand for action from within, that does not tolerate pragmatically or objectively fixed boundaries, forms a different type of reality that does not contain a purpose outside itself but within itself, which has the strength to endure. Such reality is the result of a creative power of mind that imbeds its creative power in a reality that is then sustained by that power – a power now belonging to that reality. The creative action contains both the cognitive and practical activity, but it can neither be reduced to them nor determined by them; it goes beyond them since it does something which has a purpose, and becomes sustained by that purpose. That is the energy of mind that is active from within itself, that is objectified from within itself, and that is sustained as reality.

However, the creative power of mind cannot equate to the intentionality of consciousness constituted by reality because the dynamic of intentional consciousness is contradictive – the construction of reality is constantly in contradiction with the intentions of consciousness. The difficulty in overcoming this contradiction, when social reality is in question, lays in the fact that social actors are the carriers of “construction” and are simultaneously the subjects of “intentionality” – they seek to cognitively overcome that reality, and then construct it anew, despite it being a result of intentionality. The fact that social reality does not have the character of an ordinary object, as in science or in philosophy, is overlooked; this reality is a specific type of “object” because it incorporates social actors who “constituted” that “object” and who simultaneously seek to overcome it. The objectivity of social reality is not, then, constant, it is rather variable despite its relative stability that enables its knowingsness.

We bring into question the degree to which this reality is transparent to science, and to which degree we can scientifically judge it. Too, the very demand for this scientific research is intentional – that is, the demand for its reconstruction.

In such a case, is the object of scientific research only a constitutive capability of consciousness and its rules, or rather, does sociology need to be embedded in philosophy?

Sociology should be, after all, oriented towards a social reality despite that reality being a phenomenon of conscious social actors. A scientific study of social reality should be
presupposed by its objectivity, while the intentionality of the conscience of the social actors should temporarily be placed in parenthesis. Such a methodic position enables, on the one hand, the researching of social reality as objects which are not conditioned by anything, with its own internal causality; and on the other hand, it enables intentionality, temporarily in parenthesis, the action which is not abstract subjectivity but relates to reality – knowledge has both an intentional and constitutive character, it has its own internal causality. From this causality of consciousness, a new reality is possible.

It is an effective way to simultaneously scientifically research experience (historically, technically, customarily, religiously, linguistically, creatively) as well as the current intersubjective relations which have not yet gained a solid form of objectivity (sympathy and antipathy, affinity and enmity, tolerance and intolerance, agreement or disagreement, etc.).

Sociology must simultaneously deal with the emerging social reality which is constituted in the intentionality of consciousness of social actors, and which is already constituted and has the character of givens and necessity.

If we were to place the social reality into parenthesis, without it being a methodic position, then the science of social reality would not be possible, but only a produced relation towards it; too, if we were to place the intentionality of consciousness of social actors within parenthesis, without it being a methodic position, social reality then acquires the character of a natural object in which free action is impossible, while social science turns into an apology or ideology.

Of course, this poses the real problem: how to incorporate all these subjective structures within the system of objective knowledge – how to fathom them?

The “structures of subjective meaning” could become the object of knowledge when they are objectified; for them, this objectification is vital because they are the intentionalities of consciousness. The subjective, relating to social reality or part of the interaction of social subjects, does not remain subjective and untouchable to knowledge, but seeks to be objectified – objectification is a form of intentionality. Even when it is a matter of frustration, fear, anxiety, knowledge – everything subjective – as soon as it becomes part of social interaction it becomes objectified and gains a firm social form, it becomes a social reality with a character of necessity. In that form it becomes the object of social scientific research; in its subjective form, it is the subject of psychology or psychiatry.

The subjective, then, emerges as an aspect of the social world – typical behavior, patterns of behavior, ideal type of action, etc. That which occurs in people’s minds cannot be directly the object of social science, but it does not remain in itself and for itself. The conscious is an intentional, constructed reality, but it is also objectified in the social world. Not just knowledge, but national and religious hatred, political ideology, myth-mania, criminal consciousness, etc. is objectified and institutionalized – they mold the social world.

For man, this objectification is unavoidable and “necessary.” Man objectifies all his strengths, not just consciousness, and that is the foundation of development and progress – the foundation of culture. But also, that can be the foundation of stagnation, destruction, and total extermination of material and spiritual culture.
17. Introduction to the Theory of Social Pulsation

Instead of the Afterward

Sociology, from its beginning until today, has navigated between social structures and social action (“social statistics” and “social dynamics”), attempting to determine the causality of facts and events. In this oscillation, causality is located either within social facts or within actors’ activities which are mutually or self related. In both cases the method is the same – either one or the other is presumed “an immutable cause.” The social structure, social facts, and institutions that present themselves as givens for social actors, have become utterly transparent and comprehensible, with perceivable possibilities of perfection and positive stabilization, up to the point of natural necessity. On the other hand, social actors are deemed creators of social actions that resulted in an understanding of the cognitive capacity of consciousness and all assumptions of its social creations – cultural and traditional values, morals, language, religious inclinations, etc.

However, this oscillation always pauses on either one side or the other, its gait remains empty and unexplained. Sociology could, finally, comprehend and explain precisely that which is between these two ends of the spectrum, that which is encompassed in the movement between them, and that which appears elusive. Whichever end of the spectrum we take, the other side remains incomprehensible in its reality and understandable only from our point of reference. That is why time has come to abandon these two firm and fixed points, as well as the methods which attempt to explain society and its activities under such assumptions. A positive method that assumes the objectivity of social facts, or objectivity of subjective facts, is inadequate. It is not unusable, but it has limited efficacy – it does not give an insight into the activities between social actors, nor the relations between them and the social facts. Under this method, the causality of social activities always takes the position of either one side or the other.

The solution is not to substitute, or “overcome,” this unilateral method with dialectics, that is, with a fissure between these two extremes – objective and subjective structures. In that case, the notion of causality of social activities would be completely lost. This type of “dialectic” method could lead the interpretation of those activities in which every assigned cause could have equal validity and worthiness, into arbitrariness.

The task of sociology, as a general social discipline, is to offer a novel and unique theoretical groundwork for understanding social structures and all their given conditions, as well as social activities and all their subjective–value presumptions. This understanding, with a distinct theoretical preposition, would avoid the dichotomy of the social structure and social actors, determinations and intentionality that (dichotomy) has been burdening sociology from its inception till present. True, that same dichotomy enabled a wide development of sociology, through its disciplines in both directions, but the problem of that interrelation still remains.

What determines and orchestrates social actors in their actions – is, still today, an open question for sociological theories. In other words, how to solve the problem of causality of social practice?

Do the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, their causes and effects, offer new insight into this theoretical problem?
An understanding of these conflicts permits a reinterpretation of contemporary sociological theories, and laying in place new theoretical paradigms in sociology.

Social conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina were all-inclusive, meaning that they included the entire social structure and all social actors. The feud affected the foundational economic relations of society, the political structure of society, national and social institutions, the rule of law, social and subjective values.

Social property, a structurally fundamental element of the economic order, disintegrated, while a new framework of ownership failed to be established – either private or national: they appeared only as its contradiction.

Political relations established on a one-party system, that insured a legitimization of the national government, fell apart with the disintegration of the ruling party. It was not only the federal state that lost legitimacy, it was also the federal units that had to engage in political procedures of subsequent legitimizations, but under the conditions of a multi-party system, that is, the newly formed democratic parties and the old more—or—less reformed communist organization.

Under the pressure of political and economic conflict, the national and social institutions collapse. With the dissolution of national integrality the nation also loses its legitimacy, while society enters a state of unresolved contradictions and feuds. With the collapse of national institutions and in a state of national fracturing, the order of law looses its influence. In such a case, without a system of law, a voluntary law legitimized by force emerges.

In the end, all social and subjective values that have objective leverage of influence on individuals lose their substantial integrality and collapse. Customs, habits, standards of social behavior, moral and religious norms, friendship, tolerance, compassion, all lose the causal potency of social conduct.

Then, something happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina that rarely happened in the history of any other society – the collapse of the social structure with its independent elements entering into conflict with one another, as well as the absence of a value system that previously permitted and directed the social activities of the social actors. Social practice had the carped pulled from under its feet, and lost its head as well.

In that sense, the nature of the Bosnian–Herzegovinian conflictuality, in all its forms, has become a historical experience for the world.\footnote{In the background of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had “a face of genocidal crime” and “rationally calculated strategy of destruction,” Bosnian and Herzegovinian philosopher Sulejman Bosto expresses doubt in certainty of the contemporary universalistic cognitively-theoretical constructions. Contemporary B&H experience shows that today’s world (regardless of the form we ‘have it’) is not a horizon that is self-understood, neither from immanent, nor from transcendental field of thought, which would make our lives eo ipso secured, justified as meaningful. Today’s philosophy (again) stands before the task of solving the tension between the power of thought to make the world conceptually transparent and resisting the contingencies from conceptual unambiguity. Bosto claims that the man and the world, and the man in the world, historically exposed, “stand in an undisturbed openness of thought and action in which there are no ‘eternal truths,’ where something like man’s creation of the sense is an experience which always disrupts and creates anew.” (See more in: Bosto, Sulejman (1997): Svijet i kontingencija (The World and the Contingency). Zagreb: HFD.) This “disruption” and “creation” can be described through the concept of pulsation, which I intend to introduce to the social theory and theory of history.}

The examination of those events lends itself to a general understanding of human activities, but not from transcendental presumptions of consciousness or its intentionality, nor from ontologically given social facts whose “necessity” is also of a metaphysical character, rather from social practice which simultaneously constitutes both social actors and social facts. We are in such a situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina because our state of conflict encompasses all social givens and all values, both subjective and collective. Too, we are part
of the very social practices we are examining. For the first time in our social theory, we have the opportunity to draw theoretical conclusions of general significance from our own historical position.

To completely understand the historical incident of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we must begin from the collapse of the social and value structure.

How could it be that all previous social mechanisms that reproduce society and initiate social activities wither away in strength and loom?

How could it be that the failure of the social and value system becomes the primary social practice, and what is its initiating mechanism?

The answers to these questions require new terms of understanding.

We suggest, before explaining the theory, that we clearly define the key terms we intend to use. We consider it important, even for methodical reasons.

**Social pulsation:**

It is a type of social interaction where actors express the substance of their words and actions to one another with a plea for validity, while simultaneously making the substance accessible only through an understanding and interpretation of the other from whom it returns. Only that makes social actors the manifesting subjects. (Understanding substance either agrees or differs from the plea for validity that the subject expresses to others).

**Subjectivity:**

It is being conscious about the similarity or difference in the plea for validity that is expressed to others, and the subsequent meaning that is returned from them and their reactions.

**Actions:**

It is a pulsation that is constantly under the pressure of meaning that others give it as well as an anticipation of meaning, which is constantly remolded under that pressure. Action does not have to follow the acquired meaning.

**Social Actor:**

It is a social subject who objectified the meaning of his actions through the other and thus became a social object, for both himself and the other, but who maintains his subjectivity in his plea for validity. The social agent is an individual, an institution, a society.

**Individuation:**

It is an alternation, not spontaneity, of consciousness because the behavior of the subject is constituted from the performative relationship between another individual, and/or from the difference that emerges in the ensuing subjective plea for validity. (Alternation is not consent, but acceptance of individuation).

**Self-consciousness:**

Consciousness about individuation formed in the process of alternation as a symbolic pulsation.

**Society:**

A web of social pulsation of alternating intensity.

**Social Causality:**

A cause or reason of social pulsation that constantly travels from one social actor to another, and constantly varies in pulsating intensity, from strong to weak.

Sociology, as we already said, has understood its topic from unevenly placed causality since its very beginning until the present – whether it was placed in the social structure, or in the interaction between social actors; in both cases it was a question of “principal cause.” From this dichotomy the sociological theories rarely, if ever, emerged. Because of that, we must introduce a new concept which will prevail over this dichotomy. We propose the concept of portable causality. In fact, it is rather difficult to locate the so-called principal cause of the social action and the social system. Whether we place it within the social
structure, whether we place it with the social actors, social practice is never completely
enclosed. It seems there is not an unambiguous determination by which it could be determined
and explainable by either one cause or another. If we were to analyze only the political
behaviors we would realize that they are caused, on the one hand, by socially-valued givens
and collective interests, while on the other hand, those same values and social givens are
caused and situated by a particular political practice. That is how, the perspective of the
country and society of Bosnia and Herzegovina could be examined from the existing
institutional divisions and their non-functionality, but we must simultaneously realize that
these divisions and non-functionallities are caused by the practice of political actors – both as
individuals and political organizations. The “principal cause” of the social and political
situation is always being transferred from one social position to another, from one social actor
to another; however, social actors are not only individuals (as we have come to know them in
all interactional theories), but social gatherings and institutions as well (yet not in a structural
sense). Not one social actor permanently maintains the meaning of the principal social cause.
The cause is transferred from one to the other, changing social position and direction of
development. That phenomenon could be understood and explained through the notion of
portable causality.

Indeed, it is important to recognize that causality is not of a fixed intensity. Moving
from one place to another, from one subject to another, it loses its intensity, its strength in
action. Social actors, as bearers of social practice, must be observed in the context of this
transfer of causality and its varying intensity. That context reveals that it is not a matter of
interaction or communication of social nonsense, outside social and value contexts, but
instead about the pulsating relations between them. Social actors are the social pulses, and as
such, are the subjects of social practice. Their relation is the web of social pulsation of
variable intensity.

Social pulsation is neither uniformed nor linearly arranged, and it does not produce
social balance. Social balance is a utopian category. Social pulsation is of varying intensity
regardless if the social actor is an individual with subjective ends or with existing values, or
some institution with its norms and compelling laws, or a community as a whole, with a firm
structure. It represents different pulsating fields where the causal strength of others weakens,
or altogether dissolves. That is how the individual could neutralize and subjugate the actions
of others, neutralize institutions, existing collective values, social norms, and positive laws of
the land. The individual could institutionalize his own subjectivity – its contents, such as
hatred, fear, indecision, hypocrisy, moroseness, etc. The pulsating strength of that subjectivity
could flood the community as a whole and neutralize all its actors. Totalitarianism is not only
the result of someone’s force, but also the impotence of those whose social practice has lost
its strength.

What applies to the individual applies to other social actors – institutionalized
groupings, or the community as a whole, established as force; the intensity of their pulsation
could mean domination.

These notions enable an understanding of Bosnian and Herzegovinian historical events
in a specific way (and, analogously, the entirety of world history as well). They allow us to
understand how a single mechanism demolished both the social and value structure in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, in other words, they let us fathom the mechanism that produces them. This
awareness could be the fundamental sociological awareness of today.

What sort of operating mechanism is in question?
We are familiar that Weber distinguished man’s actions in two ways – goal-
instrumental and value-rational. This interpretation of Weber’s has become a model which
modern sociologists and philosophers have continued to use.
In order to understand the concept of portable causality, Weber’s definition of action is of indispensable significance. Both of Weber’s operations contain a sense of causality, except that one pertains to nature and the other to society. For Weber, this is a permanent relation: man – nature – product; man – man – institutions and values. The first and second relations could be inverted, precisely as naturalists and structuralists have them. For our purposes, it is important that in either case we deal with an unchangeable causal relation, with an unchangeable position of the primary cause.

When we talk about the goal-instrumental operation, it does not elicit dilemmas. However, when we talk about value-rational operations, or about man’s actions toward himself and others, causality starts losing its firm and fixed ground. Values and social institutions are not the results and effects of social interaction, they are rather a conscious element of the social actors, therefore the causality of their social actions cannot be one-sidedly determined. Value-social givens have both an objective and subjective effect, and a reciprocal relation too, making them sometimes the framework and sometimes the goals of social actors.

Therefore, in this sequence of action, the transfer, or pulsation, of causality from one given to another is noted.

Social practices and social structures must be observed in this new paradigm in order to be understood, in this above-mentioned transfer of causality, or pulsation.

Why did not Weber, or anybody after him, see this?

Weber remains within the borders of his typology of action because it allows a coherent understanding of industrial and economic social structures. The development of industrial power of productivity on one hand, and rationalization of the social system with all its institutions and values on the other, are completely explainable by this typology. Weber does not find the need to introduce a higher measure of man’s action because he has before him a stable industrial–economic and value system which is mutually legitimized. The arising religious and moral values are of sufficient legitimate power for an economic order and social structures emerging from it. The rationally practical application of collective values produced a social structure as a whole; the sustainability and rationalization of the social structure legitimize those values in return. The given social conditions have their causality in collective values that were formed and shared by interacting individuals, but they also possess the justifying power for those values. The sustainability of the social and value system is insured by the repetition and rationalization of all actions, even towards nature, even towards other people, therefore Weber finds no need to transfer the causality of social action which he has already placed with the social actors.

Habermas, noting a weakness in the one-sided positioning of social action, will introduce the concept of communicative action, as a higher form of action, in which social reality as well as social actors develops. And the self-determination and self-realization of social actors, that is, their confirmation in knowledge and practice, is realized only in the interaction through the other. Communication has a causal power for both the people and the union which that communication shapes. Habermas thus avoids the one-sided causality as both a comprehension of the method and as a notion that expresses the reality of society and man.

However, the idea of communications comes from the utopian equality of social subjects who are equally capable of physical and verbal expression. It abstracts social positions, social power, and difference in the capability of physical and verbal expression established on values, which are themselves different. Its speech situation is always ideal. Habermas thus insists that in the analysis of verbal communication, in addition to the
We introduce the subjective: veracity. It is also a type of supporting structure that verifies the speaker’s frankness in what he says. This truth value of the statement is achieved with the exhibitional one. Conviction is part of the speaker’s identity because it encompasses the whole of his experiences and the existing interpersonal relations. The “value of truth” exists in the veracity of the verbalized statement and its normative exactness that is linked to the legitimization of the existing social system – that is, to the ability of the subject to internalize it. Looking at it from that perspective, a statement can neither be true nor false, but rather more or less veracious or convincible. All statements, observed from the standpoint of the function of language, are as true as they are false, as veracious as they are fallacious, as correct as they are incorrect (in reference to the existing norms). Their pertinence depends on these modalities. However, veracity and correctness, as a subjective relation, differs from the truthfulness that relates to the objective world. The demand for the value of a statement cannot be justified by its truthfulness, but rather by the inter–subjective relation that assesses its veracity and correctness and the expected reaction of the collocutor. A statement is always made with conjectured behavior in mind, and when that expected behavior is confirmed, the social relation proves harmonious and stable. If the presumed behavior is not reached, regardless if the statement is understood or not, the social relation proves incongruous, liable to provoke tension and conflict.

Verbal and physical communication does not necessarily have to be regulated. The speakers could understand one another but they do not have to act according to expectations, according to the requests for validating verbal statements. Verbal and physical communication roams within the objectively existing borders of verbal and physical deeds. In the first case, it is that condition in which verbal deeds are described, and over which the verbal statement cannot transcend; in the second case, it is the intention of the speaker, moored to his given aims and interiorized norms in accordance with the existing system of social relations. In both cases, there are “objective” frameworks which the social actor cannot bypass, neither in speech nor action. The question is, how to cross these borders. There are times when the social actor desires to cross these borders, in both speech and action. That action, however, is not merely theoretical (described), nor merely practical (expressly–interational), but rather creative. In case of verbalization, this action exceeds the existing true value of the statement and implements another that is incomprehensible. The statement can be of a familiar concept, but it must give it a new meaning that is not intelligible and that requires a new truthful legitimization. In case of a physical act, intentional or interactive, the creative dimension is also given in the transcendence of its existing standards and legalizations. But how do we ensure that the afore mentioned act matters and evokes the desired behaviour, keeping in mind its lack of understanding and acceptance.

Natural sciences have a “creative” dimension through presentable and descriptive statements even though they are associated with the existing state of affairs. These statements cannot change those conditions, but they can re–identify them and request new definitions. New concepts, or concepts with new meaning, “determine” new condition of things, for the old conditions forfeit their existing definitions. The “creative” dimension of new statements is not reflected in the change of the nature it implies, but rather in the new meaning given to it. The progress of natural sciences lies in the statements that redefine nature.

In practical action, which depends on practical reason (as performative does on theoretical), stated either expressively or interactively, the creative dimension is reflected in a new statement and action which is founded neither on the existing subjectivity nor the normative accuracy. However, if we describe it as a social pulsation it becomes clear that it is of variable intensity and that it represents a social condition that is not utopian, one where

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subjects are not of equal active or verbal capabilities. A balanced pulsation is the ideal, not assumed condition.

Social relations cannot be analyzed through the model of communicable action founded on linguistic understanding. Social relations are not founded on the semantics of statements, but on their demand for meaning which they all possess. Davidson is right when he thinks that behavior is the main evidential foundation of beliefs and desires. Action and thought, which always pertains a degree of conviction, must be analyzed as a consistent model, and only on the backdrop of that model can we understand them. Behavior, for Davidson, is the evidential foundation for the attribution of beliefs and desires. It is difficult to determine anything about the irrationality of behavior from language itself, because terminology can be dense. However, if we take behavior as the evidential foundation of rationality, we can determine the irrationality of its thoughts. Behavior not only posses a symbolic meaning (in speech), in it we also find convictions. We believe that is how it is understood, in other words, we expect a rational and adequate “answer.” Behavior is always with anticipation, as speech is always with understanding. Behavior and speech both share the need for meaning, but they cannot be equated. We do not expect the “collocutor” to just understand, but also to acknowledge the meaning of the “speech,” “since to explain why someone said something we need to know, among other things, his own interpretation of what he said, that is, what he believes his words mean in the circumstances under which he speaks. Naturally this will involve some of his beliefs about how others will interpret his words” (Davidson, 2000, 199).

Giddens, in solving the concept of social causality, introduces the concept of structuration, through which he incorporates both social actors and the social structures. Structuration is an action that simultaneously produces the social actors, or rather their interests, as well as the social structures – that being one process. Social structures emerge from the activities of individuals who institutionalize their interests and thus insure their realization. Under continuous action, social actors continuously construct both the social structures and themselves. Structuration is an open and undetermined process of repeating and perfecting individual and collective interests. Through repetition and perfection, tension is avoided, as much with the values the social actors uphold, as with the social structures that are merely institutionalized interests of those actors in space and time. With the notion of structuration we avoid the contradictions of social structures and individuals. Even if it comes to that, it is only when the social structures present opposing interests; in any case, these structures present the substance of interest, they never wane in strength or intensity.

What is common with these theories is the belief in the process and progress of rationalization. Rationalization is realized in two ways: first the socialization of individuals, second, the individualization of social values and norms. Only at first glance does this process appear to contradict itself. On the contrary, the bigger the social differentiation and structuration, the bigger the individualization, making the potential for the progress of society and individuals interlinked and progressively open. The identity of social actors can be developed only through this process of progressive individualization within a similarly stable and differential social system.

However, insofar as we have failed social and value structures, the notion of communicable action and structuration is no longer plausible. The efficacious failure of the first social cause cannot be explained by those notions because they have a prospective meaning. In other words, they are suitable for explaining the stable and promising systems and not the empty and weak ones.

Because of that, it is important to introduce new concepts of understanding to social order and social action – portable causality and social pulsation of variable intensity.

Social actors encounter the social and value givens that present the framework and subjectivity of the cause of action. In a stable social system these givens are maintained by being transferred from one to the other, as long as its causality does not wane and its efficacy fade. In that instant and action (goal-instrumental and value-rational) can switch sides, or either one become dominant. The social actors can give goal-instrumental function a dimension of value, rather, they can give action value to the goal-instrumental dimension. In the first case, causality is transferred to things, objects, and the material world as a whole, which acquires the character of value and action from itself as ends-in-themselves that subordinate man – from means they become ends.

In another case, values become the means for achieving the ends external to them – they acquire the character of natural mechanisms spurring people to act. The familiar, cultural, religious, and cognitive values lose meaning and strength in their self-sustainability and become the means (tools) for establishing something external.

Both of these situations are proof that it has come to the waning of causality of social action on either one side or the other. Both the goal-instrumental and value-rational action retains meaning for as long as they are rational, that is, for as long as they achieve their ends. Those ends are achieved through a repetition of actions and procedures because their results are affirmed as useful, valiant, and good. Utility and value of those actions and procedures are confirmed through their results – tools, actions, techniques, as well as values, norms, rules, laws, etc. Their need for repetition, affirmation, and perfection stems from this.

An exchange equal to action occurs when “rationality” disappears, when causality wanes.

The transfer of causality from one type of action to the other is evidence that the ends have lost their potentiality and strength.

This can be overcome with the introduction of new ends. How do we achieve that in a case of social pulsation with little or no intensity?

It is possible only with a new creative power of mind.

With goal-instrumental action, it appears as an innovation and perfection of means and techniques of production, or the creation of completely new ones, with new means.

With value-rational action, the creative power of mind appears as an ability of appointing new values in cases where the old ones have lost their potential strength. That is the power of mind that establishes new institutions in social action, new social givens, but also produces new values in social interaction. Those new values could be the reformulated old ones that were either lost or forgotten, and in turn could gain new meaning and new strength.

The effects of the creative mind have self-sustaining ends, and with that they differ in form from other types of actions that have ends external from it. The once established ends of the creative mind – the substance of social actors – get the causal strength of social action.

However, the lawfulness of their power is the loss of intensity – over time they fade through social action, their substantiality weakening. Social actors not only establish social institutions and values, but also empty the substantiality that directs them in action. The creative mind establishes the ends that sustain themselves, encouraging social actors to action. Since those ends are merely objectified and institutionalized requests of the social actors, they are drained through their own fulfillment. With time their actions weaken, until the moment of absolute exhaustion when they become the limitations to the social actors. The weakening causality of social action shows that social institutions and collective values do not have a linear path. They stagger in development at the point their causality weakens. That is when a need for overcoming those circumstances emerges, and it is possible with creative, not
rationalized, repetitive action. The law of weakening causality reveals that the social and national institutions, like all human values, develop in cycles, retreating to themselves, but from a different and higher order of action and possibly greater power found within them – the power of the creative mind.
ANNEX

45 Parts of the documentation: THE SURVIVED COUNTRY, Dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina: Who, when, where, Ivo Komšić, Synopsis, Sarajevo – Zagreb, 2013, translated by Ulvija Tanović
Decision to Declare State of War in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Starting from the fact that the aggression on the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was initiated by the Republic of Serbia, Republic of Montenegro, the Yugoslavian Army, and the terrorists of the Serbian Democratic Party – that the fact of aggression was confirmed by the United Nations Security Council in resolution number 752, from May 18th, 1992 – that the aggression carried on even after the adoption of the afore mentioned United Nations Security Council resolution, that the aggression was followed by a brutal genocide of Bosnian and Herzegovinian people, as a result of forty thousand killed, around a million-four-hundred-thousand displaced, and of those around sixty thousand sent to concentration camps – that the aggressor continued to premeditatedly destroy civil, economic, religious, and other objects – that the aggressor occupied around 70% of the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and refused to retreat – and starting from the rights of defense that was recognized by international law. The Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, based on the amendment LI period 5, paragraph 3, in the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at an assembly held on June 20th, 1992, reached a decision

The Decision in Declaring a State of War

1. A state of war is declared on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2. The aim of declaring war, based on the rights of citizens to individually and collectively defend themselves, is to offer more efficient engagement of all human and material potential at home and abroad in order to deploy them in the defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the aggressors, as well as establishing the impaired legal rights and conditions for the return of all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina to their rightful place.
3. The armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina are authorized to undertake any necessary measures to organize a people’s resistance in achieving the established goals.
4. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina will adhere to all provisions of international laws and international conventions that regulate the behavior of nations in a state of war, as well as in accordance to article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and respect the decisions and initiatives brought by the Security Council in order to establish and maintain international peace and security. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, and other international institutions, continue to seek a peaceful resolution to the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina through dialogue which will adhere to its dignity, independence, integrity, and wholeness. In that respect, it remains open to all relative initiatives.
5. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina will inform the United Nations Security Council of this decision.
6. This decision is effective from the day of its declaration in the “Official Newspaper of RB&H”, Sarajevo, PR. number 1201/92, June 20th, 1992.

The President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Alija Izetbegović
Tuđman’s Map

Tudman drew up this map on 5 September 1995. The time when this map was created is the first important matter that should be considered in Tudman’s overall engagement in BiH.

This was the time of the "Oluja" [Storm], a joint operation by the military forces of the HV, the HVO and the BiH Army. It was a time of relative calm and political diplomatic activities conducted by the US administration and members of the Contact Group in preparation for the Dayton Conference.

So, this was the time when the HV, the HVO and the BiH Army held over 60 percent of the BiH territory under their control, when after pushing through Glamoč, Grahovo, Drvar, Šipovo and Mrkonjić, the HV and the HVO arrived at Manjača and Banja Luka.

Immediately after this, the American mediator R. Holbrooke managed to persuade A. Izetbegović to accept the legalisation of Republika Srpska, as confirmed by the signature of Izetbegović’s representative Muhamed Šaćirbegović, at that time also the Minister of Foreign Affairs of RBiH, in Geneva on 8 September 1995.

This means that Tudman drew up his map before Izetbegović’s legalisation of Republika Srpska, at the time of its military demise, and immediately before the Dayton Conference. At the same time, a map of the territorial organisation of BiH was developed by the Contact Group. It goes without saying that this map was agreed between the member countries – Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia.

The other important fact regarding this map is its drastic deviation from the situation established by the "Oluja" military operation.

Despite this situation, Tudman uses the term Republika Srpska as if this creation of war was already legalised. Also, he divides the territory between the Federation and RS at a ration of 51.40 : 48.60, despite the fact that the ratio of controlled territories was considerably different. Tudman included into the Federation the part of BiH that had never been included there by anyone else (Grahovo, Glamoč, Drvar, Popovo Polje) – marked in blue on the map. Into the territory of RS, he included Posavina, the Sanski Most area and the whole of Podrinje where Muslims were the majority population (Goražde, Žepa, Srebrenica, Kalesija) – marked in red on the map.

This was not the Contact Group’s proposal. On their map, all these areas are part of the Federation.

There is a blue line on Tudman’s map drawn from area 2 to area 1, i.e. from Stolac across Prozor and Kupres to Velika Kladuša, that demarcates a compact territory from the Montenegrin border to Croatia. This line has no significance unless it represents Tudman’s interests in BiH, i.e. what he used to call "fattening up the Croatian croissant".

However, despite its controversial nature, Tudman’s map would have been completely meaningless if it were not for the Dayton Agreement.

If we compare it with the Dayton territorial organisation of BiH, it is clear that it falls closest to that very solution – it coincides with it ideally in the territorial demarcations (the ratio of territories between the Federation and RS in the Dayton Agreement is actually 51.40 : 48.60, and not 51 : 49 as is usually thought and said).
Tudman’s map also coincides with the Dayton solution for demarcating individual areas. Republika Srpska came to encompass almost everything Tudman had predicted, apart from the small portion of Goražde that Izetbegović would not concede at any price and the isolated area of Odžak wheedled by the state delegation of BiH, and Orašje, which the HVO forces refused to leave at the cost of their lives.

How could Tudman have known so far in advance how to draw up a map in line with the final solution from Dayton? What conclusions can we draw from this map?

His disregard for the ratio of military forces in the field, as well as his disregard for the sacrifices made to establish this military ratio, indicates that his aim was to preserve territories for Karadžić and Milošević, i.e. to ”conquer” territories only to give them back. During the military operation, Tudman directed the HV and the HVO precisely towards Banja Luka and Manjača. When some BiH Army units started moving towards Manjača, the HV stopped them with artillery fire. This skirmish within a joint military action was treated as an isolated incident and explained away as such by the Minister of Defence of the Federation, Jadranko Prlić. Also, when in Dayton it turned out RS was ”missing” a piece of territory to make up the percentage demanded by Milošević and when Izetbegović was adamant about not giving up an inch of the territory controlled by the BiH Army, Tudman magnanimously promised the withdrawal of the HV and the HVO forces from territories under their control.

Furthermore, this map unequivocally proves the existence of a firm agreement between Tudman and Milošević on the exchange of territories. Milošević made no objection to areas historically belonging to Bosnian Serbs being included in the territory of the Federation, or becoming part of cantons with a Croat majority. Tudman did not even try to save Bosanska Posavina for the Federation of BiH, even though as evidenced by their map, the Contact Group was in favour of this option.

Tudman’s map reveals that this historical area of Bosnian Croats was already tallied up as an RS territory, precisely as Milošević later announced in Dayton in front of everyone. Tudman’s map also reveals that R. Holbrooke was privy to all this. Ever since 8 September 1995, when he legalised RS, up until the end of the Dayton negotiations, he had been implementing the deal that Tudman and Milošević had struck. Finally, he adjusted the territorial demarcation between the Federation and RS to Tudman’s map and not the map of the Contact Group or the demands of the BiH state delegation.
Showing areas in relation to the Croatian proposal demarcation of the Federation and the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Map 1, Office of the President, 5th September 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>Areas (km²)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Federation</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Serbs</td>
<td>49</td>
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<table>
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<th>Territory</th>
<th>Areas (km²)</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina %</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>539.00</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>147.00</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C In total (1+2+3)</td>
<td>3.611.00</td>
<td>7.06</td>
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<table>
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<th>Areas (km²)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>26 075.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>3 405.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>3 611.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A–D+C</td>
<td>26 281.29</td>
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51.40% of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina

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<td>1.77</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
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<td>588.00</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>882.00</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D In total (1+2+3)</td>
<td>3 405.50</td>
<td>6.66</td>
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<th>Areas (km²)</th>
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<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>3 405.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>3 611.00</td>
</tr>
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<td>A–C+D</td>
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48.60% of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina

11:52, edited by Major-General K. Kašpar; 2
CROAT COORDINATION BOARD
SARAJEVO

DECISION ON THE ASSEMBLY OF CROATS OF BiH

1. The Assembly is a gathering of Croat representatives elected during the 1990 elections to the Parliament of BiH, the BiH Presidency, as presidents of municipal assemblies; representatives from main or central boards of Croat political parties; the Head Office of HKD ”Napredak” ; representatives of the Catholic Church; representatives of the Assembly of Croats from Bosanska Posavina and Central Bosnia; representatives of homeland communities, cultural, scientific, economic, healthcare, educational and other Croat workers from the public sector.

The Assembly is a non-partisan, non-legislative body that profiles and represents the interests of Croats in BiH.

2. The main task of the Assembly is to determine the general social position of Croats in BiH within the current national, religious, economic, social and political circumstances; indicate the direction of future social developments and, based on this, define the national aims of Croats in BiH and suggest methods of achieving those aims.

3. The assessments and conclusions reached by the Assembly shall be expressed in the form of declarations and guidelines.

4. The Assembly shall also express its views through:
   – public addresses to the people,
   – representative and state bodies of BiH, other states, the United Nations and other international institutions,
   – proposals and suggestions to Croat organisations and institutions.

5. The Assembly shall be in session until the end of the war in BiH, the final resolution of the organisation of the state and the announcement of elections.

6. The Assembly shall elect the Croat People's Council consisting of: a president and six vice-presidents of the Assembly, and a number of members.
The Croat People’s Council shall interpret the views of the Assembly and organise their implementation by coordinating Croat organisations and institutions, and in other appropriate ways.

The Croat People’s Council has an exclusively executive and organisational capacity. The Council shall answer and submit reports on its work to the Assembly.

7. The operation of the Assembly and Council shall be detailed by their rules of procedure.

Sarajevo, 20 January 1994

ASSEMBLY OF CROATS OF BiH
The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina shifts and demolishes the social civic structure in its entirety. The distribution of people, along with demographic ratios, are significantly altered, while solutions for political and national organizations are being sought – thus far unsuccessfully – under the international aegis. With that, the interests of even the Croat population in Bosnia and Herzegovina are brought into question. In the interest of researching – in given situations – optimal solutions to global and concrete Croat interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croatian Coordination Board convenes.

THE ASSEMBLY OF BOSNIAN AND HERZEGOVINIAN CROATS

Main goals of the assembly:

To define the position of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats in current circumstances – the communal, national, religious, political, economic, and social position.

To foresee the future social and political development and on account of that to determine national goals for Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats, and to present them as a union to the united peoples and the European Union.

To determine the methods in accomplishing those goals, as well as the place and function of Croatian organizations and institutions in it.

Invited to the Assembly:

- All Croats elected at the latest elections in the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
- All Croats then elected to the office of president and vice-president of municipalities as well as the president of executive board of the municipalities,
- Main board members of Croatian political parties,
- Members of the headquarters “HKD Napredak”
- Representatives of the Catholic Church,
- Representatives of homeland communities,
- Prominent cultural, scientific, economic, academic, political, and other public Croat figures.

THE CROATIAN COORDINATION BOARD
President Mr Tvrtko Nevjestić
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS by Ivo Komšić
FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF CROATS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

The Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina are not in a position to choose between various political ideas and affiliations. The struggle to survive and keep our homesteads determines our politics and our choice. Our people are, by and large, either abandoned or misguided. The lightly given promises and beliefs that political will should be surrendered as a sacrifice to the “creators of national history” who are to be blindly and uncritically followed, were dispersed with the first columns of refugees in their immeasurable sorrow and despair at being left unprotected by those to whom they entrusted a political mandate, while those that should have been fighting for them often abandoned them without a fight.

The people that chose its politics at the 1990 elections and determined the character of its state at the 1992 referendum was left without its own politics and without a state. For Croats, politics has become a monopoly maintained by coercion and brutal discrediting. The Croat people that had for centuries maintained and reconfirmed its state-forming capacity in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been reduced to a small portion of the country, without its Croat tradition and without economic prospects for the future. The greater part of the Croat people is increasingly being turned into a national minority. A people once rich in spirit, bread and dress now wanders the world and refugee camps, or withers under siege, destitute, despairing and bereft.

Political putschists and quasi-creators of the state, who have demonstrated their “patriotism” by destroying world heritage monuments, desecrating what is sacred to their neighbours, and confirming their “heroism” by killing children and unprotected civilians, have humiliated us morally and nailed our honourable name to the pillar of shame. On the other hand, we are subject to suffering motivated by revenge and violence against innocent Croat communities. We hear how those who have come after us deny us the right to remain in our own noble land.

Today, we are on the swept ground of history, without a consistent or singular policy. We are being abandoned by confirmed friends from abroad, while our own national community is beset by widening rifts of polarisation. A double war has been imposed on the Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the smallest
and most dispersed people: a war against the Serb aggressor and a war against our recent allies, the Muslims.

As participants in developments we were not allowed to see clearly, and as Christians, we must refrain from harsh judgements to preserve our honour and our souls. Still, we know beyond a doubt that one war was imposed on us, and we were dragged into the other (partly through the fault of some of "our own"!). In the defence against the Serb aggression, we demonstrated our capacity for organised defence. It is thanks to Croat fighters in many areas that the Serb aggressor did not manage to take over the whole of Bosnia and fully achieve its subjugation. We are proud of the just war of defence we waged. In the other conflict, our people has been humiliated because it is not able or ready to seize another's territory and expel neighbours from their homes. In our culture, people have the highest value, not the territory. We want to fight for human dignity and security. No one has the right to sacrifice a life, especially the life of another, for any political ideas or state formations. Attempts to impose solutions, even in areas that are not ethnically Serb, Croat or Muslim, could not have been implemented without ethnic cleansing and displacing peoples that accompanied the transformation of the political community of "Herceg-Bosna" into a territorial state community.

Muslim politics, caught between the Serb aggression and genocide against their people, on the one side, and the obstructions within the government from numerous Croat representatives, on the other, has opted for a strategy of equidistance and for the same methods in dealing with both sides. Friends and allies only yesterday, equally threatened, they came into conflict and incited mutual hatred playing into the hands of the initial aggressor and allowing him to do as he pleases, to prove that what is happening in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a civil war, a religious or what have you war, and by no means a Serb aggression. Thus, the burden of misguided politics and war has come to rest on the backs of Bosnian Croats, a people most loyal to their "little land of Bosnia", to the integrity of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its preservation. Politically naive and benign, unarmed and psychologically unprepared, our people were caught unawares by the onslaught of their recent allies, the Muslims, and what ensued was an unprecedented exodus and suffering. The remaining Croats were crowded into the few enclaves in Central Bosnia (from which HVO extremists had previously expelled the Muslim population) and full of uncertainty they now await the resolution of the war drama. Their fear is justified, their suffering immense, because the
wounds of Neretvica, Ahmići, Vareš, Kraljeva Sutjeska, Grabovica, Uzdol, Stupni Do and other execution grounds are still fresh. Knowing that neither church nor mosque is protected, that neither the friar’s robe nor the muezzin’s call to prayer will stop the criminals, makes them uneasy and instils disquiet into the souls of the peaceful inhabitants of this forever restless country.

There is no more time left to wait. The vicious circle of suffering of Croats and Muslims in their mutual conflict, set in motion by the aggressor with external assistance, is support for the project of Greater Serbia and must be stopped. **We must escape the circle of manipulation, take responsibility and state our political will.** We have let others decide for us, make plans about ending the war, use us, our country and our history, our fate and our future in their trade-offs. Our voices were denounced as illegitimate (often brutally) and treacherous. In the meantime, our numbers are dwindling, and our graves, our mutilated and humiliated increase every day. When it comes to the extinction of peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina – the Croats will be the first to go! We finally want to say that the only legitimate policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the one our people decidedly chose: the integrity of our country and homeland and the national equality of all its peoples as confirmed by the sovereignty of our common country and the state-forming capacity of its peoples. **Individuals may have legitimacy only if they conduct this policy.**

This assembly is made up of people who, wherever they may find themselves today, **have the legitimacy to represent the interests of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina and seek the best solutions to the present crisis.** Fighting for the interests of their country and their people, wherever they live and work today, does not make them deserters or traitors, but honest and honourable patriots. Here today, with full awareness of our responsibility, we must propose a programme that will end the war. War has become unbearable. If it continues, we will all perish: if not from shells and snipers, then from starvation. While the war lasts, it is impossible to negotiate, to look for political solutions. Also, our programme must bring together the heterogeneous interests and policies of Croats. **Croats must not be short-changed or abandoned in any part of Bosnia and Herzegovina and they must not pursue their interests at the expense of others.**

**We, the Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina do not wish to be foreigners in our homeland and will not concede to being second-rate citizens in our own country.** This should be clear to the creators of any policy aiming to take away our voice, and to others who use this situation to seize power for themselves
and disenfranchise us. Let no one think they can carve out a new state and a new government with weapons and force. The ratio of armed forces is changeable. Also, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, military victors are impossible, because here war cannot have a rational or attainable goal. Today’s winner may very well be defeated tomorrow, or have peace be tantamount for their defeat. Then, there will be no end to the war.

We are our own people in our own land, subordinated to no one. Our fighters in the Army and MUP forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and those patriots who fight and who have given their lives in the formations of the HVO mounting a resistance to the aggression against the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina entitle us to say this. (10.1% of those killed defending Sarajevo were Croats, and until the war, we made up 6-7% of the city’s population!) We, therefore, reject any identification of the Croat people with the HVO extremists. We have severely and without reservation condemned and continue to condemn the crimes that are being committed. We want to be identified with those who have defended and continue to defend this country, with our cultural and humanitarian institutions that have sought to lessen the tragedy and suffering of all people everywhere, with our parties and individuals who put their political awareness and wisdom at the service of their country, of truth and justice. We want to be identified with our Catholic Church that has been and remains the moral centre of the Croat people, the support and guarantee for their survival in this land.

We have assembled today in Sarajevo, a city that symbolises suffering in this war and resistance to aggression, a city whose streets still preserve a vision of Bosnia and Herzegovina and give us hope to say loud and clear: our country and homeland shall not be divided and no one has the right to negotiate this in our name. Only the internal organisation of the state, division of authority and insurance of equality and national sovereignty are open to negotiations. We want to convince the world and all those involved in the drama of this war that we are capable of negotiations that can put an end to this senseless war and save the people from further suffering and casualties. We want to inform the public that we have a programme to achieve this.

The principles of this programme are as follows:

1. The return of refugees and displaced persons and family reunification in their homes. This would annul or at least moderate the consequences of aggression and ethnic cleansing.
2. Territorial and institutional integrity of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina based on modern regionalism and decentralisation.

3. Sovereignty of the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina through state institutions.

4. Preventing the creation of greater national states in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, since this is contrary to the strategic interests of the Croat people in BiH and in the Republic of Croatia.

5. Removing the reasons for the involvement of the Croatian army in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the resulting sanctions against the Republic of Croatia. The sanctions would have a disastrous effect on the general position of the Croat people, and would further add to the troubles of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

These principles allow making a turnaround in the peace talks and steering them towards the internal reorganisation of BiH instead of talking about whether there is such a thing as an internationally recognised state and UN member. The talks, so far, have mainly sought ways to put an end to the state and carve up the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We propose that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina be transformed into a complex multi-level state with three or four levels of government.

In the first case, the cantons would unite directly through the federal parliament, in the second, indirectly – through republics. Both cases bring together the positive elements of all peace projects to date and take into account the realistic and irrevocable relations created by war.

We propose sixteen cantons, and three zones with special and one with a functional status (Sarajevo, Mostar, Banja Luka, and Neum). The cantons would be formed on the basis of geographic, communication, economic, gravitational and ethnic criteria. Eleven cantons would have a clear national majority, and five a relative majority with an almost completely balanced national structure.

In the case of four levels of government, each republic would contain two cantons where a different people would have the relative majority, meaning the republics would not be ethnic. This would allow refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes and stop the war over these territories.
Government institutions in the municipalities, cantons and republics would be structured based on a proportionality principle in line with the 1991 census, and on the federal level based on the parity principle including all three peoples.

One house of the federal parliament would be elected from the entire territory of the federal state of BiH, and the other would be cantonal and based on the parity principle.

Parallel to this project, the lifting of sanctions over Serbia and Montenegro would be initiated and it would be tied to the dynamics of the peace plan implementation. Also, we would propose that the three Yugoslav republics recognise each other and become associate members of the EU and full-fledged partners in the NATO Partnership for Peace initiative. In this way, the European Union and NATO would not be just the guarantors for the implementation of the peace plan, but also mediators in the normalisation of relations in the former Yugoslavia and in the re-establishment of economic, communication, cultural and other relations in this region.

Let us stop this war!

There is far too much suffering and evil. We are all still numb and shocked by yesterday’s tragedy. This is a hecatomb, a sacrifice at the altar of the bloodthirsty demon of war and killing. Once again a morsel of Bosnian land is soaking up the blood of its children. All their blood is equally red, all the tears equally bitter. How long will the blood and tears flow? Why do we hate and kill each other?

This is the lament of a young man mobilised again, after he had lost his ideals and his youth on the battlefields throughout Croatia and Bosnia. He grieves because they are forcing him to wage war against his comrades from Bosnia who had gone with him to help rescue Croatia from becoming part of Greater Serbia, when they swore to each other eternal friendship. When they shoot him, will the young men of this city know his brother died defending this very city? When they find out, it will be too late. Too late, not just for this young man, but I fear for all honest people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I, therefore, appeal to all those concerned to accept our proposal for peace and resolution of problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Sarajevo, 6 February 1994
Croat representatives elected to the BiH Parliament in the 1990 elections, as members of the BiH Presidency, as president and vice-presidents of city and municipal assemblies, and members of central and main boards of Croat political parties, the main board of HKD Napredak, representatives of the Catholic Church, the Assembly of Croats of Bosanska Posavina and Central Bosnia, homeland organisations, and a number of renowned cultural, scientific, economic, health, educational and other public workers – Croats met on 6 February 1994 in Sarajevo and passed this

DECLARATION
of the Assembly of Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina

1. Invoking the political will of the Croats of BiH, as expressed at the referendum on 29 February 1992, the Assembly, as a high political representative body of the Croat people in BiH, confirms that the integrity of the state of BiH is a vital interest of the Croat people. This integrity is supported by historical, geographic, economic, traditional, ethical and political reasons, but also by the interests of each of its peoples. All of this was confirmed by the international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2. The Assembly demands an urgent and absolute cession of all hostilities in all battlefields. This is the first precondition for the Bosnian-Herzegovinian crisis to be resolved through negotiations, and for the stability of the state of BiH to be guaranteed in the future, with parity and proportionality in the participation of each people in the political life and government of the country in line with contemporary democratic principles and basic human and national rights.

If the war continues, the Croat people will use the Assembly of Croats and other means to demand from the international community every form of protection for itself and its interests, including military intervention.

3. The internal organisation of BiH can be established only in peace and through political agreement between representatives of the peoples. It must be based on contemporary democratic achievements, the equality of peoples expressed by parity in state level government bodies and proportionality in lower level government bodies, on human rights and civil liberties.
4. In the state of BiH, the continuity of the state-forming capacity of the Croat people must be ensured, as well as that of the other two peoples, in every part of the state territory of BiH.

5. As one of the three state-forming peoples of BiH, Croats must have access to and permanent guarantees of all forms of communication with the entirety of the Croat national corpus.

6. The Assembly rejects any resolution of the crisis in BiH that would sanction the ethnic persecution committed to date, enable the continuation of ethnic cleansing and the so-called humane relocation of peoples, satisfy the occupier and aggressor, and derogate the views of the UN and the European Community by which no territorial situation imposed by occupation and force can be deemed acceptable. The Assembly emphasises that for these reasons territorial conquests and their legalisation by any side are unacceptable to the Croats of BiH.

7. The Assembly demands that the return of refugees and displaced persons from all part of BiH be ensured. Any peace agreement must guarantee this right and foresee international guarantees for its implementation.

8. The war has caused great suffering and numerous human casualties. The Assembly expresses its sympathies for all the innocent victims and demands that the perpetrators of atrocities be brought before the appropriate courts.

9. The Assembly demands that all future negotiations on resolving the crisis in BiH include its elected representatives and that no one is authorised to sign a division of BiH, for in such an event the agreement will be considered invalid.

10. The Assembly supports and accepts the views of the BiH crisis continuously expressed by the Catholic Church.

11. The Assembly supports and accepts the expressed will and political determinations expressed at the assemblies of Croats of Posavina and Central Bosnia.

12. The Assembly is in favour of establishing communication and free movement of people, goods and capital as the first precondition for a modern economic system, a market economy and connection with the developed world.

This war-ravaged and destroyed country will long depend on international aid. The Assembly believes it is necessary to emphasise that this aid must be
directly dependent on the degree of respect for human rights and civil liberties in each part of BiH, and on the efficiency and fairness of its distribution.

Gathered at the Assembly of Croats of BiH, as the highest political representative body of the Croat people in BiH, we, the representatives of Croat political parties, the Catholic Church, cultural institutions and the overall Croat public in BiH, hereby address to the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Croats this

PROCLAMATION

Croats have been living in Bosnia and Herzegovina for centuries, building and developing their country, defending and preserving it, suffering in it only to rise with it again. It has been thus from ages ago to the present day. And today, they find themselves before the most fateful moment of their history. Namely, there is a real danger for Croats to completely disappear from the territory of BiH.

For more than two years the Croat people in BiH, and the Croats in the Republic of Croatia even longer, has been subjected to unprecedented horrors of war. While we are glad that a sovereign Croatian state has been established after so many centuries, we cannot but express our deepest concern over the current situation of Croats in BiH.

The war has brought on many evils. We were expelled from areas we had inhabited for centuries and invaluable heritage incorporating all our material and spiritual potential has been destroyed. We have been made foreigners in our own homeland or refugees the world over. Multitudes have undergone unspeakable suffering.

We deem it necessary to call on the whole of our people to devote all their energies to stopping the war and returning to their homeland, to their BiH. This is our duty not only towards our ancestors that have bequeathed us this land, but to all the generations to come for whom we must secure a homeland worthy of living in.

The Assembly calls upon the entire people to bestow its trust in it and, together with it, move away from the war and unprecedented evil to a future worthy of human dignity. We must, therefore, secure the unity of the Croat people and its equal position within an integrated, non-unitarian, and modern decentralised BiH, organised through political agreement between national representatives on the basis of contemporary democratic achievements, human freedoms and civil rights.

Sarajevo, 6 February 1994

PARTICIPANTS AT THE ASSEMBLY OF CROATS OF BIH
The Assembly of Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at its session held on 6 February 1994 adopted the following

DECISION
on the participation of Croats in representative bodies and organs of government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

1. In line with the rights and obligations of the Croat people, as a constitutive people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its representatives are obliged to participate in the representative bodies and organs of the government of the Republic of BiH.

2. The Assembly protests against the increasingly widespread practice of unjustly excluding Croat officials from eligibility for offices in the judiciary, police force, administrative bodies and other areas vital for the interests of both the Croat people and all the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

PARTICIPANTS AT THE ASSEMBLY OF CROATS OF BiH
The Assembly of Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at its session held on 6 February 1994 in Sarajevo, passed this

**DECISION**

**on negotiations to resolve the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

1. The Assembly of Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina believes the armed conflicts must be stopped in all the battlegrounds in BiH, and negotiations to resolve the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be continued in an atmosphere of a ceasefire.

2. Given that the representatives appointed by the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna cannot represent the Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole, the Assembly hereby determines that the interests of Bosnian-Herzegovinian Croats in further negotiations are to be represented by the President of the Assembly, and other representatives authorised by the Croat People’s Council and its Executive Board.

3. The Assembly hereby obliges Croat representatives in the negotiations to advocate principles determined by the Assembly’s Declaration and set out in more detail in the prepared plan for continued negotiations.

4. The Assembly has been informed about this plan in detail, has reviewed it critically and believes its consistent application can ensure the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina organised on the basis of contemporary democratic achievements, the equality of peoples and civil liberties. The Assembly, therefore, proposes that the Parliament of BiH should adopt it as well.

**PARTICIPANTS AT THE ASSEMBLY OF CROATS OF BiH**
BASIS FOR DEFINING A NEW PEACE INITIATIVE – proposal by Ivo Komšić

REASONS FOR LAUNCHING A NEW PEACE INITIATIVE AND ITS BASIC PRINCIPLES

1. The peace plan project based on an extorted concept of ethnic division of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has evidently failed.

The reason for the failure lies in the attitude of the aggressor sides that are not even prepared to consistently apply the principle of ethnic division that they themselves imposed. Namely, the aggressor sides ostensibly insist on dividing the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina along ethnic lines so that they may form “national republics” in “their” ethnic areas. However, during negotiations, the aggressor sides remained steadfast in their intention to include in these so-called “national republics” considerable territories that had prior to the aggression been populated by an (absolute or relative) majority of members of other peoples – something that significantly strays from the principle of ethnic division.

As was already clear from before, this attitude has definitely unmasked the ultimate aim of the war waged by the aggressors against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is to occupy by force as much of the territory of RBiH as possible, irrespective of any principle, including the ethnic principle and then, through peace talks, ensure the conditions for the forcibly seized territories to be annexed to the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Croatia, respectively.

All the while, the State Delegation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina would have only one “important” role: its signature would ensure the international legalisation of the aims of aggression.

Such an outcome could not and must not be accepted – for it would be tantamount to capitulation, and not a peace agreement.

2. Given the extensive human casualties and immense damage of the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to date, and especially in view of the fact that a continuation of war will necessarily mean more casualties, more suffering for the people and more material destruction, the legal bodies of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
stand firmly and permanently determined that peace is to be established through legal and acceptable political solutions.

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its people are the hardest hit by the impact of war, which is precisely why the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has the greatest interest in seeing the peace process result in establishing true peace as soon as possible.

In the past, however, the peace process was guided in such a way as to favour those initiatives that sought a compromise between the interests of various European forces in this area, including also the projects submitted by the aggressor-countries such as the case of the failed plan of ethnic division.

At the same time, initiatives of RBiH were avoided by various manoeuvres so that the State Delegation and the legal bodies of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were placed in a position of deciding “in favour” or “against” imposed “peace plans”. Among other things, this creates room for political propaganda to conceal the utter illegality and unacceptability of the proposed plans with the absurd thesis that the legal bodies of RBiH do not want peace.

Given that this approach of the other participants in the peace process has yielded no results, the legal bodies of RBiH must take the initiative and propose a complete peace plan as a basis for further negotiations (or for determining a resolution within the UN Security Council).

Casualties suffered by Bosnia and Herzegovina, while others drafted “peace plans” focused primarily on their own interests, entitle a plan proposed by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to primacy in the continuation of the peace process.

3. The peace plan should be based on the principles of the London Conference that were never contested, but were violated and changed in all the plans proposed to date.

More precisely, in keeping with the documents of the London Conference, the peace plan should be based on the following principles:

– preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of RBiH within its internationally recognised borders;

– reversing the effects of the aggression, and especially that of “ethnic cleansing”;

etc
– ensuring the national equality of all peoples living in RBiH;
– establishing a political system in line with the standards accepted by modern democracies;
– ensuring effective and reliable international guarantees for the implementation of the peace plan and lasting establishment of peace.

**MAIN DIRECTIONS OF THE PEACE PROCESS**

1. Given that four states, created after the dissolution of the former SFRY, are directly involved in this war (either by waging a war of conquest or one of defence), it is evident that the peace process will have a chance of succeeding only if the existing relations between the states involved in the war are materially changed.

To that end, it would be reasonable for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to address an initiative to the Republic of Montenegro, the Republic of Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Serbia with a proposal for these states to pass unconditional decisions on mutual recognition – this would constitute the first significant step towards establishing lasting peace.

2. At the same time, wider international support should be sought for those states that pass the decision on recognising other states from the former SFRY to be admitted provisionally as associate members of the European Union and full fledged partners in NATO’s Partnership for Peace initiative.

This will make possible the activation of all European Union instruments for rapid achievement of political resolutions and establishment of a stable peace in the former SFRY, while providing effective international guarantees, including NATO guarantees.

3. Mutual recognition and an appropriate status within the European Union and the Partnership for Peace shall create realistic conditions for the already established mechanisms of these bodies to be used in order to begin developing among the countries of the former SFRY cooperation and integrative processes already in place between European countries.

This basis would provide a realistic perspective of developing the kind of relations and forms of cooperation in the interest of the countries created with the dissolution of the former SFRY and in the interest of the peoples living in this region.
4. Concurrently with the above initiatives, the Parliament, Presidency and Government of RBiH need to define their views and positions regarding the peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Starting with the determined principles, the crux of this new peace plan should be defined using the extensive experience and constitutional solutions of European countries that have successfully existed as multinational communities, such as Switzerland and Belgium.

In this way, Europe will be presented with a project that will respect the concepts of constitutional organisation and other relevant experience of distinguished European democracies.

5. An analysis of the peace process so far shows that the issue of the "maps" has been impossible to resolve, primarily because the peace plans were in effect projects to break up the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

These were not plans for establishing a new political and territorial organisation of RBiH, but for the territorial division of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by its neighbouring countries, which had conducted the aggression against it with that aim in mind.

By deviating from the basic principle of the London Conference – that all peace solutions must respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina within its internationally recognised borders – all the other principles were trampled and the problem of territories became impossible to resolve.

It is clear that the RBiH state delegation could obtain a much wider mandate for agreement on the maps if the peace plan were to guarantee the territorial integrity of RBiH and the inviolability of its international borders.

The peace process would have reliable chances of leading to an agreement within a short timeframe if all the involved countries, and primarily the Republic of Serbia, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Montenegro and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were to pass decisions on mutual recognition, that is, if all the stakeholders in the peace process were to confirm their adherence to the principles of the London Conference on the sovereignty of RBiH and the inviolability of its international borders.

Without this, there is no sense in continuing negotiations and the peace process must be transferred to the competences of the United Nations Security Council.
BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE PEACE PLAN

Introductory remarks

1. Following the mutual recognition of states (Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina) and a statement of all the participants in the negotiations about their recognition of the external borders of RBiH, negotiations could begin regarding an agreement on constitutional principles made up of the following key parts:

   a. The constitutional transformation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina into a complex state.

   b. Defining a complex state structure with multiple levels and determining its political-territorial organisation.

   c. Ensuring a special status for smaller political-territorial communities when their national composition differs from the overall national composition of the states forming the Federal State.

   d. Finding solutions that ensure the equality of peoples, and realisation of national rights in the entire territory of the Federal State and at all levels of state organisation.

   e. Defining the principles of internal organisation of state bodies.

   f. Distribution of state functions and competences to various levels of political-territorial communities.

   g. Determining the territories, that is, the areas of political-territorial communities (maps) in accordance with the agreed solutions to the above points.

All these segments would be integral parts of an agreement on constitutional principles (including the maps), while the plan as a whole would also contain special documents on implementation (provisional arrangements, international guarantees and a “military paper”).

Theses for an agreement on constitutional principles

1. Transformation into a federal state

   By adopting the peace plan, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina would alter its constitutional organisation and transform into a complex state – a Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a sovereign state within internationally recognised borders.
2. Political-territorial organisation and special status for certain units

*Variant A*

The Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be made up of cantons, as states whose names, territories, functions and competences are determined by the constitutional principles.

Cantons would be made up of municipalities as political-territorial communities with local self-governance.

For those municipalities where, according to the 1991 census, the absolute or relative majority of the population does not correspond to the majority nation of the canton, the constitutional principles would ensure a special status for the purpose of realising and protecting national rights.

*Variant B*

The Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be made up of republics, as states whose names, territories, functions and competences are determined by the constitutional principles.

The republics would be divided into cantons, as political-territorial units whose names and territories are determined by constitutional principles, and whose functions and competences are determined by the constitutional principles and constitutions of individual republics.

Cantons would be made up of municipalities as political-territorial communities with local self-governance.

For those cantons and municipalities, where according to the 1991 census, the absolute or relative majority of the population does not correspond to the majority nation of the canton, the constitutional principles would ensure a special status for the purpose of realising and protecting national rights.

3. Implementing the equality of peoples and protection of national rights

The equality of peoples and protection of national rights in the entire territory of the Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be ensured by:

– establishing a democratic political system in line with the practices and standards of European democracy;

– guaranteeing human rights at the minimum level determined by relevant conventions and other international legal acts;
– the principle of parity of representation of peoples in the bodies of the Federal Republic of BiH;
– the principles of proportional representation of peoples in the bodies of the republics, cantons and municipalities;
– the principles of consensus among national groups in deciding on issues relevant to the equality of peoples and protection of national rights, to be applied in parliaments and governments of the Federal Republic of BiH, the republics, cantons and municipalities.

4. Principles of internal organisation and organisation of state bodies

The Federal Republic of BiH and its cantons (alt. republics) would base their internal organisation on the principles of:
– parliamentary democracy;
– republican organisation;
– division of government into legislative, judicial and executive;
– guaranteeing human rights and freedoms at the minimum level determined by relevant conventions and other international legal acts.

All acts violating these principles would be legally invalid irrespective of who passed them.

To perform the functions of the Federal Republic, as determined by constitutional principles, the following bodies of the Federal Republic would be formed:
– Federal Parliament;
– Federal Government;
– President of the Federal Republic (alternative: Presidency);
– Federal Ministries;
– Federal Courts.

**Federal Parliament**
The Federal Parliament would be comprised of two houses:
– the House of Citizens, and
– the House of Cantons.

The House of Citizens would have 160 representatives elected directly by secret ballot in electoral units formed for each canton.
The number of representatives per electoral unit would be determined proportionally with the population of the unit.

The Constitution and federal laws would determine the election system for the House of Citizens in more detail.

The House of Cantons would contain six representatives chosen by each cantonal parliament.

The Election system for the House of Cantons would be determined in more detail by the Constitution and federal laws.

Within the competences of the Federal Parliament, the House of Citizens and the House of Cantons would make independent or joint decisions (competences of the Houses to be defined by the constitutional principles, the Constitution and federal laws).

When the Federal Parliament votes on issues that, according to the constitutional principles, must be decided by consensus, the voting is conducted by forming four national groups of representatives (Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs, and a group with representatives of other peoples).

A consensus is reached when the majority of present representatives from each national group vote in favour of a decision.

**Federal Government**

The Federal Government comprises the President, three Vice-Presidents and a number of members (to be determined by the constitutional principles).

The President of the Federal Government is elected to a mandate of two (alt. one) years, according to a set order determined by the constitutional principles – so that this office is equally shared among members of all the peoples.

The Vice-Presidents of the Federal Government are elected in the same way.

The number of members of the Federal Government is determined so as to ensure parity.

Members of the Federal Government are chosen by the Parliament following a proposal by the President of the Federal Government.

The mandate of members of the Federal Government is four years.

To run the federal ministries, ministers are appointed from among the members of the Federal Government.

The Federal Government passes decisions by a majority vote, except on issues that must be decided by consensus, in line with the constitutional principles.
President of the Federal Republic

The President of the Federal Republic is elected by the Federal Parliament for a period of six months, in an order that ensures the sharing of this office among members of all the peoples.

The President of the Federal Republic is particularly responsible for the following: representing the Federal Republic at ceremonies in the country and abroad, receiving foreign heads of state during their visits to the Federal Republic, receiving letters of credence for foreign diplomatic representatives and performing other duties set out in the constitutional principles.

[Note: If the alternative of a Presidency of the Federal Republic were to be adopted, the constitutional principles would determine in more detail the composition, procedure for election and operation of the Presidency, but its functions would remain similar to those proposed for the President.]

Federal Ministries

The following ministries would be formed to perform duties within the competences of the Federal Republic, as determined by the constitutional principles:
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- Ministry of Justice and Administration;
- Ministry of Finances;
- Ministry for Reconstruction and Development;
- Ministry for Refugees and Displaced Persons.

The constitutional principles would define the position and competences of federal ministries in more detail.

Fundamentals of the Justice System

The justice system in the Federal Republic and the cantons would be based on the following principles:
- courts are independent and pass judgements based on the constitution and applicable laws;
- everyone is entitled to a trial at a regular court. Irregular or emergency courts may not be established;
- everyone is entitled to a chosen defence counsel in all phases of the proceedings;
only in exceptional cases as determined by law can the principle of public hearings be suspended;

the right of appeal against first instance court decisions cannot be withheld;

final judgements in civil matters are executed throughout the territory of the Federal Republic;

final judgements in criminal matters are executed throughout the territory of the Federal Republic if made on the basis of federal law.

Decisions in criminal matters must be made by a judicial council made up of at least three judges.
The request of the accused to have at least one judge on the council be a Bosniak, or a Croat, or a Serb, or a member of the group of other peoples must be granted.

Cantons may sign mutual extradition agreements.

Signing and implementing international agreements on extradition is exclusively within the competences of the Federal Republic.

The Federal Republic shall establish the highest instance courts:

the Supreme Court of the Federal Republic of BiH, functioning exclusively as an appeals court;

the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, deciding in constitutional disputes, and the highest judicial instance for the protection of human rights.

The judges in these courts are to be appointed by the Federal Parliament with strict adherence to the principle of national parity.

Constitutional principles, the constitution and the federal law determine in more detail the competences and organisation of federal courts, procedures for appointing judges, and other matters important for their operation.

5. Distribution of state functions and competences

The distribution of state functions and competences currently performed by bodies of RBiH would be determined by the principles of presumed competences of the cantons (in line with Variant A – pt. 2) or the republics (in line with Variant B – pt. 2).
The Federal Republic and its bodies would have only those functions and competences determined by the constitutional principles (restrictively), while all other state functions and competences would be determined in principles, without exhaustive lists, for the cantons or republics (depending on which variant is accepted).

The constitutional principles would also determine the obligation of the republics to transfer to cantons and municipalities those functions that are usually implemented on the regional or local level in democratic systems.

6. Maps

Starting from the above proposed solutions, as well as other elements (ethnic and economic aspects, communication links, natural entities, etc.) of importance for composing the appropriate political-territorial organisation, the attached maps denote areas and borders of cantons and republics (the maps were developed based on the variants in pt. 2).

[During the peace process, it would be useful to develop a textual description of boundaries to make up an integral part of the constitutional principles along with the corresponding precise maps.]

Based on the above concept, the constitutional principles would be developed in detail (with annexes and separate sections) and, if possible, formulated as norms.

With preceding or subsequent verification by the RBiH Parliament, this would ensure that the constitutional principles are a constitutional act and would for the most part be immediately applicable.

This would help avoid a constitutional vacuum from the adoption of the peace plan to the adoption of a new constitution.

Apart from this, precise normative formulations of the constitutional principles would enable introducing a clause to integrate the principles into the new constitution, and further development of the constitution would be possible only with respect to those issues determined by the constitutional principles.

This would exclude legal uncertainty and reduce room for possible obstruction in the interim period and in the procedure of adoption of a new constitution.

Note: While the concept of the constitutional principles is being developed, it would be necessary to revise previous documents on provisional arrangements and international guarantees, as well as the “military paper”, and propose solutions that would constitute a rounded and consistent peace plan.
HNV Map

This map was developed based on the principle that ensures the integrity of the state of BiH, while at the same time performing its decentralisation. This principle is contrary to those of all the previous plans on the constitutional and territorial organisation of BiH, from Cutileiro’s to the Owen-Stoltenberg plan. All these plans were leading to the dissolution and division of the state and incited war.

The HNV map represents a federal organisation of BiH and its decentralisation into cantons. This removes the main causes of the war – the fear of unitarisation felt by Serbs and Croats, and the fear of the dissolution of the state felt by the Muslims.

The cantonal organisation foresees the existence of the state of BiH within its internationally recognised borders, but also the national autonomy and security of each people through the federal units. Also, each people would have a certain number of cantonal units where it would constitute the majority population. Peoples that constitute minorities in these cantonal units would have their national equality guaranteed by the existence of the state of BiH and its institutions.

This organisation was acceptable when it came to signing the Owen-Stoltenberg plan of the Union of BiH. The cantonal organisation of the "republics" of the Union would preserve the preconditions for the state of BiH and its reintegration. It also enabled people to remain in their homes and for refugees and displaced persons to return, while abolishing the idea of relocating people and exchanging territories.

The HNV map shows that no single possible "republic" of the Union would have territorial continuity, and that their federal units are separated. This means that the "republics" do not constitute the nationalisation of territories, but are merely administrative units with certain state competences over the cantons.

Also, each "republic" would contain two cantons where another people would constitute the majority or a zone under special administration – the white zones on the map. Thus, the "Serb republic" would have cantons 2 and 14 with a Muslim majority, the "Croat republic" would have canton 6 with a Muslim majority and zone C (Neum) under special administration, the "Muslim republic" would have cantons 8 and 11 with a Croat and Serb majority. In every white zone, the majority people would retain a certain degree of autonomy and self-governance and could not be relocated from the "republic" in which another people constituted the majority.

The territory of BiH would be distributed among the republics in the following percentages: 31.66% to the Muslim, 48.46% to the Serb, 18.23% to the Croat republic. Zones under UN and EU administration (the yellow zones on the map) would constitute 1.65% of the territory – Sarajevo and Mostar.

By accepting the cantonal organisation of BiH and this territorial organisation, the war for territories would become superfluous.
### NATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION (PERCENTAGES – 1991 CENSUS) IN THE TERRITORIAL ORGANISATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA INTO CANTS

The view according to the principle 2+2+2--

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CANTONS WITH THE NATIONAL MAJORITY</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Serbs</th>
<th>Croats</th>
<th>Yugoslav</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cantons with Muslims majority</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Territorial unit 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Una</td>
<td>90.50</td>
<td>10.50</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>4.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Central Herzegovina</td>
<td>57.50</td>
<td>20.50</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>5.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Zenica–Doboj</td>
<td>57.29</td>
<td>20.79</td>
<td>15.98</td>
<td>6.64</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>5.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Zenica–Doboj</td>
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<td>14.72</td>
<td>9.90</td>
<td>7.13</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>5.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Sarajevo</td>
<td>60.77</td>
<td>22.64</td>
<td>10.96</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>5.72</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>31.66%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cantons with Serbs majority</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Drvar</td>
<td>10.30</td>
<td>86.30</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>6.35</td>
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<td>4 Banja Luka</td>
<td>15.76</td>
<td>64.03</td>
<td>10.50</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>15.16</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Semberija–Majevica</td>
<td>25.24</td>
<td>67.03</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>16.00</td>
<td>28.03</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.30</td>
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<td>16 Old Herzegovina</td>
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<td>63.58</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>48.46%</td>
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<td><strong>Cantons with Croats majority</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>5 West Herzegovina</td>
<td>9.71</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>81.75</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>11.40</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Posavina</td>
<td>13.48</td>
<td>32.83</td>
<td>46.17</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.17</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>18.23%</td>
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### CANTONS – WHITE ZONES

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>ZONES UNDER UN AND EU ADMINISTRATION</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Serbs</th>
<th>Croats</th>
<th>Yugoslav</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ZONE A Sarajevo (UN)</strong></td>
<td>1.38%</td>
<td>0.27%</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CANTON</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Serbs</th>
<th>Croats</th>
<th>Yugoslav</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 – Una</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 – Sarajevo</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 – Drvar</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
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<td>4 – Banja Luka</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 – West Herzegovina</td>
<td>16.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.25</td>
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<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 – Upper Vrbas</td>
<td>17.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 – Central Herzegovina</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 – Lašva – Lepenica</td>
<td>19.00</td>
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<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.25</td>
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<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 – Zenica – Dobo</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 – Tuzla</td>
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<td>7.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 – Ozren</td>
<td>22.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 – Podrinje</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 – Semberija – Majevica</td>
<td>24.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 – Romanija</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 – Old Herzegovina</td>
<td>26.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>27.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
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No.: 008/93

[official translation]

Greeting message from the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Alois Mock, to the Assembly of Croat Parliamentarians in Sarajevo (16 January 1994)

President Ivan Komšić visited me a while ago and informed me of this meeting that is to bring together Croat representatives in the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina who are in favour of the peaceful coexistence of all ethnic groups in this country, which is a member of the United Nations.

I am particularly glad to hear that representatives of the political and religious life, as well as leading scientists and intellectuals from Bosnia and Herzegovina are to enrich this event with their presence and interest.

Those who claim that peaceful coexistence in Bosnia and Herzegovina is impossible, despite the fact it has traditionally and repeatedly been confirmed in this very country, shall never be able to muster the enthusiasm for advancing the great feat of coexistence of the states and nations of Europe and the world.

The great sacrifices demanded and received from all the ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be cause for further opposition, hatred or animosity, but should indicate the need to work towards togetherness, as is the aim of your gathering.

Dr Alois Mock
Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Austria
**Bosnia and Herzegovina Cannot be Divided or Annexed**

It is our duty to inform the world and the European public that in Yugoslavia, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is no political power strong and influential enough to prevent further destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the transferring of bloody multinational conflicts to its grounds – said, among many things, to the general public in the memorandum of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croat intellectuals.

A group of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croat intellectuals assembled on August 17 of this year, in Sarajevo, and signed a memorandum saving Bosnia and Herzegovina. This non-political and informal group of prominent scholars and historians, publicists, writers, and journalists, raised their voices for integrity, against division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is evermore threatened by multinational conflicts, similar to those already undertaken in other parts of Yugoslavia.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>The Memorandum Signees</th>
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</table>

“It’s a tragic delusion, and a political construction, presented to the world and Europe, that only Serbia and the Serbian people can be identified with Yugoslavia and its interests. This delusion is grounded in other historical untruths, such as the fact that Yugoslavia was formed by Serbia and Montenegro, that the borders of the republics are artificial, that Slovenians and Croatians are non-historical and not interested in national collaboration (who are also the “lackeys” to Germans, Hungarians, and Italians), that Muslims and Macedonians are ‘artificial people,’ etc. This is how these people are presented to the world, and particularly the European public, and brought to an unequal position and discredited as historical subjects not only in the formation of the so-called first and second Yugoslavia, but also this third. Because of this, we today count the bones of innocent victims of fascist terror from half a century ago, with efforts to deprive the Croatian people of their worldly and European legitimacy since they are ‘genocidal’ and ‘fascist,’ as if all Yugoslavian and European peoples did not pay a heavy price for a mindless and degrading ideology. And while Serbian leaders attempt to determine the present from a disgraceful European past, and disintegrate it along those lines, they simultaneously wish to establish some nationalist ideas, like, for instance, that a single people (Serbian) must live in a single country, that Yugoslavia must be as they want it, or it will not exist at all, etc. Carrying out such political agenda includes the use of armed force, embodied in the Yugoslav National Army, or rather what remained of it after Tito. To make matters worse, army leaders actively and openly participate in the indoctrination of that politics. The horrible war in Croatia is a direct consequence of such politics.

The European political conscious should recognize the historical and political fact that all nations formed the old Yugoslavia equally and freely on Yugoslavian lands, and that the old Yugoslavia was undemocratic and unitarily monarchial, and that a new Yugoslavia was formed in a war against fascism which liberated all people, and subsequently formed the contemporary republics as federal units. Serbian leaders wish to establish a third Yugoslavia by contesting the sovereignty of others while keeping it for themselves, calling on the will of
Serbian people in other multi-ethnic republics while simultaneously negating the will of non-Serbian people in Serbia itself. With that, the leading idea of Serbian leadership is the fact that Yugoslavia will acquire its ‘proper’ boundaries with the amputation of Slovenia and Croatia (with Serbian territories within them, of course).

An Appeal to the International Public

The memorandum for saving Bosnia and Herzegovina was sent out to the highest international organizations and individuals. This document was received, among others, by: Péres de Cuéllar, the president of the United Nations, Václav Havel, George Conrad, the president of the international P.E.N. Club, The Helsinki Citizens Assembly, The Triad of the European Economic Union, the ministers of foreign affairs of Italy, Germany, Austria, France, the United States, and others. The memorandum was likewise sent to the highest officials of Yugoslavia, Stipe Mesić and Ante Marković, as well as to the officials of B&H, Alija Izetbegović and Momčilo Krajišnik, Jure Pelivan, and members of other B&H parties with officials in the Republic Parliament.

Such politics brings the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in a particularly difficult situation – in fact, it directly attempts to destroy it. Bosnia and Herzegovina, our only actual homeland, was formed during a long historical process, established on fertile lands between three world civilizations (western Christianity, Islam, and Byzantine Orthodoxy), and as a common living and geo-political space of three peoples – Croatian, Muslim, and Serbian. Such an eight-hundred-year continuity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its sovereignty and its borders, are disputed and negated. The Serbian National Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a direct exponent of Serbian politics, performed a nationalization of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the territories populated by Serbian people (not taking into account the Croatian and Muslim peoples living there) while forming para-national structures, authority, and institutions on those very territories. By blocking the presidency, the government, and the assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this party, through political pressure and overreaction, strives to realize a great Serbian idea of having all Serbian people living in a single country.

It is especially frightening to know that such politics is conducted in open support of the Yugoslavian Army, which maintains an added military pressure on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Additionally, the military leaders and authorities, and now even regional commanders, are flagrantly involved in the function of civil government, directing open threats their way and urging commitment to a single national side and a single political party. The Serbian National Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina takes this republic as its private property, as if it is not a socio-political entity, but a spatial unit in which other people can participate along firmly determined rules, or will otherwise be excluded. That complete non-democratic demonstration.

It is our duty to inform the world and European public that in Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina there is no political power strong and influential enough to prevent further destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the transferring of multinational conflicts to its grounds. The existing national parties are blocked among themselves, while the opposition remains un-unified and without actual influence on the government. That is why it would be indispensably urgent to spur all applicable international political mechanisms to maintain the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and with that to reduce the spreading of the military conflict between Serbia and Croatia on this multinational republic. Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be divided between Serbia and Croatia, nor be completely usurped by one or the other, without war. Its wholeness and its peace can only be preserved within the Yugoslavian union, which would be established on an international recognition of
all six republics, and in the case of a Yugoslavian collapse, an independent republic with complete neutrality towards the Serbo-Croatian conflict.

Only an urgent and active international approach to these questions, and a guarantee from the European and international union, can implant hope that a dangerous conflagration can be avoided, while Bosnia and Herzegovina delivered from its historically pluralistic identity.

We, the Bosnian and Herzegovinian intellectuals signing this memorandum, urge the individuals and institutions whom we direct this letter to, to begin the process with the sum of our collective strength, and thus help rescue our homeland Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In Sarajevo, August 18th 1991.
OPEN LETTER TO DR FRANJO TUĐMAN,
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

Mr Tuđman,

We are not sending this letter to "The Times" or the "Associated Press", which is where we found out about your views about us. Instead, we address the Croatian public and you personally.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is facing political disappearance, but its people did not have an opportunity to democratically have their say in the matter. A fact of relevance to you should be that the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina include 750,000 Croats dispersed throughout its territory.

We must underline that Bosnia and Herzegovina is facing the threat of political annihilation: anti-Bosnian forces within it and around it have usurped such rights and powers and there is no one to interfere with their intentions. To quote a bitter joke: God is too high up, Washington too far away, and Kadijević so very close. Whatever their differences, however vehement their mutual opposition, all these concepts share a common political intent – to destroy Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian-Herzegovinian government stands completely paralysed, already accustomed to watching all these acts to dissolve the Republic with "philosophical calmness".

Greater Serbian politics seeks to absorb the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina into Greater Serbia, which is still being passed off as the "new Yugoslavia", or to form a Serb republic within Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unfortunately, the implementation of both these plans is well underway in the form of new Yugoslav banknotes and in Belgrade's ceremony bearing the title "The Convention on the New Yugoslavia". All this is going on in the dark cold shadow of the previously executed military occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina that, since the reorganisation of the army on 3 January, has gained a formal framework. The army has founded a state for itself! It is well prepared to "defend" it, brutally and efficiently, from the people; we have no reason to doubt it since the criminal devastation of Croatia.

On top of this, there is your political "analysis" according to which the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina "may suit the long-term interests of all three peoples and the interests of stability in this part of Europe." With this statement, you have, once again, demonstrated your already established deafness and insensitivity to the real long-term interests of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and especially the Croat people. How will you explain to your
own political public, that you should be accountable to, why your views have suddenly come to perfectly correspond to the presumed interests of Milošević and Karadžić?! For they were, and remain, the most fervent advocates of the break-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina, primarily by repeated “generous” offers to have Western Herzegovina annexed to Croatia. Does this mean that you do not have a consistent policy of your own regarding a “lasting solution of Croat-Serb-Muslim relations,” but keep catching onto the tail-end of Greater Serbian initiatives, wanting to carve out a piece for yourself? If it is so, then it is incomprehensibly short-sighted and irresponsible in view of the real interests of the Croat and all other peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the real interests of the Republic of Croatia, on top of being indecent and immoral with respect to the Muslim people to whom your “elaboration” offers some sort of Muslim enclave in exchange for their centuries-old state and homeland.

Mr Tudman,

As free individuals, as Croats, as citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is no less Croat than Croatia, responsible before our history, our country, our people, our families, we can only publicly state the following:

– whoever sees in the political destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina any kind of interest of the Croat or any other people as well as a “condition for lasting peace”, knows very little about the interests of the Croat people and is politically irresponsible;

– whoever plans to subject the Muslim people in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the kind of policy currently being implemented with respect to the Croat people in Croatia, forfeits the right to represent the historical interests of the Croat people as a whole.

You may regain this right by doing everything in your power to support the integrity and international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the only solution in the long-term interest of all its peoples, including the Croat people.

Respectfully,

Sarajevo, 6 January 1992
(on the eve of the Epiphany)

Miljenko Jergović, author
Ivo Komšić, professor
Ivan Kordić, author
Ivan Loverenović, author
Mile Stojić, author
Many questions come from a past which has not yet passed; critical reconstruction of past experiences, important ideas emerging from history, in different space and time. These questions, key to human existence, are fully developed in this work by Ivo Komšić. That is why he focuses on life problems mediated by the threat of loss, alienation, perversion. Komšić is disappointed in familiar radicalisms, but is critical of modern capitalism and towards all philosophical and cultural dogma. He has awakened, in these modern times, Martin Heidegger’s existential analysis of Dasein, especially the linguistic stylization of existentialism, the concept of consciousness, responsibility, guilt, in the analysis of central ideas of Falling and alienation which Heidegger highlights in his famous “Letter to ‘Humanism,’” 1947.

The analysis of consciousness, responsibilities, and freedoms are very actual in Heidegger’s philosophy. Komšić reconstructs Heidegger’s contribution to the question of the being of Dasein, of historicity and temporality, of “the way of man’s Being-in-the-world,” of knowledge of action… which came from the conduct towards the self and the other. His analysis and characterization of Heidegger’s conceptual experience of life” is enlightening. Discussions on the contemporary philosophical theories would be more meaningful and fruitful if these contributions would be carefully considered.

Relying on the critique of “the pathology of reason,” on everything that accounts for progress and regress in Europe, Komšić analyses – reconstructing Max Weber – the question: “is a scientific historical knowledge possible, as scientific knowledge of history is possible with Weber?” The return to community, history, and social questions, according to Weber, introduces a way of differentiating the theoretical and methodological ways from possibility, above the dangers of naturalism and mere rationalism. The foundational notions of knowledge, law, morality and ethics, reflect the forms of action and understanding, which never suggest a loss of a mediated and expanded morality that is always, even in modernity, a sign of erosion of the mind, character, and trust.

Komšić, in this fascinating analysis of Kant’s philosophy, touches upon all problems: from theoretical knowledge to practical reason which “produces events,” to “moral law a priori”; all metaphysical and post-metaphysical questions, in their comprehensive forms of analysis and reflection, are found here.

It is then not surprising that it is also the foundational contribution to the critique of contemporary society, each and even that epistemological totalitarianism or populism. Precisely along the lines of an extremely important abundance of critical reconstruction of Kant’s philosophy, Komšić uncovers the creative power of mind. He avers that it would “have to be simultaneously theoretical and practical, both an understanding through theory and an understanding through action.”

Komšić introduces creative activity as regulative principle, as the power of critique, which understands the petrification of the structure of mind, perversion, especially in the modern world of globalization and liberal democracy. Under the influence of Kant and Hegel, Komšić develops his idea of power of mind, very differentiated, with knowledge not subject to doubt, that the mind itself, in its realness, “recognizes the loss of its reality and trace after a completely new form; reality has no power over them because its mind has disappeared.”

This understating power of mind eliminates both subjectivism and objectivism. But it enables: the proximity of theory, the constructive road to a past life that is possible in a single great discourse. Within the world crises, the crises of globalism, myth and market popularity, in a period in which culture, for the first time in history, is the “branch of commodity production.” That is the dialectic of discontinuity of mind. “More important is the idea that, in
that sense, the mind is a step out from the real – it is an act of mind for which the real is only support and encouragement.”

That is the starting point for the critical analysis of the foundational social, political, and moral situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, during and after the war. It is concentrated around the idea of war, aggression, political division, nationalism, which is a sign that extremely tragic things had occurred. It is all expressed from the viewpoint of a critical reconstruction of Kant’s philosophy, pure reason, liberty, and causality, Komšić analyses the foundations of human values, politics, morality, tradition, kinship, language, symbols.

That is why he is against de-missionizing reason and liberty, against very sinister fatalism and resignation. It illuminates – in tracks of Kant, Aristotle, Hegel, Weber – in strict analysis, which is not doxography and the notion of creative understanding that is “neither dogmatic nor utopian.” It is simultaneously the understanding and the activity of the new, its reality, as well as a request for the serious. “But already – with the critical reinterpretation of Hegel and Weber – it is faced with the idea of reason as universal forms of life, through extremely analytic of social and political difference. It does this in a dialogue with great western philosophers, so that it illuminates the contemporary history with the “dark times,” with which man looses his place in history.

Before us we have an incredibly valuable work, comprehensive, enlightening, innovative as an important contribution to contemporary philosophy and the theory of social institutions, the progress of rationalization even in “the direction of individualizing social values and moral norms.” With his philosophical analysis of social actors, the creative mind, the failure causality, with insights into human values that develop in cycles, returning to experience, with “the power of the creative mind,” Komšić, in his own originality, with a brilliant style (and we know, as far back as Nietzsche, that style is truth), he introduces a new scenario, “the theory of social pulsation,” keeps his critical distance for good, always with a “painful denunciation” of the dogmatic and petrified human improvement.

Prof. Dr. Abdulah Šarčević

In his book, Ivo Komšić offers a new notion of sociology by engaging in a dialogue with the most important political philosophers, beginning with Aristotle, through Kant, Hegel, and Marx, to Weber, Heidegger, Richard Rorty, John Rawls, Jurgen Habermas, and Charles Taylor. He begins by analyzing the difference between the theoretical and practical reason, while highlighting how the creative mind demonstrates that the new is not a continuity of the existing.

In the first pages of the book, Komšić illustrates the difference between the spiritual (social) sciences, in which we see how free will, contingency, and subjective ideas, influence historical practice. One extreme is to perceive history as a series of free wills without continuity and limited impact, while the other extreme is to perceive history as a continuum, a process in which all wills are integrated. The second extreme regards history as a natural process. It should be said that the historical process includes choice between multiple possibilities – choice and decision have the power to change the character of circumstance and change the constants into variables, and variables into constants. And so in Bosnia and Herzegovina, during this past war, what was a constant for national ideologists, was in fact a variable for the democratically oriented. Insofar as the conditions for realizing objectives –
which were appointed by nationalists – force, pressure, and crime, it is proof that those objectives are guilty and unsustainable. That manifests that the historical activity includes theoretical knowledge and moral judgment on whose foundations it would be possible to think and act. Komšić is particularly interested in how the new develops; he wishes to explore how it is possible to transcend the limits of the givens – that is, given realities – in historical activity.

That is why he suggests that the events in society must be interpreted not from consciousness and its intentionality, nor from ontological givens of social facts, but “from social practice that simultaneously constructs both the social actors and the social facts.” That is why sociology, which desires to understand the socio-historical reality of Bosnia and Herzegovina, must answer the how it came to the breakdown of the social and value structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, how did the mechanisms that move and maintain society lose their power, as well as how did the destruction of the social and value structure become the basic social structure. For understanding social events in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Komšić offers new concepts, such as social pulsation, subjectivity, action, social actor, individuation, self-consciousness, society, and social causality. He thus attempts to overcome the existing dichotomy in social exploration which understood its subject from a single causality: either from the social structure or from the social actors. That is why he offers the concept of transferable causality, in which the cause is transferred from the social structure to social actors, and vice versa, and the cause of opinion its place in society, its direction and intensity of action. Social actors are the social pulsators, which applies to not only individuals, but for individuals and the entire society.

Prof. Dr. Mile Babić

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